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SUMMARY 
The prevailing South African Constitutional order is defined in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa as a sovereign constitutional 
democracy. Freedom of access to government held information by the public is a 
fundamental and indispensable tenet of a sovereign constitutional democracy. 
The essential link between the two is recognized by the South African 
Constitution which guarantees the right to freedom of information as a 
fundamental human right. 
The Constitution simultaneously recognizes that all rights, including the 
right to freedom of information, may be subject to limitation. However any such 
limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
The right to freedom of information is subject to often severe limitations in 
the arena of national security matters on the ground that the need for secrecy in 
this arena is self-evident. The limitation of the right may be necessary, but must,. 
as in the case of all other limitations, be reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society. A comparative overview of most notably the United States 
of America, a stable and mature sovereign constitutional democracy, reveals that 
it, in the practical application of the limitation of the right to freedom of 
information in the arena of national security does not follow through on its 
commitment to democratic values. 
In the practical application of the limitation, the United States may be 
accused of failing to meet the standards required by a sovereign constitutional 
democracy in the extent of power it affords the unaccountable executive branch 
of government over the control and dissemination of information in the arena of 
national security. More specifically, in the power it affords this branch to define 
national security. And further, in its failure to hold this branch accountable for 
decisions made in this regard. 
This lack of accountability may be attributed to a conservative judiciary 
which as a matter of course defers to the executive and a failure on the part of the 
legislature to legislate alternative methods of accountability. 
The question for South Africa is whether it having Constitutionally 
entrenched the right to freedom of information, will be able, in contrast to the 
United States, to maintain democratic standards in the practical implementation 
of the limitation of the right to freedom of information in the arena of national 
security. 
























will not be able to maintain the necessary standards, without engaging in some 
fundamental changes. Primarily because of traditional arid entrenched judicial 
and public attitudes as well as because of the extensive power afforded the 
executive branch in respect of control of information in the arena of national 
security and over the definition of national security. 
The solution lies in a pro-active legislative programme designed to give 
effect to the right to freedom of information. Any such programme must actively 
limit the extent of discretionary power afforded the executive branch and where 
such power is necessary, make it subject to substantive review, in other words 
must enable one to hold the executive accountable for its decisions. 
One of the primary tools for achieving this is by way of freedom of 
information legislation. Such legislation must expressly, and in sufficient detail, 
regulate exemptions to the right in such a manner as to make the successful 
invocation of such an exemption dependant on whether it is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society. Further, any allegation of 
reasonableness and justifiability must be open to public scrutiny in a manner 
which would not jeopardize legitimate secrets. 
The balancing of the competing interests poses a very real dilemma for any 
democratic society. This dilemma can however to a large extent be resolved by a 
change in judicial and public attitudes and legislative activism. Th,e process of 
change has commenced in South Africa. This is evidenced in the Constitutional 
terms and tone as well as in a number of legislative initiatives to change existing 
national security laws and to introduce new laws such as the current Open 
Democracy Bill. 























TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction 
Chapter One: The Constitutional Framework 
I.I Freedom Of Information: An Essential Component Of 
A Sovereign and Democratic State 
1.2 The Past Constitutional Order 
1.3 The Traditional Classical Liberal Democratic Paradigm 
1.4 The Minimalist State 
1.5 The Public/Private Divide 
1.6 The Minimalist State, Sovereignty, Representative 
Democracy and the Separation of Powers 
1.7 Is Access to Government Held Information a Fundamental 
Tenet of the Classical Liberal Democratic Tradition? 
Chapter Two: Democracy And The Modern Administrative State 
2 .1 The Administrative State and Representative Democracy 
2. 2 The Threats Posed By Secrecy 
Chapter Three: The Modern Administrative State, Democracy 
And Freedom Of Information 



















I 3.2 Recognition of the Need.For and Implementation of a Paradigm Shift 41 
I 3.3 Canada and New Zealand 42 
I 3.4 The United States 42 
I 3.5 Australia 42 
3.6 Evaluation 47 
I 3.7 Dahl's Thesis 49 
I 3.8 Dahl's Polyarchy 49 
I 3.9 Do the American and Australian Systems Comply 
with the Five Ideal Standards of a Democratic Process 
I in Relation to the Demos ? 51 
I Chapter Four: Freedom of Information And The National 
Security Exemption 54 
I 4.1 Democracy and National Security 55 
I 4.2 The United States - Freedom of Information, Democracy and 
National Security 57 
I 4.3 The National Security Exemption in the United States 57 
I 4.4 The Application of the National Security Exemption 
to Freedom of Information 58 
I 
4.5 The Executive's Control of National Security Information 60 
I 4.6 Judicial Constraints on the Executive Exercise of Control 
of National Security Information 65 
I 


























4.8 Australia-Freedom of Information and the National Security 
Exemption 
Chapter Five: Democracy, Freedom of Information and 
the 'National Security' Exemption 
5.1 The Compatibility OfNational Security Secrecy Practices 
and Democracy 
5.2 The (in)Compatibility OfNational Security Secrecy Practices and 
Democracy 
5 .3 The Dangers Of Secrecy Inhering In The National Security 
Exemptions-For Democracy.And Good Government 
5.4 Responses To Proponents Of The Compatibility Of The American 
And Australian National Security Exemptions To The Right 
To Freedom Of Information And Democracy 
5.5 Non - judicial Safeguards Against Abuse Of The Power To Withhold 
Information In The Interests Of National Security 
Chapter Six: The Nature And Extent Of The Incompatibility Of 
Democracy And The National Security Exemption 
To The Right Of Access To Information 
6.1 The National Security Exemption and Carl Schmitt's Decisionist 
Theory of Sovereignty 
6.2 Carl Schmitt's Theory of the State, the Political and Sovereignty 
6.3 The Problem of Sovereignty and the National Security Exemption 
in Perspective - The Product of the Liberal Democratic Public/ 
Private Divide 
6.4 National Security, Sovereignty, The Public/Private Divide and 




































Chapter Seven: Reconciling The Irreconcilable: National Security, 
Freedom of Information and Democracy - Final 
Control of the Agenda 
7 .1 Rendering The National Security Exemption Compatible With The 
Democratic Requirement Of Final Control Of The Agenda-
Proposed Solutions 
Chapter Eight: Democracy, Freedom Of Information And The 
National Security Exemptions In South Africa 
8.1 Freedom of Information and Democracy: The Interim and 1996 
Constitutions of The Republic of South Africa - Recognition Of The 
Need For, And The Implementation Of, A paradigm Shift 
8.2 Freedom of Information-An Essential Feature Of The South African 
Sovereign Democratic Constitutional State 
8.3 Limitations On The Right To Freedom _Of Information -A 
Constitutional Perspective 
8.4 Limitations Of The Right Of Access To State-Held Information 
In The Interests OfNational Security- Constitutional Prescriptions 
8.5 Limitations Of The Constitutional Right Of Access To State-Held 
Information In The Interests of National Security: A Prognosis -
Is The Fate Of The Constitution To Be A "Smoke Screen For 
Business As Usual - Secretly"? 
8.6 Defining National Security In South Africa 
8.7 Current Practice -The executive's Power To Define National 
Security In South Africa 
8.8 Reconciling The Right To Freedom Of Information And The 
Interests ofNational Security In South Africa- Recognition Of 



































8.9 Evaluation Of The Open Democracy Bill's 'National Security' 
Exemption 
8.10 Some Concluding Points 

























This week a Pretoria magistrate ... , ordered that evidence heard at the bail 
application of [a] drug suspect... should be held in secret. This followed an 
application from the state prosecutor who had raised concerns about "national 
security". No evidence was lead as to why national security would be 
endangered by an open hearing. And,the magistrate offered no reasons for his 
peremptory order .1 
A brief glance at the reference footnote will reveal that this is an extract from 
an editorial comment penned, not in 1987 but 1997. The Sunday Times together 
with Business Day and the Freedom of Expression Institute were forced to make 
application to the High Court for an order compelling the lifting of the ban. They 
were partially successful in that the rest of the bail hearing was heard in open court. 
However, transcripts of the cross examination of the accused remained under wraps. 
This necessitated a further application to the High Court, compelling the release of 
that evidence to the public. 
This incident raises a host of issues, in particular: 
• The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa guarantees 
accountability and transparency, and in giving effect to this guarantee, 
enshrines the right to access to state-held information as well as the 
right to reasons for decisions. Why then are decisions such as the 
aforementioned being made? 
• It is not only the denial of access to information which is cause for 
concern. More pertinently, this denial was ordered in the absence of 
reasoned argument which is indicative of an essentially slavish 
deference to: 
• The untested opinion of an unaccountable state official; and 
• national security. 
• The magistrate's deference to the prosecutor's submission that 

























disclosure would be contrary to the interests of national security in the 
absence of argument on the point is contrary to the fundamental role 
of the adjudicator. Unfortunately however, the deference exhibited 
does not constitute a unique precedent. Our legal history is fraught 
with instances of unquestioning deference to the executive in the 
interests of national security. Although much of that legal history pre-
dates the Interim and 1996 Constitutions. 
This particular instance of deference is significant in that the subject 
matter of the criminal proceedings at hand related to narcotics - which 
is not a subject one would automatically equate with national security 
as traditionally understood. The danger posed to freedom of state-held 
information in the arena of national security is therefore multi-layered. 
The failure to demand argument as to why the subject matter at hand 
constituted a national security issue raises the alarming specter of 
unquestioning deference to an ever expanding construct of national 
security, a construct with no definable boundaries. 
The actions, or more specifically, the inaction and resultant decision of 
the magistrate, are indicative of an attitude that issues pertaining to 
national security are non- justiciable - an attitude that does not sit 
comfortably in a constitutional democracy, especially one made subject 
to a justiciable Bill of Rights which includes the right of access to 
information. 
• The opponents of the state's position in this matter questioned the 
decision and the attitude underlying it and were partially successful. 
Admittedly their application and limited success would have been 
inhibited from the outset prior to the enactment of South Africa's new 
Constitution. However, their partial success was achieved only after 
the expenditure of a great deal of time and money. 
The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa embodies a number 
of supreme governing principles, adherence to which is a prerequisite for achieving 
the overarching objective of a constitutional democratic dispensation. These 
principles include, inter alia, a transparent and accountable government which self-
evidently require the public to have access to government-held information as well 























One may summarise the issues raised and opinions expressed in the Sunday 
Times editorial as a concern that these principles, exalted as fundamental human 
rights, were disregarded and violated by the actions of the prosecutor and the 
subsequent decision by the magistrate - all in the name of 'national security.' 
The editorial concludes with the following statement which reflects these 
sentiments: 
Our experience this week convinces us yet again that the instinct for secrecy 
and suppression of debate is as strong now as it ever was - whether from 
state officials, politicians or businessmen who believe they are too exalted for 
public scrutiny. 
Our Constitution embodies the principles of transparency. Our democracy 
is founded on it. It is rarely comfortable for those under the spotlight and it 
often greatly complicates life. 
But we either commit ourselves to it or admit the high-flown rhetoric of 
the Constitution is merely a smoke screen for business as usual - secretly. 
The subject matter of this thesis arises from the need to address concerns 
similar to those expressed in the Sunday Times editorial. In essence, this thesis seeks 
to address the underlying concern that South Africa may, despite its overt 
constitutional commitment to democracy, succumb to undemocratic information 
practices in the arena of national security, as has occurred in foreign jurisdictions, 
such as the United States. 
As I will demonstrate in the course of this thesis, the United States is, despite 
its developed administrative legal system and firm institutionalised commitment to 
democracy and freedom of information, guilty of failing to maintain democratically 
acceptable information practices in the face of alleged national security interests. 
This raises the following question. Will South Africa succeed, where systems 
such as those of the United States have failed in averting the threat posed to freedom 
of information and hence democracy by the interests of national security? This 
question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that South Africa, unlike 
the United States, is a fledgling democratic society characterised by instability, high 
crime rates and extreme poverty, all of which increase the risk of succumbing to this 
threat. 
The South African Constitution has in contrast to other constitutions, 
expressed and entrenched a far wider range of democratic principles and 
complementary rights, such as the right to freedom of information, reasons for a 























the state to promote and respect these rights and principles in the face of the 
entrenched Herculean strength of national security? 
It will be argued during the course of this thesis that should the South African 
system succumb to undemocratic information tendencies in the arena of national 
security, the end result will be a general emasculation of the Constitution and the 
protection afforded by it. It will effectively be reduced to nothing more than "a 
smoke screen for business as usual - secretly". 
In turning to the magistrate's decision, the prognosis for the South African 
system is not positive. The decision, made a mere eight months after the adoption 
of the 1996 Constitution, compels one to conclude that on the face of it, 
constitutional democracy in South Africa is faced with a significant threat in the 
guise of denial of access to information in the arena of national security. 
The threat posed by denial of access to information in the interests of national 
security to our constitutional democracy is both fundamental and immense. The 
immensity and fundamental nature of the threat is revealed in the apparent ease with 
which the magistrate not only deferred to national security, but so deferred in the 
context of a criminal hearing, the subject matter of which one would not 
traditionally regard as falling within the parameters of national security. What is 
more, he did so at the behest of a criminal prosecutor who once again would not 
traditionally be regarded as a spokesperson for and arbiter in respect of what is and 
what is not in the interests of national security. 
This raises the significant question of the fluidity and indeterminacy of the 
boundaries of national security, which ifleft unchecked could become monolithic 
in size at the behest of unaccountable officials. Should a precedent of secrecy in 
the ever expanding realm of national security be entrenched, the danger becomes 
obvious - an incremental malignant encroachment on, and deprivation of, the 
right to access to information and a disregard for the principles of accountability 
and transparency. 
In the following chapters I will show that there is an essential link between 
freedom of information and democracy, and that democracy is predicated on an 
unfaltering acceptance and respect of the public's right of access to information. 
This co-dependency accordingly implies that an unjustified denial of access to 
information in the arena of national security is tantamount to a denial of democracy. 
Should this fundamental threat posed by secrecy practices in the arena of national 
security not be recognised and curtailed, it will undermine and erode that which 
South Africans have fought for: 
























..... a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will 
of the people and every citizen is equally protected by the law. 2 
*** 
























THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Opponents of the pre-1993 South African order rejected its inhumane policies 
and practices under the umbrella criticism that they were undemocratic. The desire 
to create a new diametrically opposed democratic order culminated in the drafting 
of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The preamble to this 
document unequivocally articulates the desired objective: 
In humble submission to Almighty God, 
We, the people of South Africa, declare that-
Whereas there is, a need to create a new order in which all South Africans 
will be entitled to a common South African citizenship in a sovereign and 
democratic constitutional state in which there is equality ..... so that all citizens 
shall be able to enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms. 
And whereas in order to secure the achievement of this goal, elected 
representatives of all the people of South Africa should be mandated to adopt 
a new Constitution in accordance with a solemn pact recorded as 
Constitutional Principles. 1 
The Preamble, in introducing the document marking a fundamental turning 
point in South African history, not only rejects the past dispensation, but also 
identifies the goals and aspirations of the new order. These goals and aspirations are 
summed up by the label given to the new order: a Sovereign and Democratic 
Constitutional State. 
The extent of the commitment to achieving the goal of a sovereign and 
democratic constitutional state is expressed in the 1993 Constitution's recognition 
that it is but an interim one. The codification of the transitory status of the Interim 
Constitution was necessitated by the fact that the process culminating in its creation 
was undemocratic. 
The overarching commitment to democracy dictated the demise of the 
Constitution. Its demise, anticipated in its preamble would occur upon the adoption, 
by democratically elected representatives, of a final Constitution designed to achieve 
the objectives of a sovereign and democratic constitutional state. 























interim nature of the Constitution, but also in the simultaneous entrenchment in the 
Interim Constitution of certain constitutional principles which underpin a sovereign 
and democratic constitutional state, beyond the life span of the Interim Constitution. 
The commitment to these principles is alluded to in the Preamble which states 
that elected representatives 'should be mandated to adopt a new Constitution in 
accordance with a solemn pact recorded as Constitutional Principles'. These 
principles are then rendered unalterable and non-negotiable in clause 71 ( 1 )(a) which 
states that: 
A new constitution shall-
(a) comply with the Constitutional Principles contained in Schedule 4. 
The Schedule 4 principles constitute a template of the essential criteria for a 
sovereign and democratic constitutional state, as perceived by the drafters. These 
criteria include supremacy of the constitution, universal suffrage, a bill of rights, 
equality before the law, the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, a 
representative democratically elected government and the rule of law. 
Most notably, for the purpose of this thesis, the Constitutional Principles 
expressly include, alongside these quintessential democratic features, freedom of 
information. 
Principle 1 X states that: 
Provision shall be made for freedom of information so that there can be open 
and accountable administration all levels of government. 
This recognition of freedom of information as a fundamental tenet of a 
sovereign constitutional democratic state is not unique to the South African order. 
It has been recognised as such in many jurisdictions. However, the express 
affirmation thereof: by recognising and entrenching it as a constitutional principle, 
is relatively unique. This incontrovertible affirmation is given practical effect by the 
elevation, in both the Interim and 1996 Constitution, of the right of access to 
information as a justiciable fundamental human right.3 






















1.1 Freedom Of Information: An Essential Component Of a Sovereign 
and Democratic Constitutional State 
8 
An explanation of the proposition that public access to government-held 
information is a fundamental tenet of a sovereign constitutional democracy requires 
an analysis of each of its constitutive components. Through this unpacking one can 
identify the role played by, and the significance of information in relation to each. 
This analysis will provide not only the answer to the why, but also to the what. By 
positing the enquiry into access to information within this framework, one is 
provided with an avenue for exploring the content and ambit of the right to access 
to information in relation to its role and capacity for fulfilling the objectives aspired 
to in the adoption of a sovereign constitutional democracy. 
An analysis of the component parts of a sovereign constitutional democracy 
is complicated by the diversity of opinion as to their meaning. The only common 
point amidst this diversity is the agreement that there is no singular definition or 
meaning of each. The task at hand will involve an exploration of the various theories 
ascribed to each and identify that theory which coincides with objectives sought to 
be achieved by the drafters of the constitution. The final choice shall then in tum 
inform the content and ambit of the right to access to government held information. 
Etienne Mureneik argued that the interpretation of the Interim Constitution 
required the prior step of establishing 'what it is a bridge from, and what it is a 
bridge to' 4. His advice is appropriate in respect of both the Interim as well the Final 
Constitutions. lt is appropriate as they are both essentially the product of protracted 
efforts and desires to fundamentally change and eschew the past order. The 
decisiveness of this break with the past order is reflective of a desire to move to an 
order which represents the antithesis of the preceding order, one which attempts to 
prevent and prohibit practices of the past order. By identifying the prior 
objectionable features and practices, one can with a greater degree of certainty 
identify current objectives. An assessment of the potential for, and ability of, a 
sovereign constitutional democracy to achieve these objectives will provide a 
springboard to identifying the meaning and import of the component parts of the 
chosen dispensation, and the relevance of information in relation thereto. 
I propose to provide a brief overview of the past constitutional order and 
identify those aspects of it which the current dispensation has sought to terminate. 
In the process of examining why they have been rejected, a framework of current 
objectives will be revealed. In examining these objectives within the context of the 























desired dispensation, it will become apparent that that access to information is as 
vital to the achievements of these objectives as secrecy was to the success of the past 
regrme. 
1.2 The Past Constitutional Order 
The pre-1993 government's roots were founded in what may loosely be 
termed the classical liberal democratic tradition. This tradition is defined by a 
number of central institutions and practices, including the right to vote, 
parliamentary sovereignty, the separation of powers and the rule oflaw. 
The pre-1993 government substantiated its claims to democracy by stressing 
its alleged adoption of and compliance with these institutions and practices. 
1.3 The Traditional Classical Liberal Democratic Paradigm 
The classical liberal democratic tradition and its attendant institutions and 
practices were fundamentally informed and defined by its conceptualisation of the 
state. The state in terms of this tradition is essentially equated with the government 
of the day and is perceived in minimalist terms in relation to the comparatively 
elevated status of the individual, who as a collective unit reigns supreme. 
The emphasis on the supremacy of the individual ( as opposed to the state) 
translated for the liberal democrat into the need for a democratic society, which may 
simply be phrased as 'rule by the people'. The impracticality of the literal 
application of such rule resulted in the acceptance of government/the state as a 
necessary evil. The apparent contradiction and inherent tension residing in the 
simultaneous need for "rule by the people" on the one hand and on the other, 
recognition of the state and its power to govern, was accommodated within the 
Social Contract theory, which Phillips sums up as follows: 
Civil society was formed through a social contract. With a sharp eye to what 
most served their private interests, individuals came to see political order as 
necessary to let them get on with their lives; but it was this consent, and only 
this consent, that gave governments the right to rule. 5 
The theory of government by consent served to legitimate recognition of an 
external government vis-a-vis "the people" and its exercise of power in relation to 























them. This theory, informed as it was by the pre-eminence of the individual, 
presupposed a distrust of power in the hands of government. Pursuit of democratic 
ideals and objectives dictated constant scrutiny of government to permit early 
detection and avoidance of misuse or abuse of that power at the expense of "the 
people". 
The ambivalent recognition of the need for government and simultaneous 
distrust thereof was the progenitor of a number of perceptions, institutions and 
practices which characterise traditional liberal democracies. These include the 
minimalist state as located within the divisive public-private template, representative 
democracy, parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of law and the separation of powers. 
These conventions, founded as they were on the same objectives of the 
limitation, control and checking of government power, drew upon each other in the 
course of their development and refinement in such a manner so as to create a 
political order characterised by conceptual fluidity. It is fluid in the sense that each 
depends on the other for effect, and to some extent, substance. The result has been 
a doctrinal blurring in that one cannot be defined and discussed without invoking 
the other. 
1.4 The Minimalist State 
The most central and definitive of these conventions is the traditional 
perception of the state which is founded on the fundamental traditional liberal 
emphasis on the individual, liberty of the individual and the protection of that liberty 
at all costs - even at the cost of recognising the state and affording it the power to 
protect those liberties. 
Recognition of the state and recognition of its power to protect those liberties 
was inherently contradictory and threatening to the fullest possible enjoyment, by 
the individual, of those liberties. It was recognised that the protection of liberty 
required the simultaneous curtailment of the exercise of liberty. Despite the 
traditional liberal emphasis on liberty or freedom and the importance thereof, the 
traditional political philosophers such as Locke, Hobbes and Bentham all agreed that 
absolute freedom in the sense of a complete lack of fettering of action would 
inevitably result in social chaos and the deprivation in any event of the minimal 
needs, rights and liberty of many. 
This recognition that all individuals are entitled to a minimum of freedom 
required institutional restraints and regulation of the exercise of that freedom, if 























the freedom of another. 6 
The power to curtail the freedom of the individual was located in the state. 
Consequently recognition of the state and its power posed an inherent risk to the 
fundamental precept of the desired society, but was simultaneously recognised as 
essential to the continued existence of that society. 
However, the desire and perceived need to minimise that risk engendered a 
very particular view of the state - the minimalist state, contained by the 
ideologically constructed chasm between "The Public" and "The Private". 
1.5 The Public/Private Dfvide 
The extent·of the state's power over its subjects was inherently curtailed by 
the assumption that: 
... there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom which 
must on no account be violated, for if it is overstepped, the individual will 
find himself in an area too narrow for even that minimum development of his 
natural faculties which alone makes it possible to pursue, and even to 
conceive, the various ends which men hold good or sacred. It follows that a 
frontier must be drawn between the area of private life and that of public 
authority. 7 
The end result was a recognition of the state, limited however in its functions 
by the public/private divide. The recognition, legitimacy and role of the state was 
confined to the realm of the public:-
.. the public-political domain, the reserve of state/government with its external 
and internal concerns: diplomacy, warfare, law enforcement and·a minimum 
amount of organised charity. "8 
It was believed that this divide preserved the integrity of the essence of 
freedom of the individual, which in terms of this tradition was pre-eminently 
defined as , liberty from interference by the state beyond the shifting, but always 
recognisable, public frontier. Consequently, the state was reduced to what Lasalle 
6 Berlin, I "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Liberalism and its Critics (Ed) M Sandel, 1984, p20 
7 Berlin, I, op cit, p 17 























contemptuously described as the functions of a nightwatchman or traffic policeman. 9 
The formal limited role of the "night-watchman" state of classical liberal 
theory was "limited to the functions of protecting all its citizens against violence, 
theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of contracts, and so on10", but was 
precluded from intruding or regulating what may be referred to as the social and 
economic dimensions of society. 
The public/private divide and the strict harnessing of the state's activity to the 
realm of the public formed the theoretical basis for development of the particular 
concept of state and government and dictated the nature, form and content of 
political institutions designed to limit the role of the state to its assigned political 
role. 
1.6 The Minimalist State, Sovereignty, Representative Democracy and 
the Separation of Powers 
G D H Cole in his introduction to Jean Jacques Rousseau's The Social 
Contract - Discourses, identifes the Sovereign of political philosophy, as: 
.. that body in a society in which formal political authority ought always to 
reside, and in which the right to such authority does always reside. 11 
In terms of Rousseau's theory of Sovereignty, which has informed traditional 
democratic philosophy, that sovereign body in a democracy is "the people". 
Sovereignty of "the people", being one of the foundational precepts of classical 
liberal theory, meant that recognition of the minimalist state did not amount to 
recognition of government as sovereign. The state was recognised merely as a tool, 
subject at all times to the true sovereign- "the people". 
Cole summarises Rousseau's thesis as follows: 
Sovereignty ... is in Rousseau's view absolute, unalienable, and indivisible. It 
cannot be limited, abandoned, or shared save among a number of equals. It 
is an essential part of all legitimate social existence that the right to control the 
destinies of the society shall belong, in the last re~ort, to the whole people. 
The legislative power, or Sovereign, is always supreme, the executive or 
9 Berlin, I, op cit, pp 19-20 
10 Nozick, R, "Moral Constraints and Distributive Justice" in Liberalism and its Critics, (Ed) M Sandel, 1984, 
r100 























government, always subordinate and derivative ..... The government's function 
is merely to carry out the decrees, or acts of will, of the Sovereign people ..... In 
delegating the powers necessary for the execution of its will, it is abandoning 
none of the supreme authority. It remains sovereign, and can at any moment 
recall the grants it has made. Government, therefore, exists only at the 
Sovereign pleasure, and is always revocable by the sovereign will. 12 
Rousseau's terminology moves from "the people' to that of"the General Will" 
which represents the people as a whole, as a body politic, in whom sovereignty 
resides. 
The transformation from a collection of disparate individuals to that of the 
body politic is by consent of the people, who in consenting become "signatories" 
to the Social Contract - the fundamental basis of political society and justification 
for government/state in the presence of an unerring commitment to liberty of the 
individual. 
Rousseau explains the Social Contract as follows: 
Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme 
direction of the general will, and in our corporate capacity, we receive each 
member as an indivisible part of the whole. 
At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, 
this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as 
many members as the assembly contains voters, and receiving from this act 
its unity, its common identity, its life, and its will. This public person, so 
formed by the union of all other persons ...... now take [the name] of Republic 
or body politic; it is called by its members State when passive, Sovereign, 
when active, and power when compared with others like itself. Those who 
are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are 
called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being 
under the laws of the state. 13 
And ultimately, the "signatories" to the social contract willingly consent 
thereto and participate therein because: 
12 JJ Rousseau, op cit pp xxl-2 























The social treaty has as its end the preservation of the contracting parties. 14 
As pointed out by Phillips in The Classic Debates15, a direct and literal 
application of Rousseau's theory of sovereignty would require something akin to the 
Athenian model of 2 millennia ago. The citizens of Athens would meet 40 times a 
year to consider and decide issues of state. Of the full quorum of 6000, a council of 
500 were chosen to formulate policy proposals. These members then each in turn 
served on the committee of fifty, the presidency of which was held by one individual 
for only one day. 
Clearly modern society could not and cannot sustain anything remotely 
similar to the aforesaid model and the stringent requirements of its citizens to devote 
themselves to management of the state. 
The continuing commitment to locating sovereignty in the people whilst 
simultaneously ensuring constructive governance was and is apparently, in the 
liberal democratic tradition, resolved in the institution of representative democracy, 
premised on the delegation of the sovereign power by consent of the people. The 
theory of representation itself is formulated in such a way as to inherently limit the 
abuse of any power so delegated, and is supplemented in this regard by a theory of 
accountability premised on parliamentary sovereignty, the separation of powers and 
the rule of law. 
The theoretical framework and justification for representative democracy is 
succinctly summarised by Hirst as follows: 16 
Political authority is presented as a delegated power brought into existence by 
the expressed will of the people ... The ultimate sovereign power must be given 
expression in some representative body to which that power is delegated. The 
national assembly or parliament is 'sovereign' because it expresses the 
delegated power of the people and it is legitimately so because it is 
'representative' of the people's will. The assembly or parliament is a 
sovereign legislature that makes laws to take the form of universally 
applicable general rules, which single out or disadvantage no individual 
citizen or group of citizens. The assembly then delegates a portion of its own 
power to an administrative apparatus in order to give execution to and to 
enforce these laws. The executive portion of the democratic government is 
answerable to the legislative assembly or to the judiciary as interpreters and 
14 JJ Rousseau, op cit p 27 
........___i15 A Phillips, op cit p23-24 
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guardians of the law. The sovereign will of the people expressed through the 
assembly and its laws will infringe the basic liberties of none of the citizens 
because these laws are universally applicable to all, and the people as a whole 
will not consent to the infringe those inalienable rights which they each 
possess as individuals. The delegated power of execution and enforcement 
must put the legislation into effect sine ira et studio, therefore, it cannot 
damage the liberties of the law-abiding. If the executive act in an arbitrary or 
partial way then it will be called to account to the assembly. 
Representation guarantees that the legislature experiences the will of the 
people, who cannot wish to harm themselves, and the doctrine of the 
answerability of the executive to the legislature ensures that the delegated 
power of government is not abused. Democracy and the rule of law are thus 
fully compatible. 
It is this framework which informed many modem democracies, including 
to a great extent the pre 1993 South African constitutional order. 
1. 7 Is Access to Government Held Information a Fundamental Tenet of the 
Classical Liberal Democratic Tradition? 
In The Darker Reaches of Government, Anthony Matthew's asks whether 
democracy demands that citizens have access to information regarding the executive 
branch of government, i.e. whether the executive arm should be subject to the 
scrutiny of the general public as is judicial and legislative activity. 17 
Proponents of secrecy and limited access to government information would 
answer this question in the negative and affirm that democracy can continue and 
even flourish unhindered in the absence of public access to information in respect 
of the activities of the executive branch of government. 
These arguments in favour of government secrecy and consequential 
limitation of public access to government held information share a common theme, 
namely the justification of functionalism. 
The proponents argue that such access is in fact undesirable because it 
impedes effective administration in that it serves to weaken the executive and their 
ability to 'deliver the goods'. This they argue is especially true in the modem state 
which regulates and operates in a technically sophisticated society which is further 
characterised by a scarcity of resources. The complexity and detail of modem 























welfare and management operations require expertly qualified and objective 
administrators to implement them unhindered by the scrutiny of the masses or 
judiciary, who by definition are ill equipped and unqualified to make sense of or 
pass · dgement on the actions of the administrators. 
Writers such as Walter Lip_rman argue that public interests can be managed 
only by a specia1ised class and that: 
This class is irresponsible for its acts upon information that is not common 
property, in situations that the public at large does not conceive, and it can be 
held to account only on the accomplished fact. 18 
It is further argued that should the general public be permitted access to this 
information to which it is not entitled by virtue of its lack of expertise, the executive 
branch would be emasculated in its ability to deliver efficient and effective services 
as the machinery of government would grind to a halt. 
This sentiment is strongly expressed by Lippman in the following statement: 
Where mass opinion dominates government, there is a morbid derangement 
of the functions of power. This derangement brings about the enfeeblement, 
verging on paralysis, of the capacity to govern. 19 
Comments such as these and the broader justifications for denial of access to 
information and scrutiny of the executive functioning are mirrored to a large extent 
in the arguments put forward by Michel J Crozier, Samuel P Huntington and Joji 
Watanuki. They advocate a moderation of democracy as the cure for 'the problems 
of governance in the United States'. 20 
Although they do not specifically and expressly single out the issue of denial 
of access to government held information in their call for a moderation of 
democracy, it is nonetheless implicit in their submission that a democratic political 
system depends on a substantial degree of apathy and non-involvement on the part 
of individuals and groups in society. 
They argue that democracy will have a longer and more effective life if it is 
not subjected to the pressures and consequent dangers of an informed, participant 
electorate. The dangers they argue are inter alia, the deligitimation of authority 
7'4 18 W Lippman, Public Opinion in A Mathews, The Darker Reaches of Government at p3 
19 W Lippman, The Public Philosophy in Matthew's Op Cit p 3 
20 M Crozier, S Huntington, J Watanuki, 'The Crisis of Democracy' in Key Concepts in Critical Theory: 























generally and the loss of trust in leadership, an overload on government and the 
expansion of the role of government in the economy and society.21 
These dangers they argue, stem from the 'internal dynamics of democracy 
itself in a highly educated, mobilised and participant society'. They argue that the 
demands generated by these internal dynamics, which it is submitted include, access 
to information held by, and scrutiny of the functionings of the executive branch of 
government, are antithetical to the governance of democracy. They argue that the 
governance of democracy necessitates that: 
The claims of ,expertise, seniority, experience, and special talents may 
override the claims of democracy as a way of constituting authority.22 
The crucial element common to the arguments put forward by these writers, 
which requires closer scrutiny, is the fundamental assertion that democracy and 
secrecy in the executive branch of government and its administration are compatible. 
Mathews argues that the sentiments expressed by Lippmann, and it is 
submitted, those of Crozier et al, 
express some of the central tenets of. ... 'Tory democracy', [ the basic features 
of which] are the belief in hierarchy as a condition for order, the acceptance 
of authoritative leadership and the duty of the masses to obey their elected 
leaders. Of special concern to the citizen's right to information is the belief 
that democracy is essentially the right to select parliamentary 
representatives. 23 
These central tenets of 'Tory democracy' are a product of the traditional 
liberal conception of democracy discussed earlier in this chapter. Not only do the 
arguments of Lippmann and Crozier et al express the central tenets of 'Tory 
democracy', but more fundamentally, the sustainability of their proposition that 
secrecy and democracy are compatible, is dependant on these central tenets and 
hence on the traditional liberal conception of democracy. 
It is submitted that the proposition that secrecy and democracy are 
compatible, is sustainable within, and only within the context of the traditional 
liberal conception of democracy, which in view of its particular nature is not 
21 M Crozier, et al, op cit, pp 100-103 
22 Ibid 























predicated on freedom of information. It will be shown that it is by its very nature 
not predisposed to recognition of a right to access to government-held information, 
and further, that a host of forces and developments in modem society have acted in 
unison to further entrench this absence. 
I will further argue that this absence is indicative of a flaw in the classical 
tradition which ultimately negates the attainment of one of its primary objectives, 
namely the limitation and control of an excess and abuse of public power. 
This flaw is in tum the product of modem political society's continued 
ascription to the traditional liberal democratic model, which raises to the foreground, 
questions as to the truly democratic nature of this tradition within the modem 
context. 
Ultimately, it is submitted that the proposition that democracy and secrecy are 
compatible, is fundamentally flawed as it is premised on an outdated fiction. It is 
premised on a particular democratic paradigm which can no longer be truly 
regarded as delivering the ideals and objectives of democracy. Secrecy and 
"democracy" may be compatible within the theoretical framework of the classical 
tradition, premised on representative democracy and its attendant institutions, but 
this does not mean that secrecy practices are democratic. 
The characteristic features of the traditional liberal democratic model 
discussed thus far may be summed up as follows: 
• A recognition of the necessity for government. 
• A desire to curb the extent and power of government. 
• The checking and control of government power through: 
• The doctrine of separation of powers, 
• a strictly demarcated public/private divide; and 
• the rule of law as enforced by the courts; 
• An apparent retention of power by the people through the institution of 
representative democracy, which is both the location for participation by 
the people and the means of controlling and checking the power delegated 
by them. 
At first glance, the logical assumption is that this system, with its emphasis 
on the limhation and control of government power and the theoretical location of 
sovereignty in 'the people', must depend for its success on an informed populace, 
who at every tum are aware of the machinations of government. Any lack of 























how government has overstepped its bounds of authority and take the necessary 
corrective measures. In short, that access to government held information is a sine 
qua non_for the successful operation of this system. 
This assumption, as logical as it may appear, is however not true. The 
traditional paradigm in the context of the modem administrative state is paradoxical. 
It signifies a system which is distrustful of government and accordingly driven by 
the need to curb, control and check its power and ambit. Accordingly, it should be 
premised on, and serve to justify, access to information. However, this is not the 
case, as it in practice, serves to justify secrecy and the denial of access to 
government-held information. 
The reason for this paradox is located in the disjunction between, on the one 
hand, the reality of the objectives, functions, forces and tensions prevailing in the 
modem state, and on the other hand, the theoretical traditional vision encoded in 1) 
the public/ private divide, 2) the adherence to the notion of the minimalist state, 3) 
the attendant reliance on and conceptualisation of the separation of powers, 4) the 
focus on the ex post facto control of government and 5) the institution of 
representative democracy. 
The continued ascription to this theoretical framework within the context of 
the modem administrative state has seen the evolution of a political dispensation 
characterised by a decisive dislocation between "the people" and government, the 
former occupying the private and the latter the public realm. The combined forces 
of the public/private divide and the belief that representative democracy is the 
equivalent of rule by "the people", has seen the evolution of rule "by the people" into 
"rule of the people". This inversion of sovereignty, identity and status of the ruler 
and ruled has become entrenched within public/private discourse. The end result has 
been the creation of a distanced and often paternalistic government, the 
machinations and functions of which, falling as they do within the "public" realm, 
are beyond the public's frame of reference. 
The focus on ex post facto control and checking of government, implicit in 
this paradigm, further distances "the people" from acquiring a working knowledge 
of and participation in government, which in tum justifies and legitimates their 
exclusion. The necessity for information relating to government is not perceived as 
a pre-requisite for sustaining the relationship between the government and the 
governed. A demand for information only manifests itself and acquires legitimacy 
after the fact, at that point when government appears to have transcended its 
legitimate scope and abused its power. 
This theoretical evolution has informed the reasoning and justification 























arguments presented in support of this proposition draw on the language of the 
original traditional idiom, and in so doing appear both feasible and legitimate. 
In terms of these arguments, the size of society, the complexity of modem-day 
government and increasing urgency thereof necessitates a manageable and 
productive organisational structure. 1bis structure, in view of the size of society and 
the diversity of its needs, precludes direct participation by the electorate. In addition, 
the complexity and urgency of those needs means that expert swift government 
action is necessary. The impossibility of direct participation and the need for expert 
swift action automatically implies a hierarchical organisational structure. 
Within this hierarchical structure, government however remains 
democratically legitimate through the institution of representative democracy. The 
theory is that it guarantees rule by "the people" or the electorate, who participate in 
government through their elected representatives who now act in the electorate's 
stead. So too, the institutions and conventions of representative democracy guarantee 
accountability of the executive branch of government in that it is accountable to the 
legislature and therefore to the people. 
The delegation of power by "the people" to their elected representatives who, 
through the electoral process, occupy the pinnacle of the hierarchical structure, has 
as a necessary concomitant, engendered the requirement of trust in the elected 
leadership. This hierarchical structure and the delegation of power to a limited 
number of representatives means that the people are as a matter of necessity 
excluded from the workings of government. The corollary of this is the creation of 
expertly qualified leadership, being as they are in the know and accordingly 
legitimately trusted and, more pertinently, an unqualified electorate, unqualified by 
virtue of their exclusion. This lack of qualification and expertise requires obedience 
to those more qualified and legitimately precludes direct participation in 
government. 
As Lippmann revealingly points out, the .electorate are accordingly precluded 
from questioning the authoritative leadership, lacking as they do, the knowledge or 
expertise to question the actions of ongoing government. The leadership is 
accountable to the electorate 'only on the accomplished fact'. 
The dislocation and distance is further entrenched by the fact that 
accountability of the executive branch is of course also achieved through the 
mechanics of representation. The executive is accountable, not directly to the 
electorate, but to the legislature. The electorate are equipped only to assess 
government at this stage and in this forum. Likewise, it is at this point they are 
legitimately able to participate by expressing their disapproval or approval by voting 























The language of representative democracy therefore clearly precludes 
participation by the electorate in, or information as to the ongoing process of 
government between periodic elections. 
The complexity and scale of modem government clearly necessitates a more 
active executive/administrative branch of government who, in order to function 
effectively, require wide ranging powers. 
The necessity for increased delegation of power to this branch does not 
however, in terms of traditional theory, erode the democratic nature of government, 
nor does it warrant heightened public scrutiny of this branch. Democracy and 
accountability is safeguarded by the fact that this branch remains, despite its 
apparent extended power, no more than the "traffic policemen" of the minimalist 
state. Its subordinate status is guaranteed by the fact that parliament retains ultimate 
control in steering government. It retains the power to make policy decisions for 
which it, parliament is accountable to the electorate. Any delegation of power to the 
executive is premised on the assumption that the power so delegated will be limited 
to the power to implement the chosen policy. Should the executive abuse or 
transgress the limits of its authorised power, it would be accountable to parliament 
and accordingly accountable to the electorate. 
Scrutiny of and access to information relating to the executive branch of 
government and its bureaucratic infrastructure is accordingly rendered redundant, 
and even counter-productive. This perspective is lent further credence by a 
combination of what Gerald Frug identifies as the 'Formalist' and 'Expertise' 
models of bureaucratic legitimacy ,24 the origins of which are located firmly within 
the traditional democratic paradigm. 
In terms of the 'formalist' model, the bureaucracy is perceived as a 
rationalized, disciplined mechanism for implementing the wishes of its creators, the 
legislature, and by extension, the electorate. Bureaucratic power is not threatening 
because it is an objective instrument under the control of those who delegated power 
to it. 
The 'expertise' model, which it is submitted, is a product of the dynamics of 
the growth in the size of the executive and its administration, recognises that this 
growth has forced the legislature to grant a greater degree of discretionary power to 
the executive. In so doing, it is recognised that the degree of external parliamentary 
control is lessened. However, this decrease in external control does not justify the 
electorate stepping in and demanding access to information about the workings of 
























this branch of government as an alternate form of accountability. Such access is 
precluded on the ground that they, the electorate, are not qualified to assess this 
information and further that it would frustrate the smooth running of the 
bureaucracy and the achievement of its objectives. 
In addition, in terms of this model, the need for scrutiny is precluded by the 
fact that there is no reason to fear the extended discretionary power of the executive 
branch of government. The need for scrutiny is precluded, because those who 
exercise the power are experts whose 'professionalism simultaneously limits the 
scope of their power, prevents personal domination and makes possible the creativity 
and flexibility necessary to effectiveness. ' 25 In fact, scrutiny of and participation in 
the process is undesirable as the electorate's lack of expertise and professionalism 
would expose the running of the country to 'the danger of mass democracy' or, 
'supremacy of the emotional over rational decision-making' .26 
Even the most ardent proponent of the 'expertise' model would however 
recognise that it represents an ideal which is rarely achieved in bureaucratic practice. 
The answer to the excesses of the 'expertise' model, advocated by subscribers to the 
traditional liberal democratic experience, is not public scrutiny of the ongoing 
business of government. The answer instead is found in what Frug identifies as a 
fourth model of bureaucratic legitimacy, namely the 'judicial review' model.27 
The 'judicial review' model recognises the need for accountability of the 
administrative branch and that such accountability must be externally imposed. 
However, this model once again resorts to the traditional paradigm in constructing 
a suitable mechanism of accountability. In terms of this model, the executive branch 
and its administration is held accountable through the process of judicial review. 
The preservation of the power, and the sanctity of parliament, constitutive as it of 
the 'will of the people', is the primary factor which legitimates judicial review and 
which determines its scope and purpose. In terms of the traditional model of 
administrative law, which is a product of the traditional democratic paradigm: 
25 Ibid 
.... the legislature maps the boundaries of regulatory authority; agencies act, 
with a Marshallian filling in of details; and reviewing courts keep 
administrative power within statutory limits.28 
26 AJ Polan Lenin and the End of Politics, 1984, p 105 
27 Frug, Op cit, p 1283 
28 Joel Yellin, "Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: Institutional Designs for Environmental 























Democracy, or rule by "the people" translates into parliamentary sovereignty 
which is organised through the doctrine of the the separation of powers. 
Accumulatively therefore, democracy dictates that the executive branch of 
government being subordinate to the legislature, be held accountable to it in respect 
of the fulfillment of its mandate, namely the 'filling in of details' and no more. The 
scope of judicial review is limited to ensuring due compliance with the dictates of 
the sovereign parliament, and by extension, the dictates of the electorate. Judicial 
review thus guarantees accountability, thereby precluding the necessity for direct 
public scrutiny of and access to information regarding the executive branch of 
government. 
At the end of the day, in terms ofthe'traditional liberal democratic 
paradigm and the theories spawned by it, there is apparently no need, or 
justification for, public access to government-held information. The objectives 
justifying demands for such access, namely participation, transparency and 
accountability are achieved, without recourse to freedom of information. Instead, 
they are achieved through the instruments of representation and accountability to 
the legislature, and through the court structures if necessary. In fact, to permit 
such freedom of information would simply frustrate the process of government, 
to no avail. In short, secrecy and democracy are compatible. 
The question that must be asked is whether this assertion is valid and 
sustainable within the context of the modem administrative state. It is submitted that 
it is invalid and unsustainable within this context in view of the fundamental failure 
of the traditional liberal democratic paradigm to deliver effective democracy in.the 
modem administrative state. The proposition that democracy and secrecy are 
compatible depends, as shown above, for its sustainability, on the sustainability and 
sufficiency of the traditional approach to democracy which equates representative 
democracy with rule "by the people". 
It is submitted that representative democracy and its attendant supplementary 
institutions fail to deliver on the promise of "rule by the people" and to ensure 
. effective accountability as a means of controlling executive abuse of power. This 
· 
7failure·in turn negates the validity of the proposition that secrecy and democracy are 
compatible, depending as it does on the effectiveness and validity of the traditional 
liberal democratic paradigm. y . 
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DEMOCRACY AND THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
The minimalist state which informed the traditional liberal idiom no longer reflects 
or accommodates the reality of modern government. It has been replaced with the 
modern large-scale administrative state which: 
... denotes the phenomenon by which the state institutions influence many 
aspects of the lives of citizens, especially those aspects which relate to the 
economic and social dimensions. It describes a system 9f'govfrnance through 
which public policies and programs, affecting alm4't kn a~pects of public 
life, are influenced by the decisions of public officiJts. 1 
V 
The growth in the size and complexity of society together with an ever 
decreasing pool of resources has seen a comparable growth in the size, functions and 
power of the state. Its recognition and role is no longer limited to the traditional 
public sphere of life, but now extends overtly into the private spheres, providing 
extensive social and economic regulation and management.2 
Writers such as Lippmann and Crozier argue that it is precisely the size and 
complexity of the modern administrative state which dictates that the governors be 
left "to get on with the job", unassailed by public scrutiny. Their assertions are 
however flawed in their failure to recognise that ~g~_the_scale-of-
_,govemmenJ has been accompanied by_J!_chauge_ ill _p2wer relations within 
government as well as between government and the governed. Recognition of the 
full extent and implications of the modem administrative government in fact dictates { 
a conclusion converse to the one reached by them. If democracy is to be achieved, i\ 
secrecy practices must be set aside and freedom of access to government-held ·, 
information promoted and protected at all costs. 
The growth in the complexity of the functions of the state has seen more than 
a mere escalation of the size of government. It has seen a concurrent realignment of 
state functions as between the different branches of government. More importantly, 
that realignment has created the potential for a comparable shift in power which in 
turn requires a reassessment of traditional mechanisms for the checking of that 
1 V Seymour Wilson & 0 P Dwivedi The Administrative State in Canada, p5, quoted in Alan C Cairns "The Past 
and Future of the Canadian Administrative State" in (1990), 40 University of Toronto Law Journal, p 322 
























The legislature, still in name, formulates policy, but now in an expanded 
arena, extending beyond the limited public sphere. The implementation and 
regulation of the chosen policy choices·still rests with the administrative branch of 
government. However, in fulfilling its mandate, which is necessarily extended in 
tandem with the expanded scope of the state, its actions now affect almost every 
aspect of the daily lives of the electorate. 
The extended ambit of government and increase in the complexity and 
urgency of the services rendered by it has seen an increasing reliance on the 
administrative branch for delivery of these services. This increased reliance has in 
turn seen a concomitant growth in specialisation and expertise on the part of the 
administration, which has engendered a legislature which is increasingly dependant 
on the administrative branch of government, not only for implementation but also 
for information and advice as to policy formulation. 
The non-expert legislature has, by circumstance, been compelled to delegate 
ever increasing powers to the administrative branch of government. The increased 
degree of delegation has seen a fundamental change in the character and function 
of the administrative branch from its traditional policing function into a more active 
one of effective policy formulation and planning, a function previously within the 
exclusive domain of the legislature. 
The cumulative result of these factors is that power in the administrative state, 
as indicated by the name given to it, is now largely de facto vested in the 
administrative or executive branch of government, to the extent that Cairns refers 
to this arm of government as 'governments in miniature' .3 
This de facto shift in power is attributable not only to increased delegation, 
but also to one of the defining features of the administrative state which serves to 
sustain, and provides the space to capitalise on, the power implicitly imparted by the 
act of delegation. This feature is identified by writers such as Hirst and Cairns as the 
phenomenon of' continuing government'. 4 'Continuing government' is a product of 
the immensity and complexity of the state's social and economic regulation and the 
delivery of services in this arena. Fulfillment of these objectives requires long-term 
planning and uninterrupted implementation. By necessity therefore, the government 
administrative process is ongoing. 
Effective control of and power over the process therefore rests in the hands 
of the administrative branch who, unlike the legislature, remains constant and is not 
subject to change at election time. The make-up of the legislature may change. 
However, the new legislature inherits old on-going programs, and for Cairns: 
3 Cairns, op cit, p 325 























The pastness of the programs is the essence of the administrative state, for it 
is the source of the bureaucracy's prominence in modem government.5 
This continuum means that parliamentary cabinet government and the 
leadership it is supposed to provide in theory is, in the administrative state, largely 
a fiction. The administrative branch or the ,bureaucracy must, as a matter of 
necessity, be afforded significant power to maintain the government process which 
cannot grind to a halt and recommence afresh after each election. 
2.1 The Administrative State and Representative Democracy 
The evolution from the minimalist state of earlier times to the modem 
administrative state and the attendant implications thereof for prevailing power 
dynamics within government, and as between government and its citizens, raises the 
question as to: 
... whether the legal doctrines inherited from that earlier time can meet the 
challenges posed by the exigencies of modem government and the web of 
dependency upon the state in which we now find ourselves entangled.6 
Posed differently, the question is:- Is the classical liberal tradition with its 
emphasis on representative democracy and its attendant checks and balances, which 
to a large extent excluded the administrative branch of government from its frame 
of reference, able to deliver on the objectives of democracy and accountability in the 
modem administrative state? 
,t j:fu~_L .. argues convincingly that representative democracy in the modem 
political context can no longer deliver on the objectives of democracy, that it no 
longer delivers any approximation of 'rule by the people'. Likewise the additional 
complimentary mechanisms making up the balance of the legal doctrine inherited 
from the past, intended to ensure responsiveness, accountability and control are also 
fundamentally flawed and therefore unable to deliver on their intended objectives. 
They are by n~essity_flaweq~d.incapac~ed as the~e founded, in both their 
ob'jecfives __ ~d-conte:Qt, on the now inaccurate traditional assumption that 
,, .. ~eprese~tative ~emo~r~~y-is const1tutive of zrule by the people'. 
-~- - ,._ - -- - ~--. ..:-_.c;..-=---
/~ - · He argues that representative democracy can no longer be equated with "rule 
by the people" and any theory premised on the assumption of similarity 'involves 
grave contradictions and grossly implausible assumptions when set beside the 
5 Cairns, Ibid 























actualities of modem politics'. 7 
The first and most important of these contradictions is that: 
It identifies a decision-procedure for selecting personnel with one for 
selecting policies or laws. In choosing the one the people choose the other. 
But it is assemblies or parliaments which make laws and governments that 
make decisions and not the people. The electors choose some of the personnel 
involved in making the governmental decisions, but they cannot directly 
choose the decisions. The electors may reject personnel who submit 
themselves for re-election as representatives for the choices they have made 
but always relative to some very limited set of alternative personnel and on 
the basis of no more than suppositions about the choices they in turn may 
make. 8 
The second false assumption is that the legislature passes laws of general 
application which have received genuine democratic populist assent. Further, that 
the executive is an impartial agency which merely applies these laws. The reality of 
the matter is however very different as: 
Most legislation consists in delegating powers of decision and action to 
executive agencies, that have the derived power to make such rules as 
necessary and administer an activity as they see fit within some broad 
statement of objectives ..... Likewise, in the doctrine government is supposed 
to possess a doubly delegated authority, from the people to the legislature and 
from the legislature to government. In practice, government is a continuing 
agency devising policies and pursuing objectives, and it is also a party 
government. Far from being a servitor of the legislature, government is the 
initiator of legislation: the legal requirements necessary for the policy 
programs of civil servants and senior party members are brought to the 
legislature and carried through it by means of party discipline. The members 
of a party government must take a great deal of the continuing policy and 
decision-making initiated within the government's administrative machine as 
given~ it can initiate, alter or superintend only a small fraction of it.9 
He concludes justifiably, that representative democracy is in fact, not a type 
of rule by the people, but rather a form of legitimization of rule. Representative 
democracy: 

























Ceases to be a form of delegated rule by the people and instead becomes a 
form of rule by professional politicians over the people, in which some of 
those rulers are periodically changed by the mechanism of election. 10 
In short, the act of voting every five years does not ensure a democratic 
society or serve as a mechanism of accountability. It 'means no more than the 
opportunity to pass judgement, in a single act, upon hundreds of thousands of 
decisions made by the government since the last general election.' 11 
This inability to ensure democracy and accountability cannot be cured by 
recourse to the related and supplementary mechanisms of accountability of the 
administrative branch of government to the legislature ( and hence the electorate) and 
judicial review. These mechanisms, in view of the fact that they are premised on the 
assumptions and requirements of the liberal democratic tradition with its emphasis 
on representative democracy, fail in turn to achieve the objective of checking the 
exercise [ and abuse] of power by the administrative branch of government in the 
modem administrative state. 
Accountability of the administrative branch of government to the legislature 
and accordingly to the electorate, one of the fundamental premises of representative 
democracy, has increasingly been eroded. This erosion has been an inevitable 
consequence of the increased delegation of power by the legislature to the executive. 
The extent of delegation has burgeoned to such an extent that it in many instances 
can no longer be regarded as the delegation of power, but as the transfer or 
alienation of power. The transformation of delegation into a transfer or alienation 
of power has undermined the ability on the part of the legislature to control, or hold 
the administrative branch accountable. Delegation proper assumes ultimate control 
of the process by the delegator and continuing accountability to the delegator by the 
delegatee. Modem government practices are such that the legislature's control over 
the process has been diluted to such an extent that that element of accountability, so 
central to the notion of delegation, has been lost. In the absence of this element, 
delegation has been transformed into the alienation of power. 
The same may be said of judicial review as a mechanism of control and 
accountability in its current form, premised as it is on the assumption of effective 
legislative guidance of and control over the executive. It does not result in effective 
accountability or control 12 as: 
10 Ibid '/1. IIE Mureinik, 'Reconsidering Review: Participation and Accountability' in Administrative Law Refo!:ll, 1993, 
p35 
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The conceptual apparatus used by the judiciary has been characterised by a 
formalistic reluctance to recognise the growth of executive power (to the 
detriment of legislative legitimacy and civil liberties) and to develop legal 
rights and remedies to meet the challenges of the 20th century administrative 
/ 
state. 13 
The unavoidable conclusion that must be drawn is that representative 
democracy in the modem political context of the administrative state is unable to 
deliver any remote approximation of democracy in the sense of 'rule by the people'. 
Likewise those institutions premised in their design and function on the liberal 
traditional model and th! as~~pJi9ns,,underlying,.r~p_re_s~ntative _d_emocra~ are 
rendered ineffective as restraints on the exercise of government power. 
In fact, one encounters a complete inversion of the original intended 
objectives - instead of serving as mechanisms of restraint, accountability and 
participation by proxy - modem big government has been enabled to use 
'representative democracy, parliamentary government and liberal constitutionalism 
as means of legitimation' of the unauthorised use of power and has 'simultaneously 
suffered little restraint in its actions' as: 
The "sovereign power" of the people's representatives gathered in the 
legislature has been placed at the service of the executive through enabling 
legislation. 14 
The modem administrative state operating as it has within this outdated 
democratic paradigm has allowed the administrative branch the space for extensive 
secrecy practices. In addition, this paradigm has not only provided the space, but 
also served to justify and legitimate that secrecy. Adherence to the principles and 
institutions of this paradigm has imparted a false sense of security in the minds of 
all affected role players. Non-disclosure as a standard practice is depicted through 
the lens of the traditional paradigm as unnecessary in view of alleged prevailing 
guarantees of participation and accountability, and presented as a dilatory burden 
on the ability of the administrative branch to deliver often urgently needed services. 
The state, or more specifically the administrative branch thereof, has 
capitalised on this space permitted for secrecy to its fullest capacity, to the extent 
that: 
... secrecy [has become] a mam behavior aspect of a functioning 
13 H Corder, 'Introduction: Administrative Law Reform' in Administrative Law Refom!, 1993, p2 
























The reasons as to why the appeal of secrecy has been so strong are diverse. 
Friederich attributes it to the fact that secrecy is functional and an inevitable product 
of the discretion afforded the administrative branch government. His argument that 
the source of secrecy and the prevalence thereof in government is attributable to the 
institution of bureaucracy and its practices is shared by Max Weber who argues that 
The concept of the "official secret" is the specific invention of bureaucracy 
and it defends nothing so fanatically as this attitude. 16 
Hirst locates the inclination towards, and the prevalence of bureaucratic 
secrecy, in a combination of modem party government and the phenomenon of 
continuing official administration and policy initiation. These factors, he argues lead 
to a double pressure toward secrecy and the control of policy information. 
On the one hand: 
The party leaders want an administration which is loyal and responsive only 
upwards and which reveals only those aspects of policy or information 
pertaining to it which suits the governments political purposes. [On the other 
hand] the officials in turn pursue long-term departmental policies which 
leads to rule of the unelected official - not only in routine matters, but in 
major issues that either never come before the elected representatives or only 
before a small number of senior ministers on a need to know basis and with 
strong pressure to pursue official policy. 17 
Perceptions from within the bureaucratic structure itself also generate routine 
secrecy practices. An example would be the prevalence of opinion held by 
bureaucrats that secrecy promotes improved and a more efficient administration. 
The assumption underlying this perception is that secrecy frees it from 'unnecessary 
legislative, judicial and public oversight which would simply serve to delay and 
frustrate 'getting the job done'. Related to this efficacy factor is the specialisation 
of functions, a trait common in the modem administrative state. It serves to 
engender secrecy as 'secrecy is :frequently a by-product of expertise and is resorted 
15 Friedrich, C Constitutional Government and Democracy, Theory and Practice in Europe and America, 4th ed, 
p55 























to by specialised departments to secure an advantage over rival departments.' 18 
Whatever the reasons, there is an inherent tendency toward secrecy within the 
administrative branch of the modem administrative state, which tendency has 
resulted in secrecy being the nomiratherthan tlie exceptioa These secrecy practices 
have found legitimation and acceptance within the traditional democratic vision and 
bureaucrats have accordingly been enabled to argue, with reference to standard 
democratic practices and institutions, that this all pervasive secrecy is compatible 
with democracy. 
It is submitted that these assertions are untenable. Once one recognises the 
inadequacies of the liberal democratic tradition vis-a-vis its ability to deliver 
democracy in the modern administrative state, one must recognise that the assertions 
of compatibility of secrecy and democracy are unsustainable, depending as they do 
on the efficacy of this tradition. 
Recognition of these inadequacies not only debunks these assertions, but also 
compels recognition of the immensity of the threat posed.by-institutionalised secrecy --~-.------ "-- ~ - ..... - ...... ,,.. ,--- ' 
to the attainment and maintenance of democratic values and procedures. -~- - ---:-----.--:-.----------------Ext@B·S·ive state secrecy practices do not however only pose a threat to 
democracy, they also harbour more general threats to the governance of all, not only 
those that aspire to democratic ideals. 
2.2 The Threats Posed by Secrecy 
The threat posed by secrecy to the governance of society generally is summed 
up succinctly in the following quotation from President Wilson: 
Everyone knows that corruption thrives in secret places, and avoids public 
places, and we believe it a fair presumption that secrecy means impropriety. 19 
Mathews elaborates on this statement by providing a comprehensive 
itemisation of the dangers of secrecy for 'good government' which is summarised 
hereunder.20 
Blanket government secrecy practices are dangerous in the cover they 
provide, and even the tendency they have to promote, at best, mismanagement, and 
at worst, corruption, nepotism and the abuse of power generally. In short, they allow 
and encourage 'official lawlessness'. The tendency of broad pervasive secrecy 
practices to promote routine lawlessness is found in the phenomenon whereby the 
'official secret' is misused as a shield behind which illegal practices, mistakes and 
18 Mathews, Op Cit, p 14-15 
























irregularities are permissively concealed. 
Writers such as Lippmann argue that information only becomes relevant after 
the decided fact as government can only be held to account on the accomplished 
fact. The exclusion of public scrutiny at any earlier stage is justified by their lack of 
expertise and consequent inability to evaluate information about the state official's 
conduct preceding the final outcome. 
This argument fails within the context of abuse of power. Arguing that lack 
of expertise disenables the citizens from evaluating the merits of the official's 
conduct is in and of itself paternalistic and hugely problematic. To argue that the 
citizens lack expertise and the ability to determine what constitutes conduct which 
amounts to an abuse of power is absurd. 
The alternative argument presented by writers such as these is that, assuming 
the electorate are qualified to detect an abuse of power, they will be afforded the 
opportunity to do so on the basis of information made available after the fact. This 
is illogical as it is safe to assume that where one encounters an abuse of power, the 
perpetrator of that abuse will actively seek to conceal all evidence thereof and will 
have been afforded the prior opportunity to do so by a system predisposed to 
concealment. 
As such, discovery of abuses will often be a mere matter of chance and 
circumstance. Further, the information, if and when disclosed within the context of 
an accusation of abuse of power, is exposed to the potential danger of 
misrepresentation, manipulation and other transgressions inevitably employed by the 
government official, department or political party accused of abusing its power. 
The element of deception inhering in secrecy practices is doubly harmful in 
that it does untold harm to the relationship of trust between government and its 
citizens. Regular institutional secrecy practices can lead to a culture of mistrust, the 
end result of which is a generic disbelief of all information provided by government. 
The danger herein lies in what Mathews refers to as 'information pathologies', 
which see, not only the citizens, but their leaders as well, unable to discern the truth. 
Any such fundamental inability can only lead to and aggravate government 
mismanagement. 
The pervasive danger of secrecy is evidenced by its ability, not only to do 
untold harm to the government process, but also in its ability to do harm to fields of 
practice in which government has an interest and accordingly asserts control over. 
So for example, government secrecy can and has often resulted in the retardation of 
science and technology. The importance of these fields in relation to military 
strength has seen an increased blanket of secrecy over these ~atters which certainly 
are of vital importance to society as a whole. The extent of government secrecy in 
these areas can lead to government obtaining a monopoly, not only over the 





/ These illustrations of the dangers of secrecy are accumulatively indicative of 
/, a fundamental problem inhering in government secrecy practices - attributable to 
I; the essential link ~en._s_e__~r_e.,2y_and power and the built in propensity for the½ 1 ~ w ._' I  abuse of that power by maximisingseKe~~ctices. . ~ ~w. ~ ,~ r:y tiw'-< '7-.\'\ ~""'- wt( (l,"'\ \ . The link between secrecy and power is based on the fact that lmowledge, 
I 
. especially in the information-age of today, is a form of power. Consequently, when 
















of official secrecy. Knowledge, being a form of power means that secret knowledge 
is conducive to absolute power. Not only does secrecy permit the concealed abuse 
of power it also serves as a source of ower. 
It is this essential link between secrecy and power which lies at the heart of 
the threat posed by institutionalised bureaucratic secrecy to democracy. Democratic 
discourse is charateriseciofifs'particclar concern with the locat10n of sovereignty 
or power and control of the exercise and abuse of that power in "the people". The 
prevalence of secrecy and consequent monopoly over information by the executive 
branch of government and its bureaucratic infrastructure holds the danger of an~\ 
effective shift in democratically acceptable power balances from the. sovereign \ 
legislature to unelected, unaccountable officials. . ' . 
· Secrecy allows the ·executive to operate in the absence of scrutiny by the \ 
legislature and the people and as such is the antithesis of accountability. 
Secrecy practices not only render government unaccountable, but also render 
it unresponsive to the electorate, either directly or through its representatives. It 
weakens the power of the elected representatives to act responsively to the 
electorate. The alternative, namely the electorate's direct scrutiny of ~ ~ 01-2 
participation in government is rendered meaningless in the absence of freed~ 
information. 
Direct or more active public participation in an order characterised by all 
pervasive secrecy practices is inherently problematic as secrecy: 
... is a fact strongly responsible for what Eric Fromm has called a "pathogenic 
feature' of modern society - the alienated passive man'. 21 
A democratic order must be based on a politically aware, responsive and 
responsible electorate. Public participation, whether in its direct form, o~ its related 
[2IJI1-9f a politically aware, civic minded electorate is doomed to failure in the 
presence of long standing pervasive secrecy practices which exclude the electorate 
























... people refuse to participate only where politics does not count. ... they are 
apathetic because they ,are powerless, not powerless because they are ( 
apathetic. 22 
In view of the intense correlation between secrecy and power, people who are 
'kept in the dark' are rendered powerless and as a consequence, apathetic. 
This correlation between apathy and secrecy is explained by Sidney Verba' s 
observation as to the high correlation between how much we participate in politics 
and whether we think ourselves competent or politically effective.23 Secrecy 
practices are tantamount to precluding participation, and in turn engender an attitude 
of incompetence or inability to participate, because of a lack of knowledge. 
Ironically, it is precisely this lack of knowledge/incompetence which advocates of 
bureaucratic secrecy latch onto in support of continued secrecy practices and more 
often than not, the self-same advocates argue that increased participation is doomed 
to failure because of a lack of public interest Qr response. . 
At the end of the day, secrecy and its essential link with power means that 
the modem administrative state within the context of traditional paradigm and its 
emphasis on representative democracy, is enabled to excuse and in fact justify 
government secrecy. This has, in most modem states, translated into a governmental 
system which 'grows by accretion, that is ... unresponsive and unaccountable'. 24 In 
short, a fundamentally undemocratic government, premised as it is on secrecy - the 
antithesis of democracy for Durkheim, for whom, democracy is: 
A--condition of effective mutual intera~tion based on adequate7nfonnation _ 
between the state and civil society.25 
*** 
t¾-22 B Barber, 'Strong Democracy' in Key Concepts in Critical Theory:Democracy. 1993, p269 
23 S Verba, The Civic Culture, in A Philips, op cit, p 39 
24 Hirst, op cit, p3 l 

























THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, DEMOCRACY AND 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
35 
The modem administrative state is a reality which will predominate and increase 
in strength alongside the continually decreasing availability of resources and the 
international growth in population. 
Recognition of this reality and the attendant transformation of the 
dynamics of government and the relationship between government and its 
citizens necessitates answering the question posed by Frecker - Do the legal 
doctrines that we have inherited, premised as they are on a completely different 
perceptions of the state i.e. the minimalist state, meet the challenges of the 
modem administrative state? 
The answer to this question, as argued in the preceding chapters, is a 
resounding no. The next step is to ask what is required to meet the challenges of 
the modem administrative state so as to ensure democratic government. 
Although the legal doctrines inherited are unable to meet the challenges of ~ _ 
the mo~em administra!ive state, ~t must be stres~ed tha~ the ideals and o~jectives ,'! c)--'1~ Y 
underlymg those ?octrmes are _still_ perfectly vahd and m f~ct more p~essmg than E7~✓ J 
ever before)The ideals and obJectives of democracy remam the attamment of a~ ,J{) ,Q_.; 
form of •nfie by the people' and the correlative need to subject the exercise of 
government power to control and review to preserve popular sovereignty. 
However: 
One thing is certain, we cannot place undue reliance on representative 
democracy in doing so. 1 
Having said this, Hirst cautions that: 
It would be foolish to imagine that we can abandon the mechanism of 
representative democracy or completely abandon the institution of party 
government. Most people would greatly fear losing the vote; at least it 
offers some constraint on the actions of govemment.2 
1P Hirst, op cit, p30 























Recognition of the fact that the outdated minimalist state of the traditional 
idiom has been supplanted by the modem administrative state does however 
require a shift to a democratic paradigm which is capable of accommodating 
both the modem state and sustaining democracy. This shift requires a rejection, 
not necessarily of the institutions and practices of the traditional paradigm, but of 
the underlying assumptions and attitudes on which they are based. It requires that 
these assumptions be recognised as inaccurate and the implementation of an 
infrastructure designed to address the inadequacies and lacunae created by them. 
The envisaged paradigm shift must recognise and accommodate the 
realities of a shift in functions traditionally fulfilled by the legislative branch of 
government to the executive and its administration and the consequential 
potential accompanying shift in power. 
These shifts have seen a realignment in the fabric of the doctrine of the 
separation of powers which has resulted in a fundamental change in the 
relationship between government and its citizens. In terms of the traditional 
paradigm the focus is on the relationship between the electorate and the 
legislative branch of government. The legal doctrines inherited sought, through 
that branch of law most suited to the specific objectives, to regulate that 
relationship. Accordingly emphasis and reliance was placed on constitutional law 
as the means to ensuring a democratic society as opposed to administrative law, a 
mere subsidiary of constitutional law, premised on and designed to give effect to 
the prevailing constitutional vision. The lesser prominence of administrative law 
within this idiom is attributable to the perceived lesser threat posed by the 
administrative branch of government which is in tum founded on the diluted 
relationship between the executive branch of government and its citizens. 
Designed as it was to regulate a diluted relationship between the citizens and the 
mere 'traffic policemen' of the state, subjugated at all times to the will of the 
legislature and hence the will of the people, it was accordingly not preoccupied 
with the aversion of the threat of the usurpation or abuse of power by 'the traffic 
policemen'. Accordingly administrative law developed independently of and in 
the absence of democratic influences and pressures. 
Recognition of the dynamics and dangers of the modern administrative 
state to the maintenance of democratic ideals has forced proponents of 
democracy to reassess their earlier constitutional vision, primarily forcing a 
questioning of the sufficiency of representative democracy to deliver on those 
ideals. The inadequacy of representative democracy has required, and as will be 
shown, has seen a transformation of the constitutional framework of the modern 
democratic administrative state so as to give effect to the ideals and objectives of 
democracy. It is submitted that administrative law, like its constitutional 























characterised by many of the same concerns originally the preserve of the 
relationship between the legislative branch of government and the people. These 
concerns originally saw the development of a constitutional legal system 
concerned with and designed to limit and review the use and abuse of power by 
the legislative branch of government. The shift in power relations within the state 
and as between the state and its citizens requires not only a shift in the 
constitutional vision, but also a shift in the focus and shape of administrative law, 
being as it is an instrument for giving effect to the precepts embodied in the 
constitutional framework. This shift in focus and shape must be moulded by the 
need to give effect to the broad democratic ideals and objectives articulated by 
the new constitutional vision. 
The modem administrative state is predisposed to undemocratic tendencies 
only so long as it operates within a constitutional model defined by a narrow 
adherence to the traditional paradigm with its emphasis on representative 
democracy and the assumptions underlying it. If the constitutional model were to 
change and give expression to another form of democracy capable of giving 
effect to democratic ideals and objectives of effective participation and 
accountability, and the relationship between the executive and the people 
recognised for what it is and accordingly democratised, there is no reason for the 
modem administrative state to be an undemocratic one. 
Representative democracy fails to deliver on the two primary objectives of 
a democratic society in the modem administrative state. Its primary tool of 
participation, albeit in a substituted form, namely the elected representative, fails 
to deliver by proxy the objective of political participation. It fails to guarantee 
the effective vocalisation of the electorate's interests and concerns requiring 
redress by government, which was reluctantly recognised for precisely that 
purpose. The vote and judicial review, being the intended mechanisms for the 
attainment of the accountability of government to the electorate, are also unable 
to deliver on their promises. Both failures are largely attributable to the fact that 
the true locus of power and regulation in the modem administrative state, vested 
as it is in the executive and its administrative bureaucracy, falls outside the 
perameters of the traditional democratic paradigm, its assumptions and emphasis 
on representative democracy. 
The solution lies in a shift from the traditional liberal paradigm and its 
assumption that representative democracy is in fact constitutive of democracy, in 
the sense of rule by "the people". It must be replaced with a paradigm which 
recognises the inadequacies of the tool of representation to deliver on rule by "the 
people" and accordingly places less of a premium on representative democracy. 
Once the inadequacies are recognised the shift must address the resultant lacunae 






















the electorate across the full spectrum of government, including participation in 
and scrutiny of the administrative branch's activities. 
38 
Questions as to how to democratise the administrative state depend on 
whether it is possible to achieve the objectives of effective participation by the 
electorate, responsive government and accountability of the administrative branch 
of government. Mureinik argues that democracy will only be attained in the 
modem administrative state if the routine relationships between the government 
and its subjects are democratic. This will depend on how bureaucratic officials 
treat the people they govern in their daily dealings with them; on the ability to 
democratise the every day decision making processes of government, as this is 
where the true locus of power resides. 3 It is within these relationships that the 
objectives of participation, responsiveness and accountability must be achieved 
in order to sustain a democratic society. 
Direct participation by the electorate in the routine decision making 
processes of government is clearly not feasible as a general rule. As such 
alternative mechanisms which would achieve the objective of effective 
participation must be identified and put into place. As to what constitutes a 
suitable alternative mechanism will depend on the objective of participation. 
The primary objective of participation is responsive government, which is: 
A government which perceives social pressures as sources of knowledge 
and opportunities for self correction. 4 I : 
t Public participation is premised on an ongoing interaction between the 
government and the governed so that government may continually be advised of 
the public's interests and concerns for the purpose of initiating or amending 
government action to accommodate and give effect to those concerns. 
The objective of participation is to afford the participant the opportunity to 'have 
a say in government' by being afforded the opportunity to affect decisions and 
influence outcomes which have a bearing on the participant. 
f. Accountability is an integral feature of a democratic society and the flip 
side of participation. In terms of the traditional paradigm, accountability 
translates into the duty of the representative to account to its constituency in 
respect of action taken in response to its interests and concerns. As such it is an 
integral component of responsive government. In the modem administrative state 
accountability means that the executive or administrative branch, as the decision-
* 3 E Mureinik 'Reconsidering Review: Participation and Accountability' in Administrative Law Refonn, 1993, 
p 35 · f 4 Lourence J Boulle, 'Administrative Justice and Public Participation in American and South Afiican Law' in 1986 






















makers in government, must account to its subjects for those decisions and 
chosen courses of action which effect their interests and concerns. 5 
39 
The democratisation of the administrative state depends on whether or not 
government is rendered responsive._ Attainment of a responsive government 
depends on participation and accountability in the daily routine relatjonships 
between government and its citizens. 
As stated previously, direct participation is not a feasible option and in fact 
certain forms of direct participation such as the referendum are undesirable as 
they are no guarantee of responsive government. The yes/no option presented to 
the participants of a referendum does not amount to effective participation or 
accountability as it provides a once off opportunity to have, a possibly 
uninformed say in a proposed policy still to be implemented. The implementation 
of policy in the administrative state is an ongoing continuous exercise requiring 
continuos control and direction. This is not possible via the referendum. Further, 
once the yes/no vote is taken, accountability is problematised as the outcome of 
the vote may be used as a source of legitimacy for future conduct not envisaged 
by the voters.6 
The route to achieving effective public participation and accountability so 
as to ensure responsive government is through the transformation of 
administrative law. Administrative law, as the body of law intended to regulate 
the relationship between the executive, its administration and its subjects, must 
define the public's participatory rights, the content of which will be guided by 
achieving a balance between the dictates of practical government and the need 
for responsiveness, and must further provide mechanisms for the enforcement of 
these rights. Likewise, administrative law must provide mechanisms for the 
delivery of effective accountability by way of imposing a duty on the state to 
justify its decisions and courses of action to the public. 
3.1 Freedom of Information and Democracy/ Responsive Government 
Responsive or democratic government in the administrative state is, in 
terms of the objectives of the envisaged paradigm shift, fundamentally and 
wholly dependant on the public's freedom _of access to government held 
information. Institutionalised government secrecy practices are not compatible 
with, justified or legitimate in a responsive democracy. Information is the essence 
of responsive democracy, so much so that Harold L Cross concluded that, 
without freedom of information, 'the citizen'-sofaaemocracy have but changed 
5 E Mureinik, op cit, p40 
























Effective participation is the cornerstone of responsive government and 
hence democratic government. Freedom of information is in tum the cornerstone 
of effective participation and therefore democracy is inextricably dependant on 
freedom of information. As a matter of logical necessity, effective participation 
requires that the participants have free access to information to enable them to 
engage in rational and effective participation. 
A democracy which guarantees participation, but denies access to 
information or in which citizens act on false, distorted or incomplete facts will be 
a perversion of democratic government as their participation will be rendered 
ineffective as: 
Without information the citizen can't criticize policy. Without a voice and 
a right to put forward views the citizen cannot contribute to political and 
social change. 7 
Accountability, the second essential component of a responsive democratic 
government, like participation, depends entirely for any meaningful effect on 
freedom of access to government information. Accountability in the 
administrative state is premised on the duty of the state to justify its decisions. 
Justification will be impossible without a disclosure of the reasons for the 
decisions as well as all circumstantial factors necessary to assess the feasibility of 
the justificati~~- Accountability is impossible without free access to information \\1-,,-N,A 
as accountab1hty demands transparent government. ~M0cc&-Zj ➔ (liM-v~ ~{)1) 
The essentiality of this link between information and democracy is sourced 
1
/h in the fact that information is a significant form of power. The foundational tenet 
~ of democracy.is popular sovereignty-power must reside in "the people". As 
such, democracy dictates tnat the people be afforded the right to access to 
information, and that mechanisms be put into place to limit the control ofthis 
power by the government.' These requirements are essential to preventing•it from 
enjoying a monopoly over information, and hence power.· 
In short, democracy requires that the shift from the minimal state to the 
modem administrative state be accompanied by an appropriate political-legal · 
paradigm shift, premised in its design and implementation on freedom of 
information. This shift must be recognised in the prevailing constitutional ordet 
and then given effect and primarily be steered by the branch of law suited thereto 
- namely administrative law. 























3.2 Recognition Of The Need For, And Implementation Of A Paradigm 
Shift 
Many democratic societies have recognised the need for this 
paradigm shift. This shift, necessitated by the clear need for responsive 
government has, in those jurisdictions which have engaged in the process, 
accordingly been from a paradigm characterised by representation, to one 
characterised by a more aggressive form of popular participation. This shift in 
focus from representation to effective participation necessitated a correlative 
transformation of indirect IUechanisms of accountability of the administrative 
branch, by proxy. A Jliiftin focus to direcf's~rutiny, as 
opposed to through tee lens of representatl .\In short, the shift has been to a 
paradigm characterised by transparent gove ent and a culture of government 
justification. = 
41 
In view of the direct correlation between the dictates of the shifted 
democratic paradigm and the administrative branch of government, the route 
chosen by these jurisdictions has largely been through the transformation of their 
administrative legal systems, with a view to the democratisation of the 
administrative branch of government. Further, in view of the direct correlation 
between such democratisation and freedom of information, the focus of their 
transformation energies has been, as a matter of logic, the recognition, regulation 
and protection of freedom of access to government held information. 
The transformation, spearheaded by freedom of information concerns has 
found expression in a framework of legislative enactments, commonly known as 
'W"eedom of information laws. 
ft'-' A contextual reading of these legislative enactments reveals that they, in~ 
accordance with democratic dictates, are premised on more than the desire to 
simply permit access to brute information, for the sake of information alone. In 
addition, they recognise and protect access to information for the purpose of 
ensuring, not only scrutiny of, but also, access to government process and 
decision-making in a more public and participatory form. 
!=Essence therefore, these legislative acts give expression to, not merely a 
~biow ut expression to the recognition of a democratic right to know. 
"--eo ·es which have chosen the route of transformation and given effect 
thereto by placing a premium on the protection of freedom of information 
include, ~ New Zealand, Australia and the Un· ro States. These countries 
initiated therr fre~ilrf1 ation and open government policies some time 
ago, some as early as the 1970's. South Africa has only recently joined the 
international trend and the process is still in its infant stages. It has and shall 























a source of information and guidance in the development and implementation of 
its freedom of information and open government policies. South Africa has much 
to learn from these systems as it shares with many of them a common 
constitutional heritage, based on the traditional liberal democratic paradigm and 
the legal doctrines which formed an integral part thereof. 
South Africa, like its counterparts, has sought to remedy the inadequacies 
of its heritage, whilst recognising the need for and maintaining certain elements 
of it, such as the tools of representation. However, the recognition of this need 
has been accompanied by a recognition of the fact that the tools of representation 
are precisely that - merely tools for political organisation to be utilised as a 
means to an end. A recognition that the tools do not constitute the desired end, 
namely democratic rule by "the people". 
South Africa, like its counterparts, has to accordingly devise mechanisms 
and institutions to supplement the organisational structure so as to establish and 
maintain a truly democratic society. South Africa, which shall be discussed in 
greater detail at a later stage, has like its counterparts, recognised in principle that 
freedom of information is one of the primary keys to democracy, but it has, 
unlike many of its counterparts only recently engaged in the constructive 
implementation of this principle - and it is here that South Africa has much to 
learn, both positively and negatively. South Africa has the benefit of hindsight in 
respect of those systems which have operated for a considerable period of time, 
and must identify and avoid any fundamental weaknesses exhibited by those 
systems. 
3.3 Canada and New Zealand 
Canada and New Zealand will be referred to only briefly at this stage by 
stating that their commitment to responsive democratic government finds 
expression in comprehensive freedom of information acts. 8 
3.4 The United States 
The United States' experience is a valuable source of information and a 
useful tool for comparison in view of its longstanding history of a commitment to 
human rights and its proud assertion of being a modem constitutional democracy. 
This has translated into comprehensive and expansive freedom of information 
and open government policies which were implemented at a comparatively early 
stage. As such the United States shall to a large extent be the focus of this thesis' 






















comparative exercise. _____ · 1 S ~ 
The American history, in relation to the · ssue of ublic ac ~V"~ \,c ;-r-'<'.' "j 
~~d scrutiny of the executive b anch of government , has ee the * <; 
grnwtht>f1trlllnequivocal recognition of tli public's right of scrutiny o and 
access to state-held information. This reco ·tion finds expression · a lattice 
work oflegislation devote to protecting and re ~g~e--ri ts. ...:tNaJ--'u 
This legislation includes inter alia, The Government in the Sunshine Act 
of 1976, the Privacy Act of 1974, the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 and 
subsequent amendments thereto, the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 
and the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. 
The Government in the Sunshine Act of 197 6 imposes a duty on 
government agency's within its scope, to publicise, in advance, details of the 
time, place and subject matter of their meetings. The public are then entitled to 
attend the meetings. Provision is made for meetings to be closed to the public 
under certain circumstances, however, the agency remains under an obligation to 
maintain a complete record of the meeting and make same available to the public. 
The aim of the Sunshine Act is to: 
Open up to the public, portions of the 'deliberative processes' of certain 
agencies. It does not provide a right to participate in decision-making, nor 
can it be invoked to insist that a meeting be held.9 
The right to participate in decision-making is however an integral element 
of the United States' administrative legal system. It is recognised and protected 
under certain circumstances in terms of the Administrative Procedure Act - 5 
U.S.C., Chapter 5. ( A full discussion of this act is however beyond the purview 
of this thesis and is only mentioned to show the comprehensive nature of this 
system in relation to the rights of the public vis-a-vis the administrative branch of 
government.) 
The Federal Advisory Committee Act has as two of its primary objectives, 
keeping both the public and Congress informed as to the advisory committees 
and ensuring that whenever possible, advisory committee meetings are open and 
accessible to the public. 
The Privacy Act: 
Regulates the collection, control, content, dissemination and use of certain 
categories of government information and focuses upon 'systems of 
records' established, controlled or maintained by an agency .... 






















It allows individuals on whom executive federal agencies have 
documents .. to examine the documentation after a written application. 10 
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The Freedom of Information Act is the most wide ranging and 
comprehensive expression and protection of the public's right to information held 
by the administrative branch of government, constituting as it does the pinnacle 
of responsive democratic government. 
The act entitles anyone, upon application, to have ac~s to an age~ 
records_ifthat agency is covered by the a~s P?int~d out b~ Birkinshaw, 
an"71ppl16allt_does..net-ha~e a specific mterest ma matter 
to view the relevant documents - an idle curiosity suffices. The _ 
legislation provides a presumptive riglit of access to ~ents and files to 
anyone - not it should be noted~an American citizen. 11 
Further, the Act provides expressly for de nova review of a decision to --------deny access to requested information. In so doing it confirms the necessity of, 
and gives effect to, the need for responsive and justified government action in its 
provision that 
On complaint, the district court of the United States ...... has jurisdiction to 
enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the 
production of any agency records improperly withheld from the 
complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, 
and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to 
determine whether such records ... shall be withheld under any of the 
exemptions set forth in subsection (b).. . and the burden is on the agency to 
sustain its action. 12 (my stress) 
It is clear from the brief survey of the content and purpose of these acts 
that the American administrative legal system has recognised and put into effect 
the public's right to access to information and scrutiny of the workings of the 
administrative branch of government. The reasons for this recognition may be 
derived from the objectives of the aforesaid body of legislation as a holistic unit. 
s a whole, the body of legislation seeks not only to allow access to the 
information for the sake of mere access, but seeks to allow access for the purpote 
of facilitating participation, accountability and responsive government. These 
objectives were confirmed and the pursuit thereof given top level impetus whe9 
1 
1 in 1993, the President and the Attorney-General publicly committed themselve!( 
10 Ibid, pp 60-61 
11 Ibid, p51 






















to making the operation of the Freedom of Information Act more 'effective to 
enhance openness and participation. [ And] The opposition has not been slow to 
laud these virtues also to enhance the role of the consumer vis-a-vis 
government.' 13 
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The United States' has accordingly since the 1960' s embarked on a 
concerted program of guarantees to access to information, which program is a 
logical growth of its recognition of a need for a paradigm shift within the context 
of the modem administrative state. 
As Carl Friederich points out, the American experience of democracy is ~ ~ 
constitutional democracy as opposed to democracy simply as rule of the majori , 
without any constitutional framework within which majority decisions are made 
He furt:herpomts out that at the heart of a constitutional democracy is the 
notion of the division of power. 14 The division of power is central to a 
constitutional democracy as it is the primary mechanism for achieving the 
objective of constitutionalism, namely, the safeguarding of each member of the 
politica] community as a person. Constitutionalism achieves this objective by 
ensuring a system of effective restraints upon government action, by the division 
of power. Put another way, constitutionalism ( and the division of power) 'is a 
body of rules ensuring fair play, thus rendering the government "responsible'" .15 
As such, a constitutional democracy requires a strict separation of powers 
between the three branches of government, the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary. The concomitant of this requirement is the need for structures to ensure 
that each branch acts only within the perameters of its constitutionally dictated 
role, in other words, structures which enforce accountability. Placing 
constitutional democracy within the context of the modem administrative state 
requires a recognition of the inadequacy of the traditional democratic structures 
of accountability, namely accountability only to the legislature. This recognition 
is one of the progenitors of the recognition of the need for the people to have a 
right of access to information and scrutiny of the workings of the executive 
branch of government, thereby rendering it accountable to the electorate for its 
actions. 
The United States' recognition of the above and its commitment to a 
constitutional democracy is expressed in the legislative :framework discussed 
above. Its commitment to a participatory constitutional democracy has developed 
to such an extent that it has in fact elicited responses such as those by Michel J 
Crozier et al, discussed earlier in this work, that America has gone too far and 
_y_ 13 P Birkinshaw, op cit, pSI 
~
14 Carl J. Friederich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, Theory and Practice in Europe and Americ!!, 4th 
ed, p4 













that the future stability of the country depends on a reversal of the trend of 
encouraging participation, accountability and responsiveness. 
3.5 Australia 
46 
Australia's recognition of the need for a paradigm shift and the effective 
realisation thereof was given expression in the late 1970's in a complete overhaul 
of its administrative legal system. This process was guided and driven to a large 
extent by its freedom of information and ~~..mentpolicies, which found 
expression in two primary pieces of legislation premised on these objectives. 
Australia, like its counterparts discussed above, has since the early 1980' s 
vested in every person a qualified right to access to information in the possession 
of government through the Freedom of Information Act of 1982. 
Like its American counterpart, it too has provided for de nova review of 
agency decisions generally, as well as of agency decisions to refuse access to 
information, by a body external to the decision-making agency. 16 
Unlike the United States however, the Australian federal Freedom of 
Information Act vests that appeal jurisdiction in a body specifically created for 
that purpose, namely the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (MT). The AA T was 
a further product of the comprehensive overhaul of the Australian administrativl 
legal system designed to democratise government by making it responsive and 
accountable. The creation of the MT was a concrete response to the recognition 
of the inadequacies of the traditional judicial review system to realise the 
objectives of responsive, accountable government The rationale underlying the 
I creation of the MT within the context of these objectives, was to, inter aha, provide individuals with more accessible and effective avenues of redress against 
government decisions. Unlike the-mu~d revie~Junctions traditionally vested in I the courts, the right of appeal is much wider and 'in fact requires the decision to 
~The appeal function vested in the MT express y vests in it the 
I power to revise decisions 'on the merits' or to 'stand in the shoes of the original decision-maker'. 17 
I 
The Australian commitment to attainment of the objective of responsible 
government through transparency and premised as such on freedom of 
information, is given further impetus by a legislatively constructed duty imposed 
I f 
on the state to furnish information in the form of written reasons for an adverse 
decision, upon request. This duty is imposed by S 13 of the Administrative (1--'lj's, 
1 




16 P Bayne, 'Freedom of Information in Australia' in Controlling Public Power 1995, p 176 






















.. a statement in writing setting out the findings on material questions of 
fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which these findings 
were based and giving reasons for the decision. 
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It is clear that the premise of the Australian freedom of information laws 
described above, like those of the United States, is attainment of the objective of 
responsive government founded on participation, transparency and 
accountability. 
As such: 
... .in Australia, freedom of information laws are seen as an element of a 
democratic society. 18 
Freedom of information in Australian law is, as in the United States, 
accordingly recognised as a fundamental democratic right. That is to say it is 
recognised in and of itself as a democratic right, as for example the right to vote. 
It is recognised first and foremost as an end, in and of itself, as opposed to a 
means to an end. This is most decisively indicated by the wide framing of 
S l 1(1) of the FOI Act which vests the right to access to information in every 
person: 
Subject to this act, every person has a legally enforceable right to obtain 
access in accordance with this act ... 
As such: 
... a person seeking to exercise his or her right need not show any personal 
interest in obtaining the information sought. The right to access is 
premised on a person's 'right to know' rather than a need to know. 19 
3.6 Evaluation 
Having established that both the United States and Australia have actively 
engaged in the required paradigm shift, dependant on and therefore spearheaded 
by freedom of information laws, one must ask the next question: - To what 
extent have they succeeded, in their chosen route, in democratising government? 
This evaluation, which will focus primarily on the American legal system, 
18 P Bayne, op cit, p 173 




















will seek to assess the results and effects of the practical implementation of the Nut-l 1.,;t 
freedom of information laws, as against Robert Dahl's ideal democratic / ' ✓wf'j v,,,pJr 
standards. Dahl's thesis is that if these standards are met then a system has 
attained perfect democratic processes and a perfect democratic government.20 
Robert Dahl's standards are, it is submitted, an ideal tool to use as a 
yardstick for determining whether or not a system is truly democratic. It is an. 
ideal tool as the standards stated by him co-incide with the concerns expressed 
thus far in this thesis in relation to the modem administrative state. The 
correlation is attributable to the fact that the concerns expressed so far relate to 
the attainment of the objectives of democracy and Dahl's standards are 
essentially an expression of those objectives in an organised, logical and 
systematic way. 
Dahl's thesis, in view of its focus on the objectives of democracy, does not 
prescribe the method or mechanics for obtaining such objectives. As such his 
five ideal standards can be used to assess a multitude of different systems 
claiming to be democratic, irrespective of the minute particularities of those 
systems and differences between them. 
His thesis is rendered more directly relevant and useful to the inquiry at 
hand in view of his use and insistence on what he refers to as polyarchy, as an 
essential component of democracy. As will be shown, the notion of polyarchy 
encompasses a number of rights, institutions and processes which are 
characteristically fundamental precepts of the systems under discussion, being as 
they are, reflective of the traditional (but insufficient) criteria of a democratic 
order. Dahl's thesis like this thesis opines that these criteria are an integral and 6-r.,,v(-
essential component of democracy, but insufficient to constitute democracy in l\~~r~ 
and of themselves. His thesis is that a truly democratic order cannot therefore f\O)--~\J-..'"i'-'S"' 
only comply with the criteria of polyarchy, but must also meet the stated five 
ideal standards. This proposition reflects one of the central tenets of this thesis -
that the traditional liberal democratic vision and its attendant infrastructure is not 
sufficient in the modem administrative state to render the state truly democratic. 
Dahl's statement of five ideal democratic principles co-incide with the 
submissions made thus far as to what is required in addition, to supplement the 
insufficient traditional programme. The balance of his principles, completing his 
vision of an ideal democratic order, which co-incides with the vision adopted by 
this thesis, will accordingly serve as an invaluable tool in evaluating the systems 
discussed herein. 


























Dahl's thesis is that in order for a system to be regarded as truly 
democratic it must comply with on the one hand, the five ideal standard~ 
characteristic of democracy and on the other must comply with the seven criteria 
~~Chy--
He points out that: 
,-~ 
Th fi r,Y~~·· '~\ da d .d 1 d ds .f 1·k . h. h e 1v6f:~nte~a are stan r s - 1 ea_ stan ar , 1 you 1 e - agamst w 1c 
procedur~Foposed ought to be evaluated in any associat~on. Any process 
that met them perfectly would be a perfect democratic process, and the 
government of the association a perfect democratic govemment.2'': 
He recognises that the attainment of the standards, being ideal standards, is 
often difficult and perhaps even impossible. He admits, as does the writer hereof, 
that 'a perfect democratic process and a perfect democratic government might 
never exist in actuality'. 
Despite this word of caution, and even assuming that the ideals can never 
be achieved in their entirety, it is no reason 'to throw in the towel' and accept 
anything less than maximum possible compliance with the standards simply on 
the basis of the difficulties involved in achieving them. It is admitted that a 
democratic society which does not achieve all five standards perfectly, as is 
probably the case with all associations, might not be perfectly democratic. 
However, it is submitted that any 'democratic' society which does not engage in 
a continual process of evaluation of its practices and procedures with a view to 
identifying where it fails to meet the standards, and actively seeks to redress 
those problems - as a continuing process - cannot be called even an imperfect 
democracy. A democratic society must strive at all times to attain the ideal 
standards. 
3.8 Dahl's Polyarchy 
For Dahl, all democratic associations must have a political order which <;;wQ.A., ~ 
complies with the seven minimum institutions, rights and processes characteristic \J~~ 
of what he refers to as a polyarchy. They are, elected officials, free and fair 
elections, inclusive su(frage, the right to run for office, freedom of expr~ssion, 
alternative information and associated autonomy.22 · 
21 Ibid, p57 























Polyarchy he notes is in fact a type of political order distinctive of many 
modem governments. This is not surprising as 'the institutions of polyarchy are 
necessary to democracy on a large,scale, particularly the scale of the modem 
national state.' Howev~o sayJhat all seven institutions are necessary is not to 
say that they ar"'esufficient. ' 23 , 
Their sufficiency will depend on whether they comply with, or give effect 
to, the five ideal standards or distinguishing features of a fully democratic 
process in relation to the demos. For Dahl, these five ideal standards are: 
1. Effective participation; -
2. Voting equality at the decisive stage; 
3. Enlightened understanding; 
4. Control of the agenda; and 
5. Inclusivity. 
ff the processes of polyarchy do not comply with, or give effect to these 
standards, they are insufficient to constitute a democratic order. The existing 
order must then be supplemented and encode additional institutions, rights and 
processes, which do give effect to the five ideal standards. 
This thesis has concluded that the seven institutions of polyarchy are in 
fact insufficient, premised as they are on an outdated view of the minimalist 
state. They fail to give effect to the ideal standards or objectives of a truly 
democratic process in relation to the demos in the modem administrative state. 
More specifically, the institutions of polyarchy do not satisfy the criteria of 
effective participation and enlightened understanding. 
The systems discussed thus far have, in the transformation of their legal 
systems, given expression to the recognition of the fact that the prevailing 
political order of polyarchy, although necessary, is insufficient for attaining 
democratic rule. It is insufficient in its failure to give effect to effective 
participation and enlightened understanding. They have, in recognition of this 
insufficiency introduced additional rights, institutions and procedures to give 
effect to these standards/objectives- which have been organised within the 
framework of freedom of information laws. ~-
The transformed and amended systems must however be subjected to the, 
same evaluation, as the institutions of polyarchy. They too must be evaluated 
against Dahl's five ideal standards to determine if the transformed supplemented 
system does in fact attain the highest possible degree of democracy. 
23 Ibid, p 65 
I 
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I 3.9 Do The American And Australian Systems Comply With The Five 



















One may conclude, on the basis of the preceding discussions, that the 
freedom of information laws of these two countries, premised on and informed as 
they are by the objectives of responsive government, seek to guarantee 
participation and accountability. In so doing, it is submitted that they comply 
with Dahl's democratic standards of enlightened understanding, effective 
participation and voting equality at the decisive stage. 
Unlike Dahl, this thesis places enlightened understanding as criteria 
number one, prior to the criteria of effective participation and voting equality at 
the decisive stage, as the latter two criteria are intrinsically dependant on 
enlightened understanding. 
Dahl formulates the criteria of enlightened understanding as follows: 
Each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for 
discovering and validating (within time permitted by the need for a 
decision) the choice on the matter to be decided that would best serve the 
citizen's interests. 24 
This criterion implies that a democratic order must incorporate procedures 
which afford citizens the opportunity for acquiring an understanding of 
government process and policies, of its means and ends, not only as it pertains to 
the interests of the affected individual, but in respect of all other relevant persons 
as well. In other words the procedures must afford an opportunity for the 
acquisition of global knowledge in order to allow the individual to operate or 
participate rationally within the context of the political community. 
Accordingly, procedures which cut off or suppress information are not 
democratic and conversely procedures which foster the attainment of this 
criterion may be called a democratic procedure. 
The Australian and American systems, as illustrated above, clearly comply 
with this criterion, most notably in recognising and protecting that all persons 
have a right to all information, not just information deemed necessary for the 
protection or furtherance of some localised personal need or right. The breadth of 
the recognition and protection of the right to information also complies with the 
further requirement that processes relating to the demos must in their operation 
be inclusive. 






















Inclusivity requires that: 
The demos should include all adults subject to the binding collective 
decisions of the association.25 
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The freedom of information laws of these countries are in their design and 
application geared towards responsive government in that access to information 
is assured, not just for the sake of mere brute access, but to facilitate 
participation, accountability and transparent government. The full spectrum of 
freedom of information laws and their accompanying procedures accordingly go 
a long way to meeting the criterion of effective participation which is formulated 
by Dahl as follows: 
Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to 
have an adequate opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the 
final outcome. They must have adequate and equal opportunities for 
placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons for endorsing 
one outcome rather than the other.26 
It is submitted that the American system does, in its combination of open 
government legislation, in the mechanisms provided for direct participation in its 
Administrative Procedure Act and in providing for de novo appeal in relation to 
information requests, comply with the requirement of effective participation. In 
addition these legislative expressions indicate a compliance with the requirement 
of voting equality at the decisive stage, which requires that: 
At the decisive stage of collective decisions, each citizen must be ensured 
an equal opportunity to express a choice that will be counted as equal in 
weight to the choice expressed by any other citizen. In determining 
outcomes at the decisive stage, these choices, and only these choices, must 
be taken into account. 27 
The same conclusion may largely be drawn in respect of the Australian 
system, except in so far as to say that this system at present does not go as far as 
its American counterpart. Unlike the American system which actively facilitates 
prior participation in the government decision-making process, the Australian 
system's focus is on ex post facto accountability, more so than direct prior 
25 Ibid, p 63, footnote 8 
























participation. It lacks legislation akin to the American Sunshine Act and the 
American provision for participation in collective agency decision-making, in for 
example the Administrative Procedure Act. This lapse has however been 
recognised and currently under scrutiny and proposals have been put forward to 
remedy this omission. 28 
Dahl's democratic criteria discussed thus far are, despite their insistence 
on inclusivity and participation, completely compatible with the requirements of 
efficiency demanded by the governors of the modem administrative state. Often 
arguments for efficacy have translated into arguments that inclusive participation 
can be damaging to the process of government because of the drain it places on 
resources and the necessary delays it would cause. Dahl's criteria are capable of 
taking cognisance of these arguments in that they require, not absolute direct 
participation in every sphere and in every decision, but require effective 
participation. That is to say, the procedures put into place must ensure that, in 
their effect, they achieve the objectives of direct participation. The procedures 
put into place must ensure that participation is guaranteed where it counts. There 
is no prescription as to the form that those procedures must adopt and there is 
nothing to preclude the adoption of procedures which facilitate participation in a 
constrained and regulated form so as to ensure an organised system which does 
not jeopardize the smooth running of government. Achieving this balance 
between the dictates of democratic ideals and the dictates of the efficiency of the 
administrative state is the challenge for modem democracies. Procedures 
designed to facilitate the attainment of democracy in relation to the demos must 
at all times make concessions to the efficient and successful running of the 
country, which concessions are necessary in view of the fact that the demos is in 
itself a massive, diverse and complex entity, the nuances of which cannot always 
be fully accommodated. However, the true test of democracy is whether, in 
making those concessions, the procedures do not cross the minimum threshold of 
~d err in favor of the interests of government at the expense of the 
maximum possible attainment of democratic ideals or objectives. It is to these 
concessions that we now turn, as it is here that the danger for democracy is most 
pronounced and accordingly the site for putting claims of democracy to their 
most stringent tests. 
*** 
28 At present the Legislative instruments Bill 1994 is on the table as a proposal in this regard. "It sets out a 
comprehensive regime for the making, publication and scrutiny of delegated legislation." Report on Legislative 
Instruments Bill 1994, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
























FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE 'NATIONAL SECURITY' 
EXEMPTION 
The concessions referred to in the preceding chapter are, in the context of 
freedom of information, made in the freedom of information laws' provision for 
the exclusion of certain categories of information, by positing them as 
exemptions. 
Both the Australian and American freedom of information laws recognise 
as one such exempt category of information, information relating to issue of 
'national security'. It is to this specific exemption that this thesis now turns its 
evaluative exercise. The question that must be addressed is whether the legal 
systems under consideration, in both their formulation and application of this 
exemption, maintain a democratically acceptable balance between the apparently 
competing interests at play. 
Why the 'national security' exemption? In answering the question as to 
whether or not a system is democratic, one must subject stated claims to 
democracy to the most stringent of tests. The claims must be tested in those areas 
of practice which have traditionally, through time, posed the hardest problems for 
the maintenance of democratic ideals. In overcoming the difficulties posed in 
these areas to democracy, effective solutions are hard to come by. These 
difficulties often result in inadequacies, which if not addressed, can serve to 
fundamentally undermine attaining a democratic order. 
It is precisely the magnitude of the threat and the difficulty of resolution 
which requires that issues such as these be placed firmly on the table for 
discussion. In the absence of this discussion the source of the difficulties cannot 
be identified and accordingly attempts to resolve the problems will be frustrated. 
National security epitomises one such area. The magnitude of the risks 
involved in this arena for democracy and society generally are such that it poses 
an apparently irreconcilable dilemma for democracy, most notably in the arena of 
freedom of information. The national security versus freedom of information 
debate raises some of the strongest arguments in favour of secrecy practices and 
accordingly some of the severest problems for democracy. Simultaneously, the 
magnitude of the potentially adverse consequences of untrammelled secrecy 
practices in the arena of national security for society generally, exerts an equal 
pressure for the maintenance of democratic procedures and ideals. It presents, in 






















4.1 Democracy and National Security 
Democracy and national security often co-exist in what can only be 
described as an uneasy relationship ..... democracy and security invoke 
different and very often incompatible values. 1 
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Y aniv, a proponent of extensive secrecy practices in the arena of national 
security, concludes that as a result of these incompatible values, the co-existence 
of democracy and national security is fraught with inherent problems. There is a 
prevailing consensus amongst a number of writers that the root cause of the 
problem is that the whole question of national security and democracy appears to 
pit, within the discourse of the traditional paradigm, the two concepts as polar 
opposites pulling against each other. On the one hand, the state, which in this 
context exists in its most pristine form in the conduct of the 'quintessential 
function of the state'2 and on the other hand, democracy and its attendant values, 
focussing on its aberration of the state and control of the power exercised by it. 
These problems, in view of the intricate interrelationship between 
democracy and information, crystallise most instructively within the context of 
freedom of information. This fundamental tenet of a democratic order is 
problematised by the fact that national security areas, traditionally understood to 
include: 
Government intelligence, internal [ and extemal]security and defence 
operations are traditional areas of secrecy and therefore pose hard 
problems for a democratic society. A democratic society is confronted with 
the problem that some intelligence activities require maximum secrecy and 
that its missions may be spoilt by publicity, whereas democratic 
government requires publicity.3 
The strength of this reasoning in justification of secrecy is, it is submitted 
the original source of the national security exemption. The justification for this 
exemption appears to acquire further impetus in the modem state. Claims of the 
need for efficacy and exclusive expertise are generated by the fact that the 
national security dimension of the state has grown in size and cqmplexity in 
tandem with the growth in size and complexity of the modem state. The result-
1 Avner Yaniv, National Security and Democracy in Israel, 1993, pl 
2 P Birkinshaw, op cit, p26 























A growth in the state's intelligence and security programs and the state 
departments devoted to these tasks, complicated by the influence of modem 
technology on matters such as warfare. These factors, in conjunction with the 
potentially catastrophic consequences for society, were the relevant state 
departments to fail in their assigned tasks, all go toward a wide spread demand 
for and acceptance of limiting the right to freedom of information, participation 
and accountability in this arena. In short, the dictates of democratic or responsive 
government are often readily sacrificed in the interests of national security. 
Concurrently however, these factors together with the fact that "national 
security involves the most developed form of information technology, much of it 
highly secret, [ and] covers the most intrusive of information gathering exercises 
conducted on behalf of government agencies"4, means that the concerns raised in 
this thesis in respect of democracy and freedom of information in the modem 
state are equally, if not more pertinent in the national security context. 
These concerns are rendered more pertinent and urgent in view of the 
potential for catastrophic consequences for society in this arena. The immensity 
of this potential has escalated in accordance with the 'increase in the destructive 
capacity of weapons and the contemporary involvement of science and the 
military'. For society at large the result has been the aggravation of an 'ancient 
problem to a critical problem'. It is precisely this factor, namely the safety and 
well being of society, often presented as the ultimate justification for secrecy, 
which likewise requires and justifies the free availability of information in this 
arena. The bottom line now more than ever is that 
If democracy means anything at all it must imply a substantial measure of 
involvement of citizens called upon to pay the ultimate price in decisions 
concerning war and peace - 'those who are to bleed and die have a right to 
be consulted.' 5 
There is no doubt that a cord of tension bisects the issue of national 
security within a democracy, which tension often expresses itself aggressive!\ 
and seemingly irreconcilably. This tension exists precisely because of the \ 
premium placed on information, participation and accountability in a democratic f 
society. The tension may cause difficulties and require complex solutions, but it 
1 
'-' 
must be resolved and accommodated within democratically acceptable ~\\ 
parameters, failing which, any commitment to democracy, despite finding 
expression in a multitude of other arenas will come to naught. A democratic / 
4 P Birkinshaw, op cit, p26 
























society, if it is to legitimately sustain its claim to democracy must face the 
problem and engage in a continual evaluation thereof in relation to its own 
structures with a view to locating and implementing appropriate solutions, as: 
57 
... a society that demonstrates no concern for this problem has ceased or is 
ceasing to be democratic. 6 
We tum now to an evaluation of the American, and to a lesser extent, 
the Australian systems' formulation and application of the national security 
exemption, with a view to assessing whether or not they succeed in this arena, to 
achieve and maintain democratic objectives. 
4.2 The United States- Freedom of Information, Democracy and 
National Security 
The United States, as mentioned previously, is a valuable source of 
information and a useful tool for evaluative and comparative purposes. Its value 
lies in the fact that it is characterized, not only by a long standing commitment to 
democracy, which has found expression in an advanced and comprehensive open 
government/freedom of information policy, but also has an advanced and 
comprehensive national security policy and correlative infrastructure. 
4.3 The National Security Exemption In The United States 
The American Freedom of Information Act guarantees public access to 
agency information, subject to a number of exemptions. The two exemptions 
which are traditionally raised in justification of the denial of access to 
information, on the ground that disclosure would be contrary to the interests of 
national security, are the exemptions of information: 
1. (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an executive order 
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and 
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order; 7 and 
information; 
2. specifically exempted from disclosure by statute .. provided that such 
statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a 
6 Mathews, op cit, p 18 






















manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular 
criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be 
withheld.8 
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The following discussion will focus on these two exemptions as expressed 
in the Freedom of Information Act. Similarly worded exemptions are found in 
the other acts relating to access to information, disclosure and participation. As 
such, the discussion in regard to the Freedom of Information Act may be 
regarded as being equally applicable, in so far as is relevant, to the balance of the 
legislation referred to in previous chapters. 
4.4 The Application of the National Security Exemption to Freedom of 
Information 
It is recognised by both proponents of extensive secrecy in the realm of 
national security 9and those opposed to the breadth of this practice 10 that the First 
Amendment of the United States' Constitution affords the public a constitutional 
democratic right to know. The premise of the First Amendment theory which 
gives rise to this right is that 'the people as sovereign need to be kept informed of 
all matters affecting the public interest... [it] is the essence of democratic 
government.' 11 
Fein explains this theory as follows: 
The first amendment fosters several vital constitutional values which 
government secrecy may impair. The first amendment supports the 
protection and encouragement of informed public colloquy "to the end that 
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, 
if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means" [DeJonge V Oregon, 299 
U.S. 353, 365 (1937)]. Enlightened public discussion or criticism of 
government policies enables the electorate to form intelligent opinions 
whether particular public officials should stay in office or whether 
particular government practices should continue .. 12 
Both proponents for and against extensive national security secrecy 
8 S 552(b)(3) 
f.9 Bruce E. Fein 'National Security and the First Amendment: Access To Classified Information Constitutional and 
Statutory Dimensions' in Summer (1985), 26 William and Mary Law Review, p 813 
1<'. 10 Thomas I. Emerson' Comment on "Access to Classified Information: Constitutional and Statutory Dimensions" 
in Summer (1985), 26 William and Mary Law Review, p846 
11 Ibid 





practices recognise that there is a need to limit the right to access to information 
within this context. However, they part ways in drawing the democratically 
I permissible and legitimate boundaries demarcating the scope of this limitation. In addition to the two national security related exemptions provided for by 
. ~ the Freedom of Information Act quoted above, the right to access to information I 'v is further limited in the arena of national security by the government's right in 
civil actions to lodge a formal claim of state secrets privilege. This privilege is 
I successfully raised if the Secretary of the blocking agency files a personal affidavit, which may be filed in camera, asserting a formal claim of privilege to 
I 
protect certain state secrets relating to national defence and security. 13 
Writers such as Mary Cheh, who advocate access to information, whilst 
conceding that this right cannot be absolute, criticise the American administrative I legal system for failing to achieve, in the formulation and application of these 
national security limitations, a constitutionally or democratically justifiable 
I 
balance between ~~two apparently comP.eting valu~..§.:_, 
---~Chef ai-~s that~xeniptioiione~'°ithe FOIA which exempts disclosure of 
classified information 'is not so much an exemption as a !l-cen~~ to witllhold', I because the executive branch both establishes the criteria for classification and 
performs the actual classification of the information. 14 
I Her sentiments are echoed by writers such as Michael Hughes 1
5
, Thomas 
Emerson16 and Harold Koh11 who all appear to be of the view that the American 
executive branch of government has a stranglehold on information in the arena of I national security. This stranglehold they argue is neither constitutionally nor 
democratically justifiable. They argue that in effect, exemptions in the name of 









of the essence of democracy. 
These writers are all largely in agreement as to the cause of this jump from 
a theoretically recognised need for a democratically acceptable limitation of the 
right to know, to a negation of the right in the practical application of the 
exemptions. The root cause is an excess of power accorded by the legislature to, 
I) Kathleen Buck, 'Access to Classified Information: Constitutional and Statutory Dimensions The First 
Amendment - An Absolute Right?' in Summer, (1985),26 William and Mazy Law Review, p 856 
14 Mary M. Cheh, 'Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of Expression for Government 
Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government Information', in (1984) Vol 69, April Cornell Law 
Review, p 691 
15 Michael Hughes, 'CIA v Sims: Supreme Court Deference to Agency Interpretation ofFOIA exemption 3' in 
Fall (1985), 35 Catholic University Law Review, p 279 
16 Thomas I. Emerson, op cit, p846 
17 As set out in Todd D. Peterson, 'Book Review of The Law and Politics of Shared National security Power by 
Harold H Koh, New Haven, Conn: Yale university Press 1990' in (1991), Vol 59 The George Washington Law 























and appropriated by, the executive arm of government in respect of its control 
over disclosure of information in the arena of national security. This over breadth 
of power is then exacerbated by insufficient institutional checks and balances on 
the appropriation and exercise of that power, most notably an impotent judiciary, 
unjustifiably eager in its deference to the executive branch and legislative 
acquiescence to the status quo. 18 . 
It is submitted, as will be illustrated hereunder, that the criticisms levelled 
against, and the conclusions drawn by these writers in respect of the American 
legal system in the arena of national security, especially with regard to the role 
played by the three branches of government, are correct. 
4.5 The Executive's Control of National Security Information 
Exemption one to the FOIA exempts information properly classified 
pursuant to an Executive order, as being in the interest of national defence or 
foreign policy. This exemption unequivocally places the power over and the 
function of classification of this information in the hands of the executive. In so 
doing it places control over access to that information in the hands of the 
executive. The president, in his capacity as head of the executive, may by 
executive order, not only determine a scheme for classification and dictate what 
is to fall within that scheme, but may also in so doing control, or more 
specifically, prevent access to that information. 
The executive power is comprehensive and unlimited by statute. It 
includes, as illustrated by President Reagan's notorious executive order of 1982 19, 
the power to establish a comprehensive classification system, to set the criteria to 
be used in determining what information is to be regarded as classified, to 
specify broad or narrow categories of information to fall within the ambit of the 
classification system, the power to limit disclosure of the information to 
authorised persons and the power to determine who qualifies as an authorised 
person. 
Presidents Reagan's executive order capitalised extensively on the power 
afforded the executive and established a comprehensive scheme for classifying 
and withholding national security information. It identified three levels of 
classification and directed executive officials to classify material falling into 
predetermined wide ranging broad categories of information. They ranged from 
military plans to exceedingly wide fluid categories such as the vulnerabilities or 
capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national 
18 Cheli, Op Cit, pp691-3; Emerson, Op Cit, p 847, Hughes, Op Cit 287 & Koh, in Peterson Op Cit, p 748 























security, intelligence activities. The obviously comprehensive nature and breadth 
of these categories was however not deemed sufficient and they were, in effect, 
rendered limitless by the additional catch-all category of 'other categories of 
information that are related to the national security and that require protection 
against unauthorised disclosure as determined by the President' .20 
The order, having cast the net very wide, then, as a general rule precludes 
disclosure of classified information to anyone other than executive branch 
officials whose trustworthiness has been determined by an agency head or 
designated official and only if such access is essential to furthering a legitimate 
government purpose.21 
At 4 .1 ( c) the Order does provide that in the event that classified 
information should be permitted to be disseminated outside the executive branch, 
such dissemination would only be permitted under conditions that would ensure 
the same degree of confidentiality protection as that ensured within the executive 
branch. 
By limiting disclosure to select members of the executive branch only, 
the Order not only restricts public access, but also access by the legislature or 
Congress - all at the behest and control of the executive branch of government. 
Birkinshaw concludes that the effect of this Executive order was to reverse 
a previous trend of relaxation of security classifications and 'broadened the 
[executive] discretion to create official secrets', which effect was a result of the 
Order doing away with many of the prior safeguards against over enthusiastic 
classifications. 22 
This observation by Birkinshaw certainly is substantiated by the breadth 
and extent of the categories of information set out in the order as candidates for 
classification. This breadth coupled with the mandatory, rather than permissive 
tone directing the executive official's classification energies to these categories 
gave rise to a new trend, where: 
... mandatory secrecy requirements rather than permissive ones became 
more common, the balancing test requiring the weighing of public access 
against the government need for secrecy was eliminated, and systematic 
declassification was cancelled.2' 
The sum total effect of Reagan's order was - a massive restriction on 
20 Exec. Order no. 12, 356 at 163-69 (@ 13 (a)(l )-(10 _) 
21 Op Cit 4. l(a) 























previously available information. 24 
However, in 1995, this executive order was substantially amended by 
Executive Order No. 12,958 which has gone some way towards reversing the 
trend of automatic or mechanical classification, and the attendant automatic 
denial of access to the classified information, by: 
1. shortening the period of classification to 10 years in most instances, 
2. introducing, as a general rule, automatic declassification after 25 years, 
3. restoring the 'balancing test' in obliging the decision to classify to be 
guided by considering whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs 
the damage to national security that might reasonably be expected from 
disclosure, 
4. removing presumptions, in some areas, against automatic classification, 
5. requiring concise reasons to be given on the documents for classification, 
and 
62 
6. establishing a Security Classifications Appeals Board and Policy Advisory 
Council. 25 
The liberalisation of the 1982 Order, although it does on the face of 
it contain the potential for a less severe curtailment of access to information, it 
does not, it is submitted go to disposing of Mary Cheh' s criticism. It does not 
alter the fact that exemption one is not so much an exemption as a license to 
withhold. 
Her criticism is not disposed of because, even though the amendments may 
have a liberalising effect on the availability of infom1ation, that effect remains at 
the behest and under the control of the executive branch of government. The 
effect will remain in operation only as long as the executive branch of the day 
desires this result. The amendment does not reflect any fundamental change, as at 
the end of the day, the executive branch still both establishes the criteria for 
classification and performs the actual classification of the information. In so 
doing it still controls access to information, which control is not subject to any 
external constraints. There is nothing to preclude the reversal of the current 
24 As per the finding of the National Co-Ordinating Committee for the Promotion of History, in Birkinshaw, Op 
Cit,, p52, footnote 5 






















emerging trend evidenced by the prevailing Order by a future, or even the 
current, executive. 
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In addition, the liberalisation of the information system in the arena of 
national security depends on more than the tone set by the prevailing executive 
order. It further depends on a commitment by the executive branch of 
government and its administration in its entirety, not only the head of that branch, 
to act in accordance with the tone as set, and in the absence of voluntary 
compliance, it requires an effective enforcement mechanism, namely the 
judiciary. 
The judiciary has in the past, even in the face of attempted liberalisation by 
the executive and even the legislature, of access to information in the arena of 
national security, tenaciously refused to enter the fray and has not liberalised its 
approach accordingly. There is nothing to indicate that this attitude has or will 
change simply as a result of a more beneficent executive. 
At the end of the day, the 1995 Order does not fundamentally change the 
fact that the executive branch of government is accorded immense and largely 
unchecked power to classify information and accordingly control the availability 
of information. The extent of the power accorded the executive has not changed. 
The extent to which that power is actually capitalised on may see-saw in 
accordance with the prevailing executive attitude, but any self-imposed limitation 
of that power remains revocable at the behest of the executive. 
In addition, the power to classify information and any limitations in 
respect thereof, is not fatal to the executive's control over access to information 
in the arena of national security. Any limitation in this arena may always be 
supplemented and the effect of that limitation rendered redundant by the 
executive's exercise of its power to control information and its disclosure other 
than by means of classification. 
So for example, in terms of exemption three of the FOIA, the government 
may refuse disclosure of information on the ground that it would be contrary to 
the interests of national security, as authorised by some other act of parliament 
prohibiting disclosure in this arena. 
The statutes relating to questions of national security envisaged by this 
exemption generally grant the executive branch a broad degree of discretion. It 
accordingly enjoys extensive power to determine when exemption three may be 
invoked and the disclosure of information refused. 
For example, S 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 authorises 
the director of the CIA to protect intelligence sources and methods from 
unauthorised disclosure. Needless to say the act does not define intelligence 
sources and the applicability of the act and its scope is therefore left to the 






















which, as will be discussed, exercise deference to the executive determination in 
cases of dispute. 
The government has also employed the Espionage Act to successfully 
prohibit disclosure of information which related to issues other than spying to 
which the act was commonly thought to have been directed.26 Other acts which 
supplement the power of the executive in this regard are inter alia the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 and The Department of Defense Authorisation Act of 1984. 
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In addition to exemption three and its host of subsidiary acts of parliament, 
the executive branch's power to control information and restrict its disclosure, is 
founded in the state secrets privilege. This privilege may be invoked at the behest 
of the Secretary of the blocking agency on the ground of protection of secrets 
relating to national defence and security. 
The scope for control of information through this route is immense. It is 
arguably even greater than through the classification or exemption three route. 
Uie reason is that exemption one exempts information classified in the interest of 
national security, which is limited by the wording of the exemption to national 
defence or foreign policy. 
As such, there exist two criteria in terms of exemption one, which may 
result in some limitation of its scope: 
a. the material must have gone through the correct classification procedure, 
and 
b. the definition of national security is limited, albeit a broad and imprecise 
limitation, to the traditional areas of national defence and foreign policy ( 
huge concepts in and of themselves). 
These two limiting factors appear to be absent when invoking the state 
secrets privilege, and to some extent, so too in the application of exemption three. 
Unlike exemption one, which refers specifically to, and accordingly equates 
national defence with national security, the state secrets privilege refers to 
national defence and security as two distinct concepts. It accordingly 
contemplates something more than mere national defence as falling within the 
ambit of national security. The ambit of national security is accordingly limitless, 
the limits of which are left in the hand of the executive branch. 
The immensity of power accorded the executive branch in this regard has, 
as in the case of exemption one and three of the FOIA, been left largely 
unchecked by the courts. Judicial deference to the executive branch is the order 
of the day, due to sentiments such as those expressed in the case ofHalkin v 






















Helms. The court based its finding on the view that the state secrets privilege is 
absolute, and that the need for well-informed advocacy must give way to the 
government's privilege against disclosure of its secrets of state. Accordingly it 
held that the standard of review in considering the privilege was a narrow one 
and that courts should accord the "utmost deference" to executive assertions of 
the state secrets privilege. 27 
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4.6 Judicial Constraints on the Executive Exercise of Control of National 
Security Information 
Michael Hughes commences his discussion on the legislative history of the 
American FOIA with the following statement: 
The enactment of the FOIA, which followed a decade-long effort to 
amend the public access section of the AP A, was a first step into the 
sunshine. It provided the public with a judicially enforceable right of 
access to information generated by the federal government. Although the 
drafters were cognizant that certain areas would need to be outside the 
scope of the Act, the presumption was in favor of disclosure wherever 
possible, with the judiciary serving as guardian of the public's statutory 
right to know.28(my stress) 
His conclusion as to the objects of the Act is founded on comments made 
during congressional sessions dealing with the act, such as: 
Success lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses, 
balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest 
responsible disclosure; and 
This bill is not to be considered ... a withholding statute in any sense of 
the term .. .It is our intent that the courts interpret this legislation broadly, 
as a disclosure statute and not as an excuse to withhold information from 
the public.29 
Despite these clear statements of legislative intent which dictate a broad 
construction of the act, the Courts, in applying the Act, 'often took a deferential 
approach whenever any agency invoked one of the nine exemptions', most 
27 598 F. 2d 1 ( D.C. Cir. 1978)@ 7, as discussed in Buck, Op Cit. P857 
28 Michael Hughes, op cit, p284 






















notably, whenever exemptions one and three were invoked in the context of 
national security. 
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The Supreme Court in the leading case of Mink v EPA interpreted 
exemption one in favor of the executive branch. It held that once exemption one 
had been raised by an agency in respect of classified material, the court was 
precluded from considering the merits of the decision to classify, and was 
precluded from compelling the release of the documents. Further, that the Act did 
not allow for in camera examination of the documents to determine whether 
unclassified segments could be disclosed. 
The argument was raised, and accepted by the three dissenting justices, 
that if an agency raised an exemption, including exemption one, the Act, in view 
of its legislative history, directed the courts to review matters de novo. In so 
doing, the Act in effect placed the onus on the agency raising the exemption to 
justify its argument, on the merits, in favor of nondisclosure. 
This argument was rejected by the majority of the court which held the 
view that the FOIA's legislative history supported this conclusion in respect of all 
the other exemptions, except for exemption one. In respect of this exemption, the 
legislative history supported the conclusion that it should be treated differently 
than the other exemptions for purposes of court review. The court's role was 
limited. Once the agency demonstrated that the specific items were entitled to the 
exemption's protection, in other words, that they were classified, the judiciary's 
role was at an end. If the items were shown to be classified the court was not able 
or entitled to second-guess the classification decision made by the executive 
branch.30 
Hughes explains that the deferential approach adopted by the court, despite 
the apparently clear earlier statements of legislative intent, was to some extent 
explicable in view of some confusion surrounding the legislative history of the 
FOIA. The statements relied on by Hughes to support his reading of the Act 
reflected the sentiments of the Senate report which accompanied the FO IA 
proposal. This report however differed from the House report on the FOIA which 
adopted a far more restrictive and conservative approach to the Act. This 
uncertainty of legislative intent, coupled with a subsequent restrictive 
interpretation by the Attorney General and ambiguities in the original Act 
provided ammunition for the court's deferential approach. 31 
However, subsequent to, and as a result of the deferential decision in the 
Mink case, the legislature eradicated any further doubt on the matter and 
amended exemption 1, and those sections of the statute relating to judicial 
30 Mink v EPA, 410, U.S. (1973)@ 78 - 96, as discussed in Hughes, Op cit p288 
























The reasoning for this amendment was as follows: 
It is essential.. ... to the proper workings of [the Act] that any executive 
branch review, itself, be reviewable outside the executive branch. And the 
courts -when necessary, using special masters or expert consultants of 
their own choosing ..... are the only forums now available in which such 
review can properly be conducted. 33 
These sentiments culminated in the 197 4 amendments to exemption one 
and an express extension of the courts' power of review in respect of all 
exemptions. The relevant amendment to the FOIA now reads as follows: 
(B) On complaint, the district court of the United States ..... has jurisdiction 
to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the 
production of any agency records improperly withheld from the 
complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, 
and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to 
determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under 
any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section and the 
burden is on the agency to sustain its_ action.34(my stress) 
As pointed out by Hughes, the language adopted by Congress 'buttressed 
the role of the courts in reviewing agency actions to withhold information under 
any exemption, although the debate had centred on exemption one. The in 
camera examination of documents denied under exemption one, however, was 
discretionary, not mandatory. ' 35 
The effect of this amendment was clearly to override the effect of the 
Mink decision which advocate~ the treating of exemption one differently to the 
other exemptions in so far as the court's power of review was concerned. The 
language of the amendment is clear: The court's power of review de nova, 
applies to all exemptions, and the burden is on the agency relying on the 
exemption to satisfy the court that it applies on the merits. 
Subsequent to these amendments, the Court of Appeals in Ray v Turner, 
587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978) at 1195, set out the courts power of de nova 
32 Ibid, 293 
33 S.Rep. No 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-17, 28-31 (1974), reprinted in the Joint Source Book, in Hughes Op 
Cit , p291, footnote 1 15 
34 S 552 (a)( 4)(B) 























review in the national security context under the amended FOIA as follows: 
(1) The government has the burden of establishing an exemption. 
(2) The court must make a de nova determination. 
(3) In doing this, it must first "accord substantial weight to an agency's 
affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the 
disputed record." 
(4) Whether and how to conduct an in camera examination of the 
documents rests in the sound discretion of the court, in national 
security cases as in all other cases. 
The court further confirmed that these powers and duties applied to both 
exemptions one and three. 
The sentiments expressed in the 197 4 amendments and the legislative 
debate preceding them, constituted a clear statement of the legislature's 
commitment to a policy of disclosure under the FOI Act, and that, that policy was 
not to be weakened without due cause in the arena of national security by a 
deferential court. 
Despite this legislative affirmation of a policy of disclosure and its 
applicability to all exemptions, the Supreme Court in the case of Administrator. 
FAA v Robertson, subsequent to the 197 4 amendments, once again deferred to 
the executive branch's interpretation of exemption three, in the context of 
national security. In so doing it sanctioned non-disclosure at the behest of the 
executive branch clearly not sanctioned by the legislature.36 
At the time of the Robertson case exemption three protected matters 
'specifically exempted from disclosure by statute'. The court of appeals, 
following the unambiguous direction given by the wording of the exemption, 
rendered all the clearer in view of the most recent amendments to the Act, 
disallowed the agency's reliance on this exemption. It found that the statute relied 
on by the FAA permitted the agency too broad a discretion for it to meet the 
FOIA's exemption three requirements.37 
The Supreme Court however, despite the clarity of wording and legislative 
intent, adopted a deferential approach to the interpretation of this phrase and 
reversed the Court of Appeals finding. It concluded that statutes which afford the 
executive branch a broad degree of discretion in determining whether to permit 
disclosure or not, based as in this case, on the administrator's determination as to 
whether or not it was in the public interest, qualified as a nondisclosure statute 
36 422, U.S. 255 (1975) 























for the purpose of exemption three. 
The dissenting opinions of Justice Douglas and Brennan show up the 
contrived nature of the majority opinion. They held that the legislative history of 
the amendments to the Act and the wording of the exemption, namely 
"specifically exempted" did not embrace the discretionary nature of the section in 
dispute. The discretionary nature of the power, together with its vague public 
interest standard could not in their opinion be construed as a matter "specifically 
exempted". 38 
The approach adopted by the majority of the court in the Robertson case 
was clearly not in accord with the legislative intent which found specific 
expression in the amendments to exemption one, but was of general application 
to the interpretation of the Act, and all exemptions thereto as a whole. The 
court's blatant disregard of the legislature's intention in interpreting exemption 
three resulted in the 1976 amendments to exemption three. This round of 
amendments unequivocally sought to reverse the Robertson decision and in so 
doing affirmed the dissenting justices' view. 
The amended exemption specifically sought to remove from the 
exemption's protection, discretionary statutes such as those which formed the 
subject of dispute in the Robertson case. Exemption three, as amended, now 
permits th~ wit4holding of information prohibited from release by another 
/ --- . . statute/only if that-statute: · ·7; 
/("A)requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such manner as 
· >' to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for 
/ withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.39 (my 
\ stress) 
Hu~es_~g-~ue~s~th~at:..: --~------_.,;;;.-.::::::::::-=. ___ ~ 
The 1974 and 1976 amendments to the FOIA demonstrate that, in the past, 
Congress has not hesitated to overturn Supreme Court decisions that it 
believed were contrary to the Act's disclosure mandate. These legislative 
overrulings reaffirm Congress' continuing commitment to a strong public 
policy favoring disclosure under the FOIA and to narrow interpretation of 
the exemptions.40 
It is submitted that one can take Hughes' argument one step further and 
38 at 268 ( Douglas & Brennan, JJ dissenting) 
39 5 U.S.C.@ 552(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. I 1983) as discussed in Hughes Op Cit@ p296 























argue that the 197 4 and 197 6 amendments are an expression of Congress' more 
deep seated commitment to protection of the principles of a participatory, 
constitutional democracy. The amendments all go to strengthening the 
constitutional prescription of the separation of powers in their progressive 
curtailment of executive overreaching of power through the use ( or abuse) of 
extensive discretionary powers, particularly in respect of that most important 
right of access to information. The effect of the amendments is a reclamation, by 
the legislature, of the power to at best decide, and at worst, to materially guide 
executive decisions in respect of disclosure or non-disclosure of information. 
The core of the amendment to exemption three is a constraint on the 
exercise of discretion by the executive branch. Decisions regarding access to 
information which are the product of a discretionary exercise of power are not 
accorded protection by the FOIA exemption in so far as that discretion has not 
been guided by the legislature in the enabling act, by means of criteria which 
have been identified and sanctioned by the legislature. 
In addition, Congress, in its unequivocal affirmation of the courts powers 
of review in respect of all invocations of all FOIA exemptions, most notably, in 
the arena of national security, strengthened a further institutional mechanism for 
controlling and checking the exercise of executive discretion according to 
legislative and constitutional precepts. 
One would be entitled to assume that the American experience in the arena 
of national security and access to information, from this point forward, would be 
one characterised by a strict judicial attitude in response to claims of exemption 
by the executive. 
This assumption does not however hold true. The judicial trend, 
subsequent to these amendments, has been one of deference to the executive 
branch of government in the face of claims by the executive of non-disclosure in 
the interests of national security. 
4.7 Judicial Review- Post 1974 and 1976 Amendments 
The court's approach to exemption one and the review of claims thereof, 
has despite the clarity of legislative intent, continued to display excessive 
deference to classification decisions of the executive. The result:- 'Rarely has the 
judiciary compelled the government to reveal classified information. ' 41 
The courts and proponents of this trend have justified this approach by 
looking to certain Congressional statements made in respect of the FOIA 
amendments, such as: 























The conferees recognise that the Executive departments responsible for 
national defense and foreign policy matters have unique insight into what 
adverse effects might occur as a result of public disclosure of a particular 
classified record. Accordingly, the conferees expect that federal courts, in 
making de novo determinations in section 552(b)(l) cases under the 
Freedom of Information laws, will accord substantial weight to an agency's 
affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed 
record.42 
It is submitted statements such as these do not, contrary to the courts' 
opinion, justify the approach adopted by them. Their approach has been 
characterised, not by merely according substantial weight to the agency, but a 
fundamental presumption in favor of the agency, as evidenced by the statements 
made by the court in the case of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc v Colby0 . The court, as 
required by the Act, recognised its power to review the decision to withhold 
information by the executive in terms of exemption one. It further recognised that 
the decision to withhold would only be upheld if it was found to be classified and 
classifiable under the prevailing Executive Order. However, the court effectively 
rendered this power nugatory by stating that in exercising this power, its starting 
point would be a presumption in favor of the executive that the public official 
who classified the information, properly discharged his official duties. 
The aforesaid presumption, as with any presumption, effectively shifts the 
onus to the applicant to prove his or her case as opposed to the agency bearing 
the onus. The shifting of the onus is rendered even more onerous by the courts 
tendency to defer to the agency's reasoning underlying the classification decision 
on the basis of the agency's perceived expertise. 
This approach by the court is reminiscent of decisions such as Mink which 
predate the 197 4 amendments and which were founded on the belief that 
'national security' matters were to be treated differently, that the standard of 
review was to be much lower and that the onus would be on the applicant. 
The amendments were designed to eradicate precisely this line of thinking. 
They expressly placed review of 'national security' issues, raised within the 
context of exemption one, on par with all other exemptions, by expressly 
requiring de nova review of classification decisions, and by placing the burden of 
proof on the state. 
It would be nai"ve to imagine that the framers of the amendment did not 
42 S. Con. Rep. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6285, 
6290 























expect the court, in reaching its conclusion with regard to the classification 
decision, to give due consideration to the agency's affidavit. However, to argue 
that the intention of the framers of the amendment was to create a presumption in 
favor of the agency is not sustainable - their intention was in direct opposition to 
this. 
The trend of judicial deference is revealed in other cases such as, CIA v 
Sims44 • This case involved the judicial interpretation of the scope of exemption 
three as amended in 1976. The question was specifically whether a provision of 
the National Security Act of 1947 which authorised the Director of the CIA to 
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorised disclosure, qualified 
as an exemption three statute. 
In addition the court was faced with the question as to whether or not 
certain individuals and institutions involved in a research program and that 
provided information to the agency were "intelligence sources" within the 
meaning of the National security Act for the purposes of the FOIA exemption. 
On both of these issues the court found in favor of the CIA and held that 
the exemption was applicable and that the material was protected because it 
related to intelligence sources.45 
The findings of the court hinged on its interpretation of "intelligence 
sources", which if narrowly construed would have precluded the possibility of 
the CIA invoking exemption three. 
In the court's view, an "intelligence source" was anyone who "provides or 
is engaged to provide information the Agency needs to fulfill its statutory 
obligations. 1146 
This was an outright rejection of the previous court of appeals definition 
which defined "intelligence source" as a "person or institution that provides, has 
provided, or has been engaged to provide the CIA with information of a kind the 
Agency needs to perform its intelligence function effectively, yet could not 
reasonably expect to obtain without guaranteeing the confidentiality of those who 
provide it." 
In adopting a much wider definition, as advocated by the CIA, the court 
effectively increased the scope of exemption three. The wider definition allowed 
a far more extensive body of information, than intended by exemption three, to 
be shielded from disclosure. In addition, in defining "intelligence sources" in the 
broadest possible terms, it effectively left decisions as to what constitutes an 
intelligence source at the sole discretion of the agency. In so doing it lowered the 
burden of proof to be met by the agency and accordingly, the court largely 
44 105 S.Ct 1881 (1985) as discussed in Hughes, Op Cit, p296 
45 @ 1890 & 2 























negated it review powers. 
These criticisms were acknowledged by Justice Marshall who, despite 
concurring with the majority's final finding, pointed out that the court in 
accepting the overly broad interpretation of "intelligence source" was giving the 
CIA director the type of discretion that Congress sought to eliminate in its 197 6 
amendments.47 
Justice Marshall further pointed out that a more expansive reading of 
"intelligence sources" ignored the more rigorous review required by the national 
security exemption, namely exemption one, which although not raised, was of 
relevance in view of the subject matter. Further and more fundamentally, it was 
incompatible with the overall legislative scheme which unequivocally afforded 
the judiciary an active role in limiting the discretion of agencies to refuse 
information requested in terms of the FOIA.48 
Justice Marshall's reasoning in favor of a restrictive definition of 
"intelligence sources" and the consequences of adopting a broader definition is 
summarised by Hughes as follows: 
Justice Marshall reasoned that his reading of "intelligence source" was 
more in keeping with the spirit of the FOIA than the overly deferential 
approach favored by the majority. In fact, he opined that the majority's 
position actually frustrated the efforts of congress to achieve the delicate 
balance between the public's need for information and the government's 
need for confidentiality in some of its operations .... [He] believed that in 
its unquestioning acceptance of the arguments advocated by the agency, 
the Court was violating the FOIA's requirements that the judiciary review 
de novo agency claims of exemption. In addition, he maintained that the 
majority in effect was substituting its own judgement for that which 
properly belonged to the legislative branch.49 
The last point made could be refined further and one may conclude that the 
majority was not so much substituting its judgement for that of the legislative 
branch, but in accepting the agency's argument, it was condoning the executive's 
usurpation of a legislative function. 
Hughes concludes that as a result of the Sims decision, which reflects the 
current generally deferential approach of the courts to the FOIA national security 
exemptions, 'those who voice concern over increasing government secrecy will 
47@ 1898 
48 @ 1895-6, as discussed in Hughes, op cit at p283 





















again have to turn to Congress if sweeping executive and judicial policies 
favoring nondisclosure are to be overturned.' 50 
4.8 Australia - Freedom of Information and The National Security 
Exemption 
74 
The Australian federal Freedom of Information Act, like its American 
counterpart, exempts matters relating to national security. They are exempt, 
directly in terms of S 33(1)(a), and indirectly in terms of S 38(1). These 
provisions and the applicable law will not be discussed in detail so as to avoid 
unnecessary duplication, but will only be discussed in so far as they either depart 
in their effect from the American provisions or in so far as they echo the same 
problems encountered in the application of the American provisions. 
Section 33(1) states that: 
A document is an exempt document if disclosure of the document under 
this Act: 
(a) would or could reasonably be expected to cause damage to: 
i.) the security of the Commonwealth; 
ii.) the defence ofthe Commonwealth; or 
iii.) the international relations of the Commonwealth, and 
Section 38(1) provides that: 
Subject to subsection (lA), a document is an exempt document if; 
(a) disclosure of the document, or information contained in the document, 
is prohibited under a provision of an enactment and 
(b) either: 
(i) that provision is specified in Schedule 3; or 
(ii) this section is expressly applied to the document, or information, by 
that provision, or by another provision of that or any other enactment. 
Unlike the American FOI Act exemptions, no system of classification is 
utilised by the act and accordingly the decision as to whether requested 
information is a national security matter and accordingly exempt, requires a fresh 
and independent appraisal and consideration by the decision-maker. In addition, 
the decision-maker is obliged, in terms of the language of the exemption 
provision, to consider during the course of his or her consideration of the 























requested information, whether the disclosure thereof would, or could 
reasonably be expected to cause damage to the Commonwealth's national 
security. As such, an inherent limitation is built into the decision-making process 
by the legislature's choice of wording in S 33(1)(a) of the Act. This is contrary to 
its American counterpart which leaves the matter entirely to the discretion of the 
executive in permitting non-disclosure on the grounds of classification. The 
executive, in classifying is not compelled by the American Act to weigh any 
stated competing interests according to a predetermined standard. 
The Australian Act's express limitation of non-disclosure, to information 
which if disclosed, would or could reasonably harm the country's security or 
defence, does not extend to the imposition of a limitation regarding the type of 
harm envisaged. When it comes to questions of the type of harm, the language 
used in the S 33(l)(a) is, as in the case of the American exemption, extremely 
broad. It fails to give guidance on, or define, what constitutes national security or 
defence. This determination is left entirely in the hands of the decision-maker. 
The only potential restraint on the exercise of the decision-maker's discretion in 
this regard is the availability of an application for de nova appeal by the AA T 
that the requested information does fall into an exempt category. This option is 
however, as in the American context, not available in the arena of the national 
security exemption. 
Unlike the American model however, this failure is not solely the result of 
judicial conservatism, but is the direct result of an express proviso to S 33(1) of 
the Australian Act which states that: 
Where a Minister is satisfied that a document is an exempt document for a 
reason referred to in subsection(!), he may sign a certificate to that effect 
(specifying that reason) and, subject to the operation of Part VI, such a 
certificate, so long as it remains in force, establishes conclusively that the 
document is an exempt document referred to in subsection(l). 51 
This proviso unambiguously precludes the possibility of a de nova appeal 
in respect of the decision not to disclose information in the interests of national 
security. In so doing it treats the national security exemption differently to other 
exemptions. An aggrieved party does retain the right to pursue the remaining 
limited alternative remedy of judicial review, as opposed to an appeal, of the 
decision. However, that review is limited to review of whether 'reasonable 
grounds' exist for the claimed exemption. 
Unfortunately judicial conservatism has seen the adoption of an approach 






















to the scope of review in this context 'which robs even this limited scope of 
review of much significance' .52 Accordingly, even the built-in limitation to the 
national security exemption referred to earlier, namely the duty to weigh the 
interest against the likelihood of harm, is rendered largely redundant. 
76 
The courts' conservative deferential approach was confirmed by the 
Federal court in the case of Department of Industrial Relations v Burchj)l 53 where 
it was held that 
... to be reasonable, it is requisite only that [ the grounds stated in the 
conclusive certificate ] be not fanciful, imaginary or contrived, but rather 
that they be reasonable, that is to say based on reason, namely agreeable to 
reason, not irrational, absurd or ridiculous. 
Bayne notes that this test of reasonable grounds, framed as it is in a double 
negative, in effect casts a burden of proof on the applicant.54 His criticism co-
incides largely with the criticisms levelled at the implications of the American 
court's approach to its review functions in this arena. Therefore, the approach of 
both systems may, at worst, be said to be premised on a presumption of 
reasonableness in favour of the agency, which presumption is not easily rebutted. 
Alternatively, at best, should this test be seen to in fact impose the onus of proof 
on the agency, the standard for discharging it is so low as to effectively amount 
to a favourable presumption. 
It is further submitted that the approach adopted by the courts to review for 
unreasonableness in the arena of national security ( in the presence of a 
conclusive certificate) is reactionary in comparison to the general developmental 
trend in administrative law to expand the application of the ground of review for 
reasonableness. Contrary to this trend, the courts' approach harks back to the 
traditional constrained view of judicial review - a legacy of its English heritage. 
This legacy was found to be inadequate in the provision of just 
administrative action and was accordingly the subject of large-scale change in the 
process of Australia's general overhaul of its Administrative legal system in the 
1970's. These changes saw not only the establishment of the MT, but also a 
codification of more extensive and pervasive grounds of review in the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. 
The minimisation of the potential of review as an effective constraint on 
the exercise of the national security agencies' discretionary power to withhold 
information is taken one step further, so as to render it completely ineffective. 
52 P Bayne, op cit, p 183, footnote 17 
53 (1991) 14 AAR 408@ 411 






















The reviewing body is precluded, in the event of a conclusion that the decision 
was unreasonable, from setting aside or revoking that decision55 • Contrary to its 
usual remedial powers, it is limited to merely recommending that the conclusive 
certificate be revoked. 
77 
The rationale for the inclusion of a conclusive certificate proviso and the 
attendant emasculation of appeal and review as mechanisms of control in relation 
to national security issues, was that very sensitive documents required additional 
protection from disclosure, as the exemptions alone would not suffice. 56 Further, 
that this additional protection would be assured by locating decisions as to 
disclosure of these documents at the highest official level. 
Criticisms levelled against the Australian response to these concerns are 
not primarily directed at this underlying rationale. The critics are concerned with 
the methods chosen to accommodate it, and the adverse consequences of the 
implementation of those methods. The upshot of the matter is that the reach of 
the chosen methods enables the decision-maker to capitalise on his or her 
untrammeled discretion, whether mistakenly, unreasonably or abusively, to 
protect information not envisaged or intended to fall within the democratically 
acceptable meaning of 'very sensitive documents'. It in fact allows the decision-
maker to determine the founding criteria for sensitivity, as opposed to limiting his 
or her actions to assessing the content of documents as against pre-determined 
criteria for sensitivity. The potential for the misuse and abuse of this power in 
this arena is huge. 
As such, criticisms may justifiably be levelled against the immense degree 
of discretion granted by virtue of the Act's failure to prescribe prior constraints, 
or ex post facto mechanisms of accountability for failing to operate within those 
constraints. 
One particular aspect indicative of the immensity of the breadth of this 
power and the impact thereof on the availability of information relates to the time 
period for which the certificates may remain in force. The Act omits to prescribe 
any such time limits and accordingly information which is the subject of a 
certificate may potentially be excluded from the public eye permanently or way 
beyond the life span of the sensitivity of the material. 
Recognition of the unacceptable breadth of the certificates and their effect 
on the availability of information prompted the Senate Standing Committee in its 
1987 report to recommend, in an attempt to limit that effect, that the time period 
for which the certificates would remain in force should be limited. 57 
The Act was duly amended, but this amendment falls far short of 
55 S 58 FOi Act 
56 Freedom of Information Issue Paper 12, September 1994, p45 























addressing the Senate Standing Committee's underlying concerns. The amended 
act provides that the period for which the certificates may remain in force may 
be limited by regulation. 58 As such it leaves the choice of limitation, and in the 
event of a choice in favor of limitation, the determination of that time period, 
entirely at the sole discretion of the executive decision-maker. 
The legislature's reluctance to act decisively in response to criticisms of 
the Act's failure to balance the dictates of national security concerns with the 
dictates of the right to freedom of information, as indicated by the conservative 
approach adopted in this amendment, means that the issue of conclusive 
certificates remains firmly on the table. 
It was tabled as an issue for discussion by the Law Reform Commission in 
Issue Paper 12. The following issues or concerns, all of which relate to the 
breadth of the unreviewable discretion afforded by the certificates, and the 
implications thereof for a democratic society premised on freedom of 
information, were raised: 
• Are the provisions for conclusive certificates necessary? 
• Should the AA T ( or any other external review body) be given power to make 
determinative decisions in relation to conclusive certificates? 
• Should the considerations that the AA T has to take into account in 
considering conclusive certificates be redrafted to enable account to be taken 
of the public interest in disclosure? 
• Should conclusive certificates expire automatically after a specified period of 
time?59 
*** 
58 Freedom oflnformation Amendment Act 1991 (Cth) S 36A 
























DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY EXEMPTION 
Proponents of the right to freedom of information as an essential tenet of a 
constitutional democracy all agree that this right is not absolute - most notably so 
in the arena of national security. However, the prevailing consensus within this 
camp is that any limitation on this right, including and especially, limitations in 
the arena of national security, must be justifiable and sustainable as against the 
dictates of a sovereign constitutional democracy. 
Accordingly, recognition by a legal system of exemptions to, and 
consequent limitations of, the right to freedom of information, does not justify 
the automatic conclusion that the system is fundamentally flawed. However, any 
such exemptions and consequent limitations, must upon evaluation, not be of 
such a nature, be applied or be permitted to be applied, so as to negate the central 
principles of a sovereign constitutional democracy. 
There are those who apparently locate themselves within the democratic 
camp and who argue that the systems discussed in the preceding chapter are, 
despite the nature and pervasive extent of the secrecy practices permitted in the 
arena of national security, truly democratic. They argue that these practices are 
compatible with democratic principles. In their view, treating national security 
matters differently, in comparison to other exemptions to the right to information, 
is democratically and constitutionally justifiable. The basis for this conclusion is 
that the national security exemption constitutes a special case. As such, it falls 
outside of the traditionally accepted democratic standards pertaining to 
information generally, and outside of those pertaining to other exemptions. The 
democratic standards themselves in respect of the national security exemption are 
different, dictated b_y the special needs and interests at play in this arena, and it is 
against these different standards that the practices must be evaluated. 
One such proponent is Bruce Fein. He concedes that a constitutional 
democracy requires that the public be afforded access to information relating to 
government practices and policies. He further concedes that the importance of 
freedom of information finds support in the protection and encouragement of 
informed public discussion and debate "to the end that government may be 























by peaceful means. " 1 
On these, and the following points, there is no substantial difference 
between him and many other proponents of access to information as an essential 
democratic right. He and other like-minded writers agree that, in the absence of 
the right to freedom of information, the primary democratic objective of 
responsive government would remain elusive. To this end Fein advocates 
freedom of access to state-held information by the public so as to enable them to 
engage in a form of self-government or participation in the process.2 
He concedes further that freedom of information is vital not only to 
responsive, but also qualitative government. Public disclosure and consequent 
public input is generally accepted by him as leading to an improved quality of 
decisions. 
In short, he concedes that a modem sovereign constitutional democracy, 
premised as it is on informed public debate and discussion, a degree of self-
government or participation, and a responsive government prepared to embrace 
the opportunity for improved decision-making, requires recognition and 
protection of the right to access to information. 
Having made these fundamental concessions, he nevertheless argues that 
the American legal system's formulation and application of the national security 
exemptions is quite compatible with the value ascribed to freedom of information 
in a sovereign constitutional democracy. 
5.1 The Compatibility Of National Security Secrecy Practices and 
Democracy 
Fein recognises that the American legal system's formulation and 
application of the national security exemptions allows for extensive secrecy, and 
often routine non-disclosure practices, to the detriment of the right to access to 
information. He concludes however, that the system and its practices are 
compatible with democracy. His argument in support of this conclusion consists 
primarily of two legs. 
The first is that secrecy may, in limited circumstances, be justified in a 
constitutional democracy to attain ends, and maintain government interests, 
which take precedence over a completely informed public - and that secrecy in 
the arena of national security qualifies as such, in view of the important interests 
1 B Fein' National Security and the First Amendment: Access to Classified Information: Constitutional and 
Statutory Dimensions' in Summer ( 1985) 26 William and Mary Law Review,p 812 - quoting an extract from De 
Jonge v Oregon, 299 US 353, 365 (1937) with approval. 























sought to be protected thereby. 3 
The second leg of his argument is that issues of national security are of 
such a nature as to render this arena fundamentally different from other functions 
of government. This fundamental difference means that secrecy or denial of 
access to information makes no difference to the attainment of the broader 
democratic objectives of accountability, participation, responsiveness and the 
attendant benefit of improved decision-making. These objectives, he argues, 
because of this fundamental difference, do either not apply in the arena of 
national security, or if they do, are capable of being achieved through more 
appropriate, alternative means, not dependant on freedom of information.4 
The interests referred to under the first leg of Fein' s argument are in his 
words "national interests [which] concern in a fundamental sense our national 
survival"5 • Not surprisingly, the examples used by him to illustrate his point, fall 
largely within the realm of the military. 
There is, he argues, a compelling interest in maintaining secrecy of 
weapons information, because disclosure may aid the military strength of 
international enemies, or may undermine the fighting capacity of the country's 
armed forces. These interests require protection of this information from 
disclosure, not only during periods of war, but even during peacetime, as this 
type of information may at all times be exploited by terrorists and used to the 
detriment of the country. 
Other types of military information worthy of protection from disclosure 
are, by way of example, the plans of a nation's armed forces, details of its 
military troops and tactics. 
In addition, he advocates the extension of protection against disclosure, on 
the same grounds, to include 'national interests' other than purely military 
secrets. The extended national interest arena includes information relating to 
foreign relations, treaties and executive agreements. These interests, he argues, 
require protection and justify secrecy beyond the military ambit, and outside of 
the war context, as secrecy in these areas is often a pre-requisite for the 
deterrence of military aggression and for avoiding the endangerment of lives. 
Failing to maintain secrecy in this extended arena could have the following 
adverse effects: 
• Express or tacit agreements between countries would be scuttled or their terms 
adversely skewed, if the content of negotiation deliberations, or advice given 
to the Head of the Executive were disclosed. 
• It would 'chill' candid discussions between Presidents. 
3 Ibid, pp810-811 
4 Ibid, p814 






















• It might adversely affect national interests by undermining an agreement 
otherwise advantageous to the nation. 
Further, many of these considerations, he argues, retain their force, even 
after negotiations have been concluded, because it may affect future 
negotiations. 6 
Interests such as these, he argues, focused as they are toward 
"safeguarding the nation's survival, or supporting urgent foreign policy or 
national security goals, may require the President to withhold classified 
information from the public or Congress. "7 
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To paraphrase Fein, he argues that extensive secrecy in this arena is 
justifiable in view of the nature of the interests sought to be protected, and 
further, moving onto the second leg of his argument, does no harm to democracy 
because the usual democratic concerns relating to freedom of information are 
answerable within the national security context. 
This second leg of his argument appears to be premised on the assumption 
that the reasons for regarding the right to know as a fundamental democratic right 
are rendered largely redundant in the national security arena. This assumption 
underpins his argument that national security secrecy practices are compatible 
with democratic principles and values. The two are compatible as denial of the 
right to information does no harm to attaining democratic objectives, or 
conversely were it to be respected in this arena, would not have the desired 
democratic results. Objectives such as responsive, accountable and quality 
government are not dependant on freedom of access information classified in the 
interests of national security. 
So for example, he argues that the right to know, so as to enable the citizen 
to evaluate government action, is not essential in this arena. The public has no 
need for particular items of classified information in order to evaluate 
government performance. The public, he argues, are able, in the light of the 
masses of non-classified information available, to assess the state's national 
security programmes without having recourse to classified information. 
In his view, information of this nature is rendered even less essential by 
virtue of the fact that the public, in engaging in the process of evaluation, are 
concerned primarily with whether or not national security policies have been 
successful and that: 
.. the particular items of classified information employed in achieving 
success or in suffering defeats are, at best, of secondary interest. The 
6 Ibid, p810-81 l 






















electorate generally know, without access to classified information, 
whether the nation is at war, or has strengthened its alliances, or has 
improved its international posture.8 
The public are accordingly enabled, on the basis of available information, 
to evaluate government policy. Furthermore, should the public be dissatisfied 
with the revealed policy and practices, denying them access to classified 
information does not impair their democratic power to vindicate their own 
national defence or foreign policy preferences. Such denial does no harm to 
accountability of the executive as the electorate still retain indirect control over 
their preferences through the electoral process, which ensures not only 
accountability, but responsive government as well. Should the public, upon 
evaluation, be displeased, it can make its preferences known and an "incumbent 
president virtually may be ousted from office if the public believes his foreign 
policies have failed." 
With regard to the democratic premise that access to information 
engenders better decision-making, he argues that: 
.. the likelihood that publicity of government deliberations and consequent 
public input will improve the quality of decisions or agreements is 
insubstantial. [Because] Members of the public ordinarily lack the time or 
comprehensive knowledge needed to make a productive contribution to 
national security decision-making by the government.9 
This essentially elitist view is shared by writers such as Walter Lippmann 
who is more unambiguous and outspoken in his belief that: 
.. popular opinion cannot be right on the large questions of war and peace 
since these matters require a knowledge and experience which ordinary 
people lack. '0 
Fein hedges his elitist argument with the rider that even were government 
decision-making likely to be improved, such improvement would apply only in 
limited circumstances, and any limited benefit derived, would in any event be 
outweighed by the harm publicity would cause. 
The expertise argument excludes the public from both participating in the 
decision-making process and engaging in a qualitative assessment of such 
8 Ibid, P 814 
9 Ibid, p815 
























decisions with a view to holding the decision-maker accountable in respect 
thereof Its exclusionary power however goes further than merely excluding the 
public from participation and accountability procedures. It also serves to justify 
absolute and exclusive control by the appointed experts, namely the executive, at 
the expense of the other two branches of government - the legislature and the 
judiciary. National security decisions, specifically questions as to what in fact 
constitutes the interests of national security, is by necessity the preserve of the 
executive experts. These determinations, and consequent decisions to refuse 
access to information, are beyond questioning outside of that elite circle, whether 
it be by the public, the judiciary or the legislature as: 
Only a national government which has day-to-day experience of 
conducting international relations can judge when disclosure of 
information in its possession concerning international relations or national 
security is justified. 11 
Fein and other like-minded writers use the expertise argument to sustain 
their conclusion that the limitation of public access to government held 
information, legislative exclusion and inertia and judicial conservatism and 
deference in the arena of national security, is democratically sustainable. 
5.2 The (in)Compatibility Of National Security Secrecy Practices and 
Democracy 
Writers such as Thomas Emerson, Mary Cheh and Anthony Mathews 
would disagree with the conclusions drawn by Fein. They argue, it is submitted, 
quite correctly, that the American system's treatment of the national security 
exemptions, is fundamentally problematic and irreconcilable with the dictates of 
a modem sovereign constitutional democracy. The problem lies in a number of 
features characterising the American system, which result, not in the limitation of 
the fundamental democratic right to freedom of information, but the negation of 
this central right. The negation of this right in tum irredeemably frustrates the 
attainment of the democratic objectives of participation, accountability and 
responsiveness. 
The features which these writers are critical of may be summarised as 
follows. 
In the formulation of the exemptions, the executive is afforded too broad a 
discretion to define, and/or to determine, the scope of their application. The key 























term of 'national security', which is the stated criteria for determining disclosure, 
or more specifically, denial of access to information, is a "concept of enormous 
ambiguity". It is "virtually without limitation", and is capable in the context of 
modem society of embracing almost any aspect of society. 12 The legislature, in 
the drafting of the exemptions, has failed to limit the scope of this term. This 
failure is attributable to its failure to provide guidance as to its meaning and 
content. In so doing it has afforded the executive branch an almost limitless 
discretion to ascribe a meaning to it~ and to determine its content, and as a result, 
this branch has been afforded equally extensive power over an effectively 
limitless arena of information. 
It is this feature which prompted Cheh's criticism that: 
The exemption in the Freedom of Information Act which exempts 
disclosure of information properly classified as 'secret in the interest of 
national defence or foreign policy' is not so much an exemption as a 
license to withhold. [Because] The executive Branch both establishes the 
criteria for classification and performs the actual classification of such 
information. 13 
This criticism is valid as against both the American and the Australian 
Freedom of Information exemptions, in both their wording as well as their 
recourse to classification on the one hand and conclusive certificates on the other. 
The adverse consequences caused by this legislative inertia are 
compounded by prevailing judicial attitudes (which as was illustrated are 
immune to legislative directives to change) of conservatism and deference to 
executive branch decisions. The prevailing judicial approach, informed by the 
"political question doctrine or similar prudential issues" 14, has resulted in the 
judiciary failing to fulfil its intended role, namely to check the exercise of 
executive discretionary power. Conversely, the effect of the judiciary's attitude is 
a condonation and legitimation of the ever increasing extent of discretion in the 
arena of national security. 
Legislative inertia and judicial deference have together fostered a legal 
environment entirely at odds with the fundamental democratic tenet that the 
public have a constitutional right to know. As discussed earlier, the 
fundamentality of this tenet finds recognition in the same systems' Freedom of 
Information Acts, which vest the right to know in all persons, irrespective of 
n T Emerson, op cit, p 846 
13 M Cheh, op cit, p 691 
14 Mark D Robins 'Book Review of National Security Law by Stephen Dycus' in (1991) Vol 11 Boston College 






















need, which expressly create presumptions in favour of disclosure, and which 
locate the onus to disprove these presumption on the state. 
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The American system, in its formulation of the national security 
exemptions and judicial attitudes thereto, reveals an irreconcilable inconsistency, 
in respect of the sentiments underlying, on the one hand, these express 
affirmations of the right to know, and on the other hand, the sentiments 
underlying the limitation of this right in the arena of national security. The 
sentiment underlying the affirmations are inverted, in the formulation of the 
national security exemptions, and judicial attitudes thereto. The latter two factors 
act in concert so as to effectively, and unjustifiably, create a converse 
presumption in favour of non-disclosure in this arena. In so doing the onus is 
shifted and placed on the citizen seeking the information. The effect of this is to 
erode the integrity and status of this right to information as a fundamental 
democratic right. 
The objection is not to the existence of the national security exemption in 
principle, but to the underlying premise informing its formulation and 
application, which effectively inverts the status of the democratic right to 
information in this context. 
The ethic of non-disclosure engendered by the dynamics of the national 
security exemption has in fact seen and sustained the exclusion, not only of the 
public from this arena, but also the legislative branch of government from 
national-security information and decision-making. This exclusion found 
expression in, for example, section 4. l(a) of President Reagan's order, which 
precluded disclosure of classified information to anyone other than executive 
branch officials. This trend however pre-dates Reagan's directive as evidenced 
by the American experience during the Vietnam war and the Cuban affair, which 
witnessed bodies with constitutional authority over questions of war and peace 
becoming the victims of defence secrecy. In the former instance, congress was 
consistently kept in the dark, and in the latter, the CIA kept vital information 
even from the head of the executive. 15 The extent and consequences of this 
alarming trend in the United State are summarised succinctly by the novelist and 
social commentator Gore Vidal: 
We have not declared war since December 1941 and we have fought about 
50 wars since then. That means that the House of Representatives has 
given up its great powers and the power of the purse is now rather dubious 
since the executive does all sorts funny things when it wants to raise 
money without consulting the House it feels the House won't go along. 























The Constitution doesn't work. 16 
Our local South African experience serves as a further example of this 
dangerous trend toward legislative ignorance of national security secrets. One 
simply has to look to the host of senior parliamentarian's testimony at the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission's hearings. They routinely alleged that they did 
not know of the security branch's covert atrocities. (Of course circumstances are 
such that the veracity of these statements are open to question.) 
Despite the damage this trend does to one of the foundational precepts of a 
sovereign constitutional democracy, namely the separation of powers and the 
directly related question of sovereignty in a democracy, there are those who argue 
that the exclusion of the legislature from access to such information, and in fact, 
national security decision-making, is quite compatible with democratic 
principles. One of the justifications for this proposition is the danger of leaks 
from within the legislature and the consequent danger for national security. 
(The proponents of this argument, needless to say, do not deal with the danger of 
leaks from within the executive branch and why the propensity for leaks should 
be any less here as opposed to from within the legislative branch.) 
One such proponent is Lee Weingart who argues that the danger of leaks is 
so compelling that the legislature's functions must be limited, so as to preclude it 
not only from such access, but also so as to generally preclude its law making 
functions from legislating on access to national security information. 
He argues that this domain falls entirely within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the executive branch, and that the legislature's role in this regard should be 
limited to the prevention of mismanagement or wrongdoing. It is therefore, in the 
arena of national security information, limited to legislating for example, only 
whistleblower legislation. 17 
This argument, that the legislative branch of government should be 
precluded from access to national security information, and by extension, 
excluded from formulating policy and enacting legislation in regard to access 
thereto, provides a key to understanding one the fundamental problems with the 
national security 'exemptions' as discussed thus far. The extent of the damage 
done by this argument, and the ease with which such damage is espoused, to the 
fundamental, traditional pegs of a sovereign constitutional democracy, is 
indicative of the underlying undemocratic assumptions informing this point of 
view. These assumptions are irreconcilable with the separation and division of 
powers, parliamentary sovereignty vis-a-vis the executive, the rule of law and 
16 Interview with Gore Vidal, Mail and Guardian, March 19-25, 1999, p 25 
17 Lee C Weingart 'Who Keeps the Secrets? A framework and Analysis of the Separation of Powers Dispute in 























accountability - the traditional foundational precepts of constitutional democracy. 
The doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers 
do not emerge from this argument, in support of excluding the legislative branch 
from this arena, remotely intact. The reasoning underlying this argument seeks to 
place the legislative branch as a mere limited mechanism of control, in respect of 
only wrongdoing or mismanagement, as opposed to a policy steering mechanism. 
This reasoning runs counter to the primary tenets of parliamentary sovereignty, 
and the separation and division of powers, as between the legislative and 
executive branches of government. 
The envisaged placement of the legislative, vis-a-vis the executive branch, 
expresses and gives credence to an inversion of power between these two 
branches of government. The implications for constitutional democracy and the 
allocation of power on which it is premised are profound. The end-result has 
been that: 
... the Constitutional allocation of authority over national security and 
foreign affairs has become distorted due to executive overreaching, 
congressional acquiescence and judicial indifference. 18( my stress) 
Constitutional democracy's separation and division of power is central to 
the sustainability of the classical liberal democratic tradition's theories of 
representation, or participation by proxy, and accountability - the theoretical 
guarantors of popular sovereignty. 
In relying on these central precepts, traditional theory has been able to 
justify significant degrees of secrecy and institutionalised inaccessibility to the 
executive branch of government, in relation to the electorate. The main point 
supporting this exclusion is that the electorate's access to, and participation in, 
the executive branch's activities is both unnecessary and undesirable. It is 
unnecessary because the primary objectives of participation and accountability of 
this branch to the electorate, are guaranteed, by proxy, through their elected 
representatives, who collectively ensure responsive government. The elected 
representatives, or parliament, in response to the electorate's needs and interests, 
formulate appropriate policy by way of legislative enactments. The legislature's 
delegation of power to the executive is limited to the power to implement that 
policy, under the control of the legislature. The possibility of executive 
overreaching is minimal as it is routinely accountable directly to parliament. In 
addition, legislative control is enforced through the courts, in terms of the theory 
of the rule oflaw. 






















Classical liberal democratic theory and its rationale for justifying secrecy, 
has, as discussed in the preceding chapters, been subject to stringent criticism. 
The theory and underlying reasoning in support of institutionalised secrecy has 
been debunked, in view of its ineffective delivery of participation and 
accountability. It was precisely this inefficiency which necessitated a paradigm 
shift to a constitutional vision of democracy premised on the central democratic 
right to freedom of access to information. 
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Traditional theory, with its emphasis on representative democracy, is 
fraught with problems in delivering on the objectives relating to responsive 
government, but does, nonetheless provide some succour. However, even the 
minimal protection afforded by it is lost by the exclusion of the legislative branch 
of government from this domain. The reasoning underlying this exclusion makes 
a mockery of even those limited mechanisms of participation, control and 
accountability encoded in the traditional doctrines underpinning the theory of 
representative democracy. 
Within the national security context, this reasoning has seen the exclusion 
of the legislature, the only link between government and the electorate, and has 
accordingly eliminated the traditional democratic route to participation and 
accountability of the executive to the electorate, even if such was by proxy. The 
legislature's envisaged role in this arena as a mere "watchdog" in cases of abuse 
of power, reveals a skewed focus on posterior control as opposed to prior 
participation. This focus by its very nature precludes delivery of one of the 
central ideals of democracy - responsive government through prior participation. 
Even the envisaged posterior control by the legislature is severely curtailed and 
emasculated by the limitation of its role to that of a "watchdog". The limitation of 
its "watchdog" role to cases of mismanagement and abuse, rather than in respect 
of substantive content and direction of executive conduct, means that the degree 
of accountability of the executive to the legislature falls far short of the degree 
prescribed by classical traditional democratic theory. 
In addition, the ordinarily available limited opportunity for effective public 
control and rectification through judicial review, has also been precluded. The 
capacity of judicial review as a means of accountability, has in practice, been 
emasculated within this context. 
Accumulatively, the inversion of power and absence of even those 
traditional mechanisms of participation and accountability in the national security 
arena pose significant and insurmountable problems for any assertion that 
national security secrecy practices are compatible with democracy. The effective 
displacement of even the traditional, but outdated and ineffective democratic 
mechanisms and procedures is indicative of the extent of the disparity between 






















democracy. The attitude revealed by the level of disregard for even the these 
traditional procedures is indicative of a fundamental lack of respect and 
commitment to the attainment of the democratic objectives of participation and 
accountability. 
90 
The national security exemptions' position outside of the obligations 
imposed by the law generally so as to ensure democracy, is arguably 
democratically justifiable. This location is anticipated and provided for in the 
freedom of information laws' recognition of certain exempt categories, of which 
national security is only one. 
However, the national security exemptions have, through their 
formulation, and in their application by the executive branch and the judiciary, 
been treated differently, not only to the generally applicable law, but most 
notably, differently to the other exemptions. This difference in treatment has 
resulted in the national security exemptions, or more specifically, the denial of 
information in terms thereof, unlike the other exemptions, subject to the law's 
secondary level of checks and balances designed to ensure that the exemptions 
are applied so as not to unduly negate democratic principles and ideals. This 
difference in treatment translates into the claim that the national security 
exemptions, unlike the other exemptions, are in fact not to be regarded as an 
exemption, in the ordinary sense of the term, to the ordinary rules of democracy 
and freedom of information. The reference to an exemption naturally implies an 
exemption to some pre-existing fundamental standard. The national security 
standard however becomes its own pre-existing standard, displacing all other 
(democratic) standards, including the standards of traditional theory. As such the 
national security exemptions are not exemptions, but constitutive of the rule 
itself. The defining principles and standards of a sovereign constitutional 
democracy, and the implicit importance of freedom of information in relation 
thereto, become the exemption in this arena, permitted limited application only 
for the purpose of control of abuse. This inversion, it is submitted, amounts to a 
complete negation of democratic principles and standards and no amount of 
argument can overcome this difficulty. Any argument of compatibility between 
national security and democracy is fundamentally incoherent as democracy is 
displaced in its entirety. 
The potential for the wholesale displacement of traditional democratic 
standards and institutions inhering in the assumptions underlying the national 
security exemptions, strengthens, rather than weakens, as argued by proponents 
of secrecy in the national security arena, the need for the recognition and 
protection of the democratic right to freedom of access to information. 
In the absence of such recognition and protection, the executive branch of 






















unaccountable in respect of its activities. The absence of public pressure and 
accountability allows the space, which has been capitalised on, for not only the 
existence, but also the incremental "growth of unilateral executive authority"19 • 
5.3 The Dangers Of Secre-cy Inhering In The National Security 
Exemptions - For Democracy And Good Government 
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In the absence of participation and accountability the prevailing ethic of 
secrecy creates the space for the expansion of the national security arena, and the 
attendant expansion of the power and functions of the executive branch 
responsible for it. This expansion is intricately linked with the definition of 
national security, or more specifically, the lack thereof. This lacunae effectively 
locates the power to define within the exclusive jurisdiction of the executive 
branch of government, and 'once government controls the definition of national 
security, there is no limit to what information it may decide falls within this 
category' .2° Further, in the event of questions being raised as to the legitimacy of 
the inclusion of certain information, the decision-maker simply has to raise the 
defence of expertise to block any questioning of their decisions. 
The spectre of secrecy of course means that the chances of being afforded 
the opportunity of even being able to raise one's question is minimal - one is 
simply not privy to the substance of the decisions or the workings of this branch 
as a matter of course. 
The prevailing ethic of secrecy, in conjunction with the indeterminacy of 
the concept, creates the space for the ready expansion of circumscribed and 
legitimate secrecy into broader unauthorized and illegitimate secrecy practices. 
These extended and illegitimate secrecy practices in tum mean an extended area 
of government subject to no restraints, and " where intelligence and security 
officials are subject to no or few legal restraints, they very easily constitute 
themselves into new and unaccountable centres of power in the state."21 
The scope for abuse of this power inhering in these practices, and the 
cover implicitly provided thereby, allows for the assumption of new and 
unauthorized functions, which assumption is often the precursor of abuses and 
illegalities, under cover of the national security exemptions.22 
The space created has been capitalised on, more often than not, to further 
illegitimate agendas, as illustrated by the following tendencies and trends, 
19 H Koh, op cit, p 752 
20 A Mathews, op cit, p 20 
21 Ibid 






















identified by Mathews23 . 
Within the intelligence agencies, whose primary function is the collection 
of intelligence material and its evaluation, there has been a tendency "to extend 
their functions under the shield of secrecy to covert operations". 
92 
Related to the above tendency, is the tendency on the part of the security 
branch of government to shroud more than military matters in secrecy. As a 
result, the denial of the right to know or participate is extended to matters only 
indirectly related, or even wholly unrelated, to matters traditionally and 
legitimately regarded as relating to national security. As a consequence, the 
extent of the political arena amenable to public scrutiny and participation is 
incrementally reduced at the behest of an unaccountable executive as secrecy 
practices are transformed into 'super secrecy' practices. This tendency towards 
super secrecy is borne out by the American experience. In the United States, past 
experience has shown that the classification process is grossly overused and often 
abused in that millions of documents are, as a matter of routine, stamped as 
classified.24 This observation is vindicated by the discussion in the preceding 
chapter relating to President Reagan's executive order which compelled 
automatic classification of certain information falling within broad categories 
without the necessity for establishing, prior to classification, whether disclosure 
of that specific information would adversely affect national security interests. 
The National Co-Ordinating Committee for the Promotion of History found that 
the order's tone and directive did in fact result in indiscriminate classification of 
vast amounts of information. As a direct result of Reagan's order there was a 
massive restriction on previously available information.25 
Exclusive control of information and prevailing extensive secrecy practices 
afford the controller the opportunity for the manipulation of information, which 
may degenerate into disinformation practices for the purpose of enhancing power 
or weakening the position of opponents. In addition it permits the space to cover 
up incompetence, mistakes and corruption. 
This sampling of the adverse effects of secrecy within the national security 
context goes to show the dangers posed thereby for democracy and the 
democratic right to freedom of information. They all gravely injure the citizen's 
right to know and the attendant rights to responsive and 'good government'. 
Not only do they gravely injure the citizen's right to know, but also give 
rise to further problems for good governance and decision-making. For example, 
super secrecy practices often have the result of impairing rather than enhancing 
the "critical judgement of those who evaluate intelligence and of those who act 
23 A Mathews, op cit pp 18-21 
24 Emerson, op cit p 846 























on the evaluations," because: 
... secrecy encourages the worst kind of agents for objective reporting and 
discourages the consideration of alternative sources of information and 
views.26 
5.4 Responses To Proponents Of The Compatibility Of The American 
And Australian National Security Exemptions To The Right To 
Freedom Of Information And Democracy 
The aforesaid observations and discussions serve to undermine the validity 
of arguments such as those raised by the likes of Fein and Lippmann and serve to 
inform the following responses thereto. 
Responses to Fein' s argument are not so much located in an attack 
on the first leg of his argument, that the nature of the interests falling within the 
ambit of national security require protection from non-disclosure. Fein' s critics 
acknowledge that there are certain interests which require protection from 
disclosure. These critics are however sceptical of the bona jides and legitimacy of 
some of the claims made by government that disclosure will in fact harm national 
security, in view of the frequency of, and the motives underpinning such claims. 
The motives for such claims are viewed with skepticism in view of the 
intricate relationship between secrecy, or the power over information, and power 
generally. The nature of this relationship provides a compelling incentive for 
executive security branch personnel to engage in exaggeration, or even outright 
distortion of the truth. It serves as a source of extended power. This power is 
sourced in, and legitimated by the belief in the public's eye of the existence of a 
threat, as this belief in tum translates into an acceptance and even the defence of 
permissive secrecy and unaccountability. Often, the simple invocation of the 
label "national security" evokes this belief in the public's mind. Therefore: 
Defining a problem as a national security issue automatically legitimises 
the use of exceptional means in response to that problem. 27 
Accordingly allegations of harm to national security, permit the scope for 
increased power. The limits of that scope are determined, at the end of the day, 
by those who have the power to define or label. This concern finds expression in 
Michel Foucault's concern with power. For Foucault: 
26 Mathews, op cit, p 19 
























Power is not a negative but a positive phenomenon: "Power produces; it 
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth" ( SP, 
ppl96/194). Discipline and Punish eloquently testifies to this new attitude 
toward power, for a central contention in this work is that the social role of 
the prison was not to repress delinquency but to create it.. By thus 
manufacturing a threat to social stability, the prison provided a rationale 
for the construction of the vast apparatus of control and discipline that now 
dominates bourgeois society.28 (My stress) 
In terms of the national security exemptions under consideration, 
allegations of harm to national security legitimate, and by extension, an extension 
of power. The security branch of government are enabled, in terms of the ethic 
underpinning these exemptions, characterised by an unquestioning acceptance of 
purported allegations of harm, to establish illegitimate, untested and 
unaccountable centres of power in the state. This power is sourced in the 
perceptions generated by exaggerations and distortions of the threat of harm 
The temptation for unjustified allegations is all too real. 
These perceptions are generated, not only by outright fabrications of 
allegations of harm, but also through more sophisticated means of manipulation 
of information. These more subtle distortions, which may on the face of it appear 
to justify the assertion of harm to national security, are on closer scrutiny 
( which is of course precluded in the ordinary course of events ), often revealed 
for what they are - mere rhetoric designed to prompt a public, legislative or 
judicial response which condones and 'legitimates' further opacity. 
Cass Sunstein cautions against accepting even apparently substantiated 
allegations of harm at face value, in view of the power vested in those with a 
monopoly over information, and the tendency to capitalise on that power, to 
pursue illegitimate ends. The monopoly enjoyed over all relevant information 
translates into the power to manipulate the information ultimately disclosed and 
the facts presented in support of allegations of harm. 
He notes that "the reduction of social risks has perhaps been the most 
intense preoccupation of regulatory government in the last quarter century [ and] 
an extraordinarily wide range of agencies ...... are obliged to protect [society] 
against the dangers they face in daily life. Here democratic aspirations loom 
large. Here those aspirations have often been disappointed."29 Sunstein's 
discussion points specifically to agencies responsible for the regulation of civil 
social risks, as opposed to, for example, 'military' type social risks. However, the 
28 A Megill, Prophets Of Extremity: Nietzsche. Heidegger, Foucault and Derri~ 1987, p241 
29 Cass R Sunstein 'Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, And The First Amendment' in Winter 1993 Florida State 























national security agencies certainly would fall within the broad context of his 
argument, as they are imminently geared toward protection against danger. His 
comments are accordingly equally applicable to the national security agencies, as 
in fact has been shown thus far. 
He argues that one of the reasons why democratic aspirations have often 
been disappointed in this context is because of the agencies' deliberate and 
sustained efforts to retain absolute decision"'.making power, and their complete 
lack of effort to benefit from, or to increase citizen participation in the decision-
making process. One routine method of justifying and maintaining the exclusion 
of democratic processes, including access to information, is by focusing the 
public's, and even the legislature's attention, not on the full spectrum of 
possibilities of outcomes, but "instead on isolated extreme cases".30 These 
isolated extreme cases are then presented and depicted as constituting the norm, 
or in other words, as being generally applicable, and the standards are set 
accordingly. The standards set in the context of freedom of information are broad 
and generally applicable secrecy practices, rather than isolated instances of 
secrecy, tailored in accordance with reality of the infrequency or limited 
applicability of the extreme case resorted to as justification. This skepticism of 
allegations of harm in the face of the tendency to manipulation and exaggeration 
is shared by Emerson in his observation that: 
Experience has shown that government claims of harm to national security 
are highly exaggerated and must be viewed with the utmost skepticism.31 
An element of this type of information manipulation and exaggeration is 
evidenced in, for example, Fein's reasoning with respect to purported allegations 
of harm to the country's national defence. Most of the interests referred to, and 
the dangers alluded to by him, in this context, are rationally located within a war-
time context. In the hands of writers such as Fein, they are, with a glib slip of the 
tongue, presented as justifications for secrecy even in peacetime. This jump in 
logic requires substantial explanation and justification. It is not sufficient to offer, 
in lieu of the required explanation and justification, one or two isolated extreme 
cases in justification of secrecy as a general peace-time rule, which cases will 
often be chosen precisely because of the potential for extreme consequences 
inhering therein. What is required is rational justification on a case by case basis, 
which is based on a real probability of harm as opposed to a mere assertion of 
harm. Without this rational justification, allegations of harm amount to no more 
3° C Sunstein, op cit, p 653 






















than expedient scare tactics. 
Apart from this cautionary note of skepticism, Fein' s opponents do not 
fundamentally disagree with the essence of the first leg of his argument. They 
agree that certain interests do require the protection afforded by secrecy. Their 
opposition centres primarily on the those aspects of his argument falling under 
the second leg of his argument in support of his conclusion that prevailing 
national security secrecy practices and democracy are compatible. 
To recap, he argues that the democratic assumptions and objectives 
underpinning the right to information are unable, because of the nature of 
national security, to be realised in this arena, even if the information were 
available. Alternatively, in the event that democratic assumptions and objectives 
are realisable in this arena, those assumptions and objectives can be achieved by 
means other than access to information. Accordingly, denial of information or 
secrecy does no harm to democracy and the two are accordingly compatible. 
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By way of illustration, he argues that the democratic objective of enabling 
the electorate to evaluate government policy and actions is not frustrated in this 
arena by denying access to, for example, classified information. This is so for 
two reasons. On the one hand, the public still has access to the masses of 
unclassified information, which should suffice for these purposes. On the other 
hand, the public generally, in engaging in such an evaluation, are not concerned 
with the particularities of government policy and actions. They are concerned 
only with success or failure, and as such, detailed classified information, is only 
of secondary importance. 
His argument that the public retains the right to access to masses of 
unclassified information is open to dispute when viewed in the context of the 
trends which have developed in the arena of national security. One such trend, as 
pointed out earlier, is the massive growth of the body of classified information in 
the United States which has meant a massive restriction on available information. 
As such, his assertion that the public has recourse to masses of information is 
incorrect. 
In addition to questioning the actual quantity of unclassified information 
that is available, one must also question the content and veracity of that 
information. The power vested in the controllers of that information to 
manipulate and distort, as well the incentive to in fact engage in such conduct, 
must be borne in mind when evaluating information that is readily available. 
Fein's proposition that the public has access to masses of unclassified 
information and hence are able to engage in evaluating government performance 
is problematised if one assumes that at least some of that information is 
inaccurate or even distorted. Even if one were to assume that all available 























the public's ability to rationally evaluate government action. Any such evaluation 
would be on the basis of an incomplete selection of information, which may be 
presented or perceived out of context. The ability to evaluate a comprehensive 
policy or programme must surely be significantly impaired if that evaluation is 
based only on isolated bits of information, rather than on the full spectrum of 
. relevant information. 
Fein's presumption that the availability of unclassified information is 
sufficient for the purposes of evaluation is buffered by his assumption that the 
public, in evaluating government action, are not concerned with the individual 
items of information, but only with the success or failure of national security 
policy. This assumption fails to justify extensive secrecy practices in two 
respects. Firstly, it fails to take into account the fact that the power to manipulate 
information includes the power to manipulate perceptions as to outcomes. In 
addition, and more fundamentally problematic, is the assumption itself, that the 
public are concerned only with outcomes. The one point which has been stressed 
in this thesis is that political society has realised that focussing only on outcomes 
or results has failed to deliver on the democratic promise of responsive and 
accountable government. The nature of the modem state is such that participation 
in, and knowledge of, ongoing government is vital to democracy. This 
recognition fostered the recognition of a need for a paradigm shift, in which 
democratic governments have engaged. This shift, by virtue of its focus on 
responsive government has recognised the right to information as a fundamental 
democratic right to know, as opposed to limiting recognition of that right to 
instances where the public can show a direct and specific need for it. These 
sentiments are equally applicable to national security branch of government as it 
certainly forms an integral part of, and exhibits the same characteristics as all 
other branches of the state. 
Fein's assumption that the public are interested only in outcomes: 
... underestimates the force of [this] precept. .. that the public have a 
constitutional right to know ... - that the people as sovereign need to be kept 
informed of all matters affecting the public interest. .. [ a precept] which 
goes to the essence of democratic government."32 
There is nothing inhering within the context of national security matters to 
justify the displacement of this fundamental precept. In fact, the argument raised 
by the likes of Fein, that the dire nature of the consequences of decisions in this 
arena are justifications for such a displacement, pale in comparison to the 






















antithesis thereof. Writers such as Fein: 
... ignore the moral right of the citizens in a democracy to have relevant 
knowledge of and influence upon the terrible decisions of war - a right 
which no one has expressed more cogently than Jefferson: 
"It is their sweat which is to earn all the expenses of war, and their blood 
which is to flow in expiation of the causes of it. "33 
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Fein's third proposition in support of his conclusion that secrecy and 
democracy are compatible is that denial of access to information in this arena 
does no harm to the public's democratic right and ability to vindicate their 
preferences. Assuming that they are in fact enabled, on the basis of available 
information to assess the outcomes of the government's national security policies 
and programmes, they are able to vindicate any dissatisfaction through the power 
of the vote. The American electorate retain the ability to remove the President, 
who is both the head of the executive and head of national security, from office 
by means of the vote. 
This argument, when viewed in the context of the discussion to date, lacks 
cogency in its failure to account for the fact that: 
By the time a secret is discussed in a public ... setting, it no longer exists as 
a secret. But the trails in memory that secrets leave reveal the distances 
they have travelled, the force of their passage, the gashes they have left in 
the ongoing order of things. 34 
In the context of national security, the legacy of that secrecy is potentially 
for the people, one of mayhem and destruction. This potential renders the power 
to remove the President, only after the fact, of little value. In this context, the 
power to remove the President or the government of the day, amounts to no more 
than too little, too late. 
Resorting to the vote as a tool of participation and control, in lieu of 
access to information, cannot sustain the argument that national security secrecy 
practices are compatible with democracy. It is precisely the inadequacy of this 
tool which fostered the paradigm shift toward a more democratic form of 
governance. 
The American Watergate saga provides a concrete example of the 
inadequacy of the vote, and the consequences of that inadequacy, in the arena of 
33 A Mathews, op cit, p 21 























national security. In addition, the legislative response to this saga is instructive in 
that it expressed a recognition of, and dissatisfaction with these inadequacies, 
which were remedied by strengthening the right to access to national security 
information. 
This historical episode illustrates the potential space for extreme abuse of 
power at the highest level, within this arena, under cover of the protection 
provided by extensive and institutionalised secrecy. The vote in this instance, 
although utilised after discovery of the executive abuse of power, was inadequate 
in its inability to prevent, rather than cure that abuse. The inadequacy of this tool 
was confirmed by the frenetic legislative activity in the months immediately 
following this saga which culminated in the 197 4 and '7 6 amendments to the 
Freedom of Information Act. These amendments aimed (albeit ineffectively) to 
strengthen the right to know, specifically within the national security context, 
presumably so as to avoid a repetition of the unacceptable abuse of power which 
was made possible by the system and its protection of secrecy. It was: 
... the first major step forward in helping to restore the confidence of the 
American people in the institutions of government by purging the body 
politic of the secrecy excesses which marked the sordid Watergate cover-
up_3s 
Fein's arguments thus far are all located within the largely problematic 
discourse of representative democracy with its emphasis on the vote as the 
pinnacle of democracy. The language of representative democracy creates the 
space for the assumption that the voting electorate engage in the process of 
government every five years or so when they cast their vote, and are accordingly 
a body distanced from, and ignorant of the interim machinations of government. 
It is therefore hardly surprising that Fein, in view of his reliance on representation 
and the vote, confidently concludes that freedom of information and consequent 
increased public awareness, does not in this arena, lead to improved decision-
making, in view of the public's lack of time and knowledge. 
This argument is problematic in view of the fact that it becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. It depends for its cogency on prior public exclusion, which is 
in fact responsible for creating that lack of knowledge. As such, the argument is 
rhetorical, as it is ultimately that original public exclusion which justifies further 
public exclusion, and not the lack of knowledge. In addition, his conclusion that 
denial of access to information is justified by the public's lack of expertise may 
be subjected to the same criticism levelled against Lippmann's similar reasoning 














and conclusion, by Mathews that: 
[He] fortifies his case by a concealed assumption that the citizen's right to 
information is virtually the right to take the final decision. The final 
decision will inevitably be taken by the constituted authorities of the 
general public. What is demanded is not that these authorities be deprived 
of their constitutional authority to act but that their judgement on behalf of 
the people be conditioned by as full an adversary discussion of the issue as 
the philosophy of the open society implies.36 
Fein' s arguments fail in their entirety to address these fundamental 
concerns, and accordingly fail to sustain his conclusion that democracy and 
national security secrecy practices are compatible. His arguments fail to 
recognise the extent of the harm done by the American system's national security 
secrecy practices to democracy. They fail to recognise that these practices negate, 
not only the democratic rights of participation and accountability, which are of 
vital importance to democracy in terms of the shifted paradigm, which the 
American system purports to have engaged in. In addition, they negate the 
traditional precepts of constitutional democracy. It is precisely this negation, and 
the extent thereof, which leads to the conclusion, contrary to that reached by 
Fein, that the right to access to information must be protected at all costs in this 
arena. 









Despite the conclusiqns drawn by him, Fein does recognise the potential 
for abuse of the system. He concedes that, in the American context, the President 
could misuse his classification powers to withhold information which would not 
damage national security.]7 
The remedy for him does not lie in increased legislative protection of the 
right to freedom of information, nor does it justify or require a more pro-active 
judiciary. He argues that the potential for abuse does no intrinsic harm to 
democracy as there are effective non-judicial safeguards against such abuse. 
The starting point and the key to the operation of the safeguards identified 
by Fein, is the substantial probability of leaks from within the executive branch 
itself. He maintains that such leaks would reveal patterns of improper 
36 A Mathews, op cit, p 21 






















classification, or abuses generally and thereafter the legislative branch of 
government would be entitled and enabled to investigate such abuses. 
In addition, the legislature could, having discovered the abuses, utilise its 
fiscal powers to exert pressure on the executive branch to co-operate in the 
investigation and correction of the abuse. This type of pressure could even be 
exerted under the threat of a refusal to pass legislation requested by this branch. 
The public, he argues are afforded the opportunity of limiting abuse in 
view of its power of vindication exercised through the vote. In the American 
instance, the President may, in fear of the potential adverse consequences at 
election time, as a matter of expediency, not engage in excessive or abusive 
secrecy practices. 
In a similar vein he argues that the President's successor could inform 
congress or the public of any abuses practised by his or her predecessor. 
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This last point fails to take into account that in the United States, the 
outgoing President may specify that certain documents may not be made publicly 
available for up to twelve years. 38 More fundamentally, his argument fails to 
acknowledge the reality of modern-day national security management structures 
which, by virtue of their size, are not under the daily direct control of the head of 
the executive, which in the American and South Africa scenario is the President. 
These structures, or more specifically the intelligence and security agencies act 
largely independently of the head of the executive. In addition, they are part of 
the modem ongoing administrative state, which is largely immune to changes 
effected by periodic elections. Accordingly, this branch is not subject to, or 
inclined to act in fear of, or with respect to, preferences expressed by the public 
through their votes. 
The problem with the inefficiency of the vote as a mechanism of ensuring 
accountability has formed one of the central tenets of this thesis. These 
inefficiencies are however magnified here in view of the fact that in the national 
security arena, the executive branch is not even indirectly accountable to the 
people through their representatives. At least in the other areas of government 
administration, this formal, albeit inadequate, nexus, upon which representative 
democracy is premised, is recognized. In the absence of this formal nexus 
between the administration and the people, the people are left with the wholly 
inadequate alternative of relying on leaks from within the executive as the 
starting point for control. Not only does the adequacy of his entire argument 
depend on the wholly unsatisfactory existence of leaks, but more significantly on 
sufficient leaks to enable the discovery of patterns of abuse. The extent and 
entrenchment of the culture of secrecy, which he seeks to justify, is such that 























there is little, or no likelihood, of the requisite number of leaks occurring which 
would reveal patterns of abuse. This ad hoc and unreliable solution is completely 
untenable as the source of a safe-guard against abuse and certainly cannot be 
seriously regarded as providing an effective alternative to more stringent 
mechanisms of accountability through the judiciary and public access. 
One simply has to cast one's eye to the wide spread extent and 
consequences of the prevailing national security secrecy practices discussed 
earlier, to conclude that these alternative non-judicial safeguards fail to deliver on 
the democratic objectives of responsive accountable government. 
The failure of these non-judicial safeguards is intrinsically tied up with the 
more fundamental failure of the underlying argument that national security 
secrecy practices and democracy are compatible. The underlying argument fails 
to recognise the reality and the true extent and nature of the incompatibility of the 
two, and accordingly any solutions informed thereby will by necessity fail. The 
success of any proposed solutions to reconciling national security secrecy 
practices and democracy depend for their success on whether or not they in fact 
address the true problems inhering in, and generated by the co-existence of the 
two. Any solution will depend for its success on an identification or recognition 

























THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF 
DEMOCRACY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTION TO 
THE RIGHT TO ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
All armed forces and defence policies are constructed around a set of 
philosophical assumptions about such critical issues as state 
sovereignty ... Most importantly, the assumptions have to do with the 
concept of security. What is security? Whose security is at issue? And by 
what means should security be ensured? The way in which these questions 
are answered at a conceptual level will have a major bearing on actual 
policies and strategies. 1 
Although this quotation refers specifically to armed forces and defence 
policies, the points made are equally applicable to the issues raised in this thesis. 
The issues raised in this thesis are contextually broader, but of the same genre. 
Ultimately, the philosophical assumptions informing actual defence policies will 
be the same philosophical assumptions which inform attitudes adopted to the 
national security exemptions to the democratic right of access to information. 
They will both, at the end of the day, be determined by the same assumptions 
about democracy in the national security context. 
In the national security context, democratic assumptions purportedly 
ascribed to by the prevailing order are subjected to the stress of the state's 
power, in its most pristine form. This stress is attributable to the apparent 
juxtaposition between, on the one hand, the state's apparently extensive power 
exercised in the conduct of its 'quintessential function', and on the other hand, 
democratic objectives and values which are opposed to any authoritarian 
imposition of the "strong-arm" of the state. 
The official route adopted in addressing the dilemmas which this stress 
poses for sustaining democratic ideals and aspirations, will be determined by the 
level of commitment to the latter ideals and aspirations. Any superficiality in that 
commitment will crystallise in the route adopted, and the true underlying 
assumptions, often disguised under the thin veneer of democratic terminology, 
will be revealed for what they are. 
























The manner chosen to resolve this potential conflict will depend on, and 
be informed by philosophical assumptions about the state and democracy. It will 
be informed by assumptions central to democratic discourse, most notably 
assumptions about sovereignty. More specifically, it will be informed by 
assumptions about the location of sovereignty, which in a democracy is vested in 
"the people", and in an authoritarian state, in the externally constructed state 
itself. 
The often unstated choices made at this prior conceptual level will, as 
pointed out by Nathan, have a major bearing on all actual national security 
policies and strategies, including national security information policies and 
strategies. The right to freedom of access to state-held information is a 
democratic essential. As a matter of routine, most legal systems recognise 
national security information as qualifying as an exemption to this right. The 
national security exemption to the right to freedom of information accordingly 
constitutes a potentially direct point for conflict of the competing interests at 
play. These exemptions are therefore an appropriate site for establishing a 
particular system's true prevailing underlying assumptions. 
In the previous chapter it was argued that Fein's arguments, in support of 
his conclusion that the American national security exemptions are compatible 
with democracy, are not valid. This invalidity, it is submitted, is rooted in their 
failure to recognise, and address, the true nature and extent of the problem posed 
for democracy by these exemptions. The nature and extent of the problems posed 
by them for democracy is revealed by the true character of the assumptions 
underlying their chosen formulation and their method of application. The 
character of these assumptions is, at the end of the day, responsible for rendering 
the exemptions, in both their current formulation, and in their application, 
irreconcilably incompatible with democracy. 
Fein's failure to recognise these assumptions, and therefore the true nature 
and extent of the problem is in itself symptomatic of the problem at hand, and for 
this reason, to some extent explicable. The true character of the underlying 
assumptions is not always manifestly apparent. The truth of the matter is often 
eclipsed by the proffered 'democratic' signifiers encoded in the formulation of 
the exemptions. The failure of the likes of Fein to recognise the assumptions for 
what they are, may to some extent be attributed to them succumbing too readily 
to the perceptions created by the specific location and the language of the 
exemptions. These signifiers encourage and facilitate the conclusion that the 
exemptions are compatible with democratic ideals and objective, despite their 
apparent undemocratic tendency toward super-secrecy. The foundation for this 
conclusion lies in the perceptions created by the contextual location of the 
exemptions. 























exemptions within the context of the broader, generally applicable freedom of 
information laws. These laws are in tum located within the broader context of the 
overarching legal system which overtly purports to subscribe, and to give effect 
to democratic ideals and objectives. The contextual location of the exemptions 
presents them as forming an integral part of this overarching system, from which 
they derive their fundamental nature. 
This location facilitates the rationalisation of the resultant secrecy 
practices as being compatible with democracy. The exemptions, like the broader 
freedom of information laws, are perceived as part of, and the product of a 
broader framework committed to democracy. The exemptions are an integral part 
of this order and must accordingly share the same source and democratic 
assumptions. Being sourced in the same framework as the freedom of 
information laws, and formulated by the same lawmakers responsible for the rest 
of the legal system characterised by its subscription to the democratic way, the 
exemptions are assumed to have been formulated and applied in a manner 
consonant with the underlying democratic assumptions. They must accordingly 
be compatible with democracy. 
Fein's susceptibility to this path of rationalisation is seen in his emulation 
of the discourse of the exemptions in the substantiation of his conclusion. He 
locates his supporting arguments squarely within democratic discourse by 
clothing them in democratically acceptable terminology and by falling back on 
traditionally accepted, but outdated, democratic institutions and perceptions. 
His arguments accordingly suffer the same fate as the exemptions. Their 
mere representation in democratic terms does not inevitably lead to a conclusion 
of compatibility with democracy. His arguments presented in support of his 
conclusion are, like the national security exemptions themselves, once denuded 
of their superficial veneer, unable to sustain the conclusion of compatibility. 
Once denuded of this veneer they are revealed to be premised on the 
irreconcilably undemocratic assumption that in the arena of national security, 
sovereignty is located in the state, and not in "the people". 
The American and Australian national security exemptions are, in both 
their formulation and application, wholly incompatible with democracy for the 
same reason. They are premised on an assumption about state sovereignty which 
is irreconcilable with the inflexible, democratically dictated location of 
sovereignty. The exemptions, as will be shown hereunder, are premised on an 
assumption that in matters of national security, sovereignty is, and ought to be, 
located in the external state, as an entity separate and distanced from its citizens. 
They are therefore incompatible with democracy which dictates that sovereignty 
is, and ought to be, located in "the people". 
The objections raised in the preceding chapter to the formulation and 






















They are summarily revisited as they are indicative of the truth and extent of 
these underlying undemocratic assumptions about the location of sovereignty, 
which inform these exemptions. 
106 
The exclusive extended discretion afforded the executive branGh of 
government in its power to define the inherently ambiguous concept of national 
security, locates within this branch an extended, and potentially illegitimate 
source of power. The power to define the term national security, and accordingly 
determine its limits, is a source of power, because: 
Defining a problem as a national security issue automatically legitimises 
the use of exceptional means in response to that problem. 2 
The extent of the discretion afforded, together with the fact that the actual 
exercise of that power is not subject to scrutiny by the legislature, the judiciary, 
or the public, effectively constitutes a disintegration of the division of power 
dictated by the democratic doctrine of the separation of powers. The executive 
branch, in its power of exclusive control over information in the arena of national 
security, as well as its exclusive power to determine what in fact falls into this 
category, acquires a power traditionally the preserve of the legislative branch of 
government. By locating this power of determination in the hands of the 
unaccountable executive it is afforded the power to determine the scope and 
ambit of the national security arena. Implicit in this power is the power to 
determine the extent, ambit and terms of the extraordinary powers which are 
generally permitted and legitimated in this arena. The executive branch is at the 
end of the day answerable to no other branch or person for the decisions made in 
the process of exercising that power. The power of self-determination, together 
with this lack of accountability, means that the legislature, as representative of 
"the people", is deprived of the power to define and control. The public too are 
denied this power in their denial of access to information, determined by this 
branch of government to be national security information. In these denials the 
democratic assumption of popular sovereignty is subverted. The denial of 
popular access, whether directly, or indirectly by an unaccountable executive, 
constitutes a denial of the power to control government through participation in, 
and scrutiny of its process. Therefore, a denial of access to this information 
constitutes a denial of popular sovereignty. It is this subversion which at the end 
of the day is responsible for the fact that: 
Excessive resort to 'national security' as a justification for state action is 























invariably accompanied by a shift from constitutional to authoritarian form 
of govemance.3 
The implications of the chosen formulation and application of these 
exemptions, for the separation of powers, are indicative of a failure to 
acknowledge and respect one of the fundamental precepts of democracy - that is 
the democratically dictated location of sovereignty or power, in "the people". 
The democratically prescribed location of sovereignty, in terms of the 
shifted democratic paradigm, however translates into, and finds practical 
application in more than the doctrine of the separation of powers. In terms of this 
paradigm, information, which is a very real form of power, or more specifically 
the right of access thereto, must be located in "the people". Furthermore, it 
requires that this location must be respected and protected at all costs. It is this 
essential democratic assumption of popular sovereignty which, in the modem 
administrative state, translates into the recognition and protection of the right of 
access to state-held information as a fundamental democratic right. 
The national security exemptions fail, in their formulation and application, 
to recognise and protect this right as a fundamental democratic right. They 
disregard the general tone and prescriptions encoded in the freedom of 
information laws and all other exemptions to the right, which are moulded on, 
and give effect to the dictates of the shifted paradigm. 
The generally applicable freedom of information laws, of which the 
exemptions constitute an integral part, are founded on the pre-eminence of the 
right of access to information as a fundamental democratic right. They are 
accordingly formulated so as to give concrete and practical effect to this 
underlying premise. This effect is successfully achieved in the formulation and 
application of all the exemptions encoded in the freedom of information laws, 
except for the national security exemption. The formulation of the former 
exemptions expressly create prior presumptions in favour of disclosure. 
Furthermore in the event of the state seeking to withhold information in terms of 
one of these exemptions, the onus to disprove this presumption is unequivocally 
placed on the state. In applying these exemptions the courts have willingly 
adhered to these clear statements of legislative intent and held the relevant state 
organ to account for any infringements of the right of access to information. 
In contrast, the national security exemptions are formulated, and applied 
by the courts, in such a manner so as to give effect to presumptions of non-
disclosure rather than presumptions of disclosure. The inversion of this 

























exemptions, the onus of disproving that presumption has been shifted to public. 
In contrast therefore, the national security exemptions, in their effect, confer a 
prior right to secrecy on the state in the arena of national security. The prior 
recognition of the state's right to secrecy means that the public's right to 
information is accordingly displaced, and its status as a founding fundamental 
right inverted. 
The essential link between information and power means that this 
displacement and inversion of the right to access to information constitutes a 
disregard and denial of the democratically prescribed location of sovereignty. 
The reality of this inversion and displacement, and the assumptions 
underlying it, are deftly concealed by the use of the classificatory term -
"exemption". The Collins English Dictionazy defines the word "exempt" as 
"freed from or not subject to an obligation, liability". The term accordingly 
implies some pre-existing obligation which is of general application, except in the 
permitted exempt case. The use of this term within the context of the freedom of 
information laws, which unequivocally affirm the universal applicability of this 
right as a fundamental right, automatically appears to marginalise the status of 
the exempt category of information. National security information is, within this 
legislative framework, presented and seen as an exemption to the prior obligation 
to disclose. As an exemption to the prior generally applicable rule, the exemption 
is accordingly defined, and its ambit determined by the prior obligation. This 
obligation, despite the exemption, remains generally and otherwise operative. 
Accordingly, the exemption is seen as a momentary and isolated deviation from 
the prevailing general rule, rather than as displacing the general rule in its 
entirety. At a more fundamental level~ by classifying national security 
information as an exempt category, it is presented as being afforded protection 
from disclosure, but not at the expense of the general rule, or at least, at the least 
cost to the general rule. Accordingly, the reference to an exemption forces one to 
assume that the underlying starting point or assumption informing the recognition 
and formulation of the exemption, is a democratically appropriate assumption. 
However, in practice, in the context of prior standards and exemptions, 
the national security exemptions to the right to information are no exemptions at 
all. The practical inversion and displacement of the right to information effected 
by the formulation, application and enforcement of these exemptions means that 
the claims to secrecy are not regarded as an exemption. Instead, they constitute, 
in the context of national security, the general rule. In this context, non-
disclosure of all national security information becomes the prior rule against 
which access to information is now regarded as the exemption. This is evidenced 
by the reversal of the relevant presumption and onus in this arena, which offer no 
assistance in response to the tendency toward excessive classification. 























exemptions places them in opposition to the democratic assumptions upon which 
the prevailing freedom of information legislative framework is premised. This 
framework, in the premium it places on the right to information, and the 
extensive protection afforded to this right, expresses and concretely protects the 
democratic assumptions of sovereignty, and the related assumption of the 
separation of powers. 
This theoretical framework, despite its recognition that the protection of 
popular sovereignty requires protection of the right to information, does 
recognise that this right is not absolute, and may be limited under exceptional 
circumstances. The legal framework however, seeks, as a general rule, in terms 
of the prevailing democratic paradigm, to unequivocally subordinate the exempt, 
exceptional circumstances to the right to information. In theory, the legal 
framework, premised as it is, on the democratic assumption of sovereignty, is 
premised on the protection of that location at all times. The power to withhold 
certain information, in terms of this framework, may not do damage to the 
location of sovereignty. Accordingly, the power to so withhold must be implicitly 
authorised, or at least be capable of ex post facto review and ratification, by the 
sovereign demos. In practise this means that the withholding of the specific 
information must have been anticipated and authorised by "the people", acting 
through their elected representatives, or directly. Alternatively, the substance of 
the decision to withhold must be subject to, and withstand scrutiny, after the fact. 
This theory has in fact, to a large extent, found application in the freedom of 
information acts generally, and more specifically, in their formulation and 
subsequent application of the exemptions, other than the national security 
exemptions. 
The national security exemptions are, in both their formulation and 
application, treated differently in comparison to the other exemptions. This 
difference is indicative of the true underlying assumptions informing the national 
security exemptions. Perceiving and applying these exemptions differently is in 
fact tantamount to locating the national security exemptions outside of the 
prevailing legal framework - outside of law and beyond the power and control of 
"the people", both indirectly through their elected representatives, and directly. 
The national security exemptions are, in effect, posited outside of the 
prevailing democratic paradigm and its attendant location of sovereignty. Herein 
lies the implausibility of any assertion of compatibility of the national security 
exemptions to freedom of information and democracy - it is premised on an 
insurmountable inconsistency. Claims of compatibility with democracy are 
fallacious as these claims and justifications place the national security exemption 
outside of the prevailing democratic paradigm, and are premised on assumptions 






















6.1 The National Security Exemption and Carl Schmitt's Decisionist 
Theory Of Sovereignty 
llO 
In short, the current national security exemptions to the right to access to 
information are fundamentally incompatible with democracy as they are premised 
on, and give effect to a perversion of the democratic theory of sovereignty. 
Democracy locates sovereignty in "the people", whereas the national security 
exemptions locate sovereignty, in their location of exclusive control over 
information falling within this exemption, as well as over the definition of the 
concept, in the hands of the unaccountable executive branch of government. 
This location of control, through an exemption, over national security 
information, and over the definition and ambit of what in fact constitutes national 
security, locates the national security exemptions firmly within the parameters of 
Carl Schmitt's decisionist theory of sovereignty, as opposed to the democratic 
theory of sovereignty. For Schmitt, "Sovereign is he who decides on the state of 
exception. "4 The Collins English Dictionary defines an exception as "anything 
excluded from or not in conformance with a general rule, principle, class, etc". 
Accordingly the language of a national security exemption, in so far as it assumes 
a prior generally applicable rule or standard constitutive of the ordinary, and an 
extra-ordinary deviation in relation to that norm, is synonymous with Schmitt's 
language of the "exception". 
Carl Schmitt's theory of sovereignty is useful as a tool for analysing the 
relationship between democracy and the national security exemptions. Its 
utilitarian value lies in the fact that it unequivocally reveals the truth of the 
philosophical assumptions underlying the manner in which the American and 
Australian legal systems purport to balance or reconcile the tensions inhering in 
this relationship. 
The factual site for the location of power in terms of the American and 
Australian national security exemptions, co-incides with Schmitt's theory of 
sovereignty. Schmitt's theory of sovereignty is the product of a paradigm 
purposefully and unashamedly set up in opposition to the democratic paradigm 
and its attendant theory of sovereignty. The correlation between the two 
accordingly reveals the truly undemocratic nature of the assumptions underlying 
these exemptions. 
Schmitt's theory of sovereignty is the product of his specific political 
philosophy and view of the state. Accordingly, the synonymity as between the 
respective locations of sovereignty, further reveals that the American and 
4 C Schmitt, Political Theology, 1985, p 11 in Schwab, The Challenge of The Exception: An Introduction to 























Australian exemptions are ultimately premised on the same political philosophy 
and view of the state ascribed to by Schmitt. 
The correlation between these exemptions and Schmitt's theories 
ultimately reveals the invalidity of the claims of compatibility between the 
exemptions and democracy. The purported legitimacy of locating extensive, and 
hence sovereign power in the hands of an unaccountable executive in the arena 
of national security is not, despite assertions to the contrary, founded on 
democratically acceptable grounds. This legitimacy is instead founded within the 
wholly undemocratic paradigm ascribed to by Schmitt. 
These assumptions and grounds of legitimacy, once they are recognised 
for what they are, render any assertion of compatibility between democracy and 
the national security exemptions entirely unsustainable. 
In addition to this incompatibility, the correlation with Schmitt's paradigm 
reveals that the exemptions, and the arguments canvassed thus far, attempt, by 
clothing the issue in democratic terminology, to disguise these underlying 
assumptions. Thus their synonymity with Schmitt's theory allows for the 
recognition of the often disguised, despotic undemocratic nature of the national 
security exemptions. 
This recognition is the starting point to finding an appropriate and 
democratically acceptable solution to democratising the national security 
exemptions. 
6.2 Carl Schmitt's Theory Of The State, The Political and Sovereignty 
Schmitt's thesis is useful in that it accommodates the apparent duality 
exhibited by the modem administrative legal systems under discussion. These 
systems have purportedly recognised that democracy requires access to 
information and have accordingly, through open government legislation, given 
expression and protection to the right to access to information. They have 
however simultaneously permitted the right to information, and by extension, the 
integrity of democracy, to be fundamentally eroded in their protection of 
executive branch secrecy in the arena of national security. 
Schmitt's thesis does not seek to reconcile this duality and attendant 
inconsistency, nor does it offer a solution. It does however reveal the duality for 
what it is: A duality which cannot be democratically sustained. Schmitt's thesis, 
which ultimately and ominously led him to make common cause with the 
despotic and authoritarian Nazi regime, is premised on the assumption that this 
duality and the true power relations encoded therein, do not constitute a problem 
requiring a solution. It does not constitute a problem, because for him, the 
recognition and maintenance of democratic ideals and objectives in the national 























objectives are both undesirable and inappropriate. 
Instead, the undemocratic location and authoritarian exercise of power by 
an unaccountable executive in this arena was for Schmitt a necessary and 
desirable solution to a pre-existing problem, for which democracy was, and is, 
unable to provide a solution. In this arena, legitimacy and sovereignty are 
dictated by criteria other than democratic criteria. 
Schmitt's thesis was largely premised on an attack on liberalism, more 
specifically on its insistence that the state is, and should, in its entirety be, 
subject to the law. He argued that this proposition fails in two respects. First, it 
fails to reflect the truth and the extent of state power, which in the national 
security arena, is not in fact subject to the law. His second normative objection to 
this proposition is that, not only is it inaccurate, but is also undesirable in the 
national security arena. This thesis agrees with his first line of attack, but rejects 
the second. 
The formulation and application of the national security exemptions, and 
the power afforded thereby, certainly points to the same conclusion as to the 
inaccuracy of liberal theory, as drawn by Schmitt. That is to say that the state in 
this arena, is in fact, contrary to the prevailing democratic insistence on the rule 
of law, released from all obligations to comply with prevailing constitutional 
principles. 
His thesis recognises that liberal theory is to a limited extent able to justify 
and sustain its founding assertion that the state is subject to the law. Liberal 
democratic theory is correct, and an accurate reflection of state power, in as 
much as: 
By and large, governmental agencies concerned with matters of social and 
economic organisation operate through managerial imperatives and are 
subject to at least some minimal legal regulation and political 
control.5 
Schmitt argued that liberal theory is however inherently limited to these 
social and economic dimensions of the state. His criticism is confirmed by Hirst, 
in his observation that the social and economic agencies do not exhaust the full 
spectrum of state agencies. There are additional agencies, most notably the 
national security agencies, which do not, in practice, accurately reflect, or give 
effect to the classical theoretical imperative that the state ought to be subject to 
the law. In reality they are not subject to even 'minimal legal regulation and 
political control'. These agencies are accordingly, in reality, not accommodated 























within the liberal paradigm and its ins~stence on the rule of law. 
The inherent incapacity of traditional liberal theory to accommodate the 
national security agency's functions and powers is evidenced in those modem, 
purportedly democratic societies founded on this tradition. They are forced, in 
view of this incapacity, to accommodate these functions and powers as 
exemptions to the prevailing rule of law. In so doing, they expose a fundamental 
inconsistency which cannot be explained with reference to the liberal democratic 
paradigm. 
The functions and powers of these agencies are, in reality, far more 
appropriately and accurately accommodated within Schmitt's paradigm. His 
theory of sovereignty and "the political" appears to offer a far more accurate 
description and rational explanation of the power exercised by these agencies and 
their source of legitimacy. 
This correlation between his theory of sovereignty, and the reality of these 
exemptions, debunks the purportedly democratic connotations of "the 
"exemption". It debunks the implicit perception, generated by the contextual 
usage of this term, of subordination to the law. The correlation between the 
practice of the national security exemptions and Schmitt's theory reveals that the 
national security exemptions do not in fact constitute an exemption or exception 
to the democratic standards and norms. It reveals that the functions and powers 
exercised in terms of these exemptions are not, in fact, subject or subordinate to 
these standards and norms. 
The national security exemptions, when placed within the context of the 
security of the state, do not connote, as implied by traditional theory, an 
exemption or exception to prior democratic norms or standards. Instead, they in 
fact constitute a standard, and generate resultant norms all of their own. 
Ultimately, the democratic standards and norms encoded in the law, are in fact 
subject to the exemptions. 
In terms of Schmitt's theory this arena of the state cannot be 
accommodated, or explained, within the parameters of the liberal paradigm, even 
when constituted as an exemption. Liberal theory is inherently unable to explain 
or accommodate the national security functions and powers of the state, because 
of its failure, and its refusal to recognise that in reality, "all legal orders and law, 
including the rule of law have an 'outside', that they rest on a politics which is 
prior to and not bound by law. ,,6 This prior political arena is the archetypal site of 
state security, which is also therefore, outside of, prior to and not bound by law. 
More importantly, this arena can never in fact be bound by law, and therefore 
can never be accommodated within liberal democratic theory in view of its 























insistence that the state is, and should, in its entirety, be subject to the law. 
For Schmitt, the prior political arena is intrinsically a matter of security of 
the state. The national security exception or exemption cannot therefore, in fact, 
constitute an exception to the prevailing legal framework. It cannot be regarded 
as such, because an exception or exemption, by its very nature, presumes a prior 
existing standard against which that exemption or deviation is defined. An 
exemption's dependency on the existence of a prior a standard for its definition, 
substance and ambit, automatically implies that that prior standard is the 
progenitor of the exemption. This latter point is unsustainable in terms of 
Schmitt's theory of "the political". For him, the political, is in fact, not only prior 
to, but also the progenitor and source of (its own) law. Accordingly, the national 
security arena which is synonymous with the political, is likewise, not only prior 
to, but also the progenitor and source of law. 
In identifying "the political", and hence the national security arena, as the 
progenitor and prior source oflaw, Schmitt's theory of "the political" is 
essentially a question of sovereignty - often alternatively defined as the source of, 
or the power to make law. 
The relationship between his theory of "the political" and his chosen 
location of sovereignty co-incides largely with Thomas Hobbes' theories of the 
genesis of the state, its source of legitimacy and sovereignty. 
Schmitt's conceptualisation of "the political" and attendant 
conceptualisation of the state is reminiscent of Hobbes' theory of the genesis of 
the Leviathan state as a necessary solution to the state of nature. Schmitt's 
conceptualisation of the political as " relation[ s] of enmity which forces groups to 
struggle one with another, not to compete but to contest not to discuss but to 
confront", co-incides to a large extent with Hobbes' state of nature. Hobbes' 
state of nature, which preceded the recognition of the state, was characterised by 
a state of war, of all against all, which made life 'nasty, brutish, and short.' In 
this state of nature, there was no property, no justice or injustice - only 'force 
and fraud [which] are, in war, the two cardinal virtues.'7 For both Hobbes and 
Schmitt, the interchangeable state of nature and the political pre-dated the state, 
which in fact originated in response thereto. For Schmitt: 
The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political. States 
arise as a means of continuing, organising and channelling political 
struggle. It is political struggle which gives rise to political order; a body 
involved in friend-enemy relations inevitably becomes political whatever 
its origin or the origin of the differences leading to enmity ..... To view the 























state as the settled orderly administration of a territory, concerned with the 
organisation of its affairs according to law, is to see only the stabilised 
results of conflict. 8 
Likewise for Hobbes, the desire and necessity for self-preservation in the 
state of nature heralded the genesis of the state. The desire and need to bring an 
end to the state of nature saw the members of society willing to submit to 
government. As such, the recognition of government, and the legitimacy of its 
actions, in so far as they were directed toward the safety and security of society, 
was founded on society's interest in self-preservation. The legitimacy of the state 
(as sovereign) was founded on the necessity for order as opposed to chaos. The 
resultant voluntary submission to government was as between the members of 
society by covenant. In terms of this covenant it was agreed that sovereignty or 
power would, as a matter of necessity, be conferred on one man or an institution, 
so as to ensure that the covenant could be enforced, as ' covenants without the 
sword, are but words.' Accordingly this fictional covenant is not: 
.. as afterwards in Locke and Rousseau, between the citizens and the ruling 
power, it is a covenant made by the citizens with each other to obey such 
ruling power as the majority shall choose. When they have chosen, their 
political power is at an end ... When the government has been chosen, the 
citizens lose all rights except such as the government may find it expedient 
to grant...the ruler is not bound by any contract, whereas the subjects are. 
In short, the covenant heralded the genesis of the Leviathan State or, 
"one supreme authority not limited by the legal rights of the other bodies.',9 One 
not subject to, but the source of law. 
For Hobbes, that supreme authority, or sovereign, was that person or body 
able to restore order. The ability to restore order is the determining legitimating 
factor. The person or institution which is in fact able to restore order is also, 
because of that ability, entitled to obedience or subservience. For Hobbes, 
'autoritas, non veritas, facit legem ' - he who has authority can make the laws. 
Schmitt's parallel thesis concludes in a similar vein. For him, the need to 
contain the political relations of enmity necessitated and legitimated the 
authoritarian state. The authoritarian state was dictated by the need for 
oppressive and determined action - the only possible solution to the threats 
posed to the safety and security of the community by the prevailing chaos. 
Conversely, necessity precludes democratic, consensual government in "the 
8 P Hirst, op cit, pl09 























political" arena. Power is vested in that person or institution able to control the 
political. Power, or sovereignty is accordingly sourced in the political, and 
legitimated by the ability to bring an end to state of "the political" by restoring 
order through the suppression of the the danger posed by the relations of enmity. 
The political relations of enmity and their subsequent containment pre-dates the 
ordered structured State and the resultant (democratic) constitutional and legal 
order. The political, and by extension, the power sourced therein, logically and 
necessarily pre-dates that constitutional and legal order, and is not bound by it. 
For Hobbes, the state of nature terminated upon the genesis of the state. 
Whereas for Schmitt, the threat of instability remains ever present. It is however 
not always imminent, and during periods of relative peace - during what he 
refers to as periods of normalcy - it is merely latent. So too for Schmitt, the 
"Leviathan state" is always present, but latent, in accordance with the latency of 
the threat to order. The authoritarian power of the latent Leviathan state is not 
visible or necessary during periods of peace. This does not however mean that it 
does not exist, it is merely 'veiled by the routine of normalcy'. 
Schmitt argued that the relatively stable period of the eighteenth century 
was a period of such latency. Political stability and the consequent lack of threat 
allowed the space for the development and victory of Locke's theoretical 
constitutional ordering of the state and the development of democratic legal 
doctrines, such as Montesquiei' s separation of powers, designed to give effect 
thereto. It allowed the space for the recognition and implementation of a 
democratic order characterised by consensual popular rule and its attendant 
insistence on subjugating the state's power to the law. 10 
Threats to the safety and security of society, having been suppressed, were 
not an immediate and primary concern of the government of liberal theory. The 
state's role and power in this regard was accordingly not a primary issue for 
liberal theory. During this period of normalcy, the state was perceived as being 
concerned primarily with the social and economic regulation and development of 
society. The lack of urgency and harm in the event of the state failing in its 
regulatory functions precluded the need for determined and oppressive, 
authoritarian measures. Accordingly, the space existed for the development of 
liberal theories of sovereignty. The absence of the need for "decisionist" 
government permitted the democratic location of sovereignty in "the people". It 
permitted the recognition of the exercise of sovereign power through the elected 
representatives of "the people", and the attendant subordination of the state, to 
the laws, as passed by the representatives of the, now, sovereign electorate. The 
state's subordination was to the law generated by the sovereign legislature, 






















which included subordination to the prevailing constitution and the individual 
legislative acts of parliament which sought to give practical effect to the 
principles contained therein. 
117 
Schmitt argued that the circumstantial context of "normalcy" resulted in 
the security function of the state, and the power dynamics inhering therein, 
simply not being factored into this classical liberal theoretical framework. The 
liberal theoretical frame of reference therefore does not include, or even 
anticipate, the (repressed) power of the state as protector. Accordingly, it cannot 
explain or accommodate the national security power and function of the state. 
Likewise, the location of sovereignty in 'the people', and the subjection of the 
state to the constitution and the law is designed, and therefore only applicable in 
a state of normalcy. By definition, the democratic imperatives of popular 
sovereignty and the rule of law only explain, and apply in respect of, government 
functions in the social and economic realms. That is to say, only in respect of 
those state functions and powers operative during these periods of normalcy. 
There exists at all times, however, a latent outside to the legal and 
constitutional order which prevails during these periods of normalcy. There 
remains at all times the latent threat of chaos, or a threat to the security of the 
state and its prevailing democratic constitutional and legal order. fu other words, 
there remains at all times the threat to national security. The prevailing 
constitutional and legal order, in view of the fact that they were allowed to 
develop only as a result of the original suppression of threats to the community's 
security, are intrinsically dependant on the exercise of the prior political power 
responsible for that original suppression. As with the latent threat itself, the 
measures necessary to address it, fall outside of liberal theory and accordingly 
outside of the prevailing constitutional and legal order. fu fact, the prevailing 
constitution and legal order can only survive the intrusion of the now patent 
threat, if that original constituting political act continues to be sustained by some 
existing political power. That power is by definition, outside of, and therefore, 
not subject to that constitutional order. 11 
The latent threat, once it becomes patent, constitutes a state of exception 
to the normal order. Not only does liberal theory not anticipate the state of 
exception due to the contextual roots of its origin. More importantly, it is 
fundamentally unable to do so because of its insistence on subjecting state power 
to a prescribed and preformed law. For Schmitt, the state of exception cannot, by 
its very nature, be anticipated or articulated in terms of a pre-formed law. It is for 
this reason that it can never be subject to the law. As in the state of nature, the 
imperative is to restore order, or a state of normalcy. Therefore, the resurrection 























of the latent threat is by necessity, accompanied by the emergence of the latent 
original sovereign. The latent original sovereign is that person or institution able 
to recognise the now patent threat, and who is able to restore the state of 
normalcy. It necessitates the emergence of a "decisionist" sovereign who, once 
he or she has recognised the threat, is afforded the power to take decisive steps 
to suppress the threat, including if necessary suspension of the constitution. 
Accordingly the constitution, or prevailing legal framework is subject to the state 
of the exception. The acts taken by the person or body with this capacity do not 
depend for their legitimacy on the constitution, which may in any event be set 
aside, but in the power to identify the potential threat and to protect society. 
Necessity demands this location of sovereignty, and a failure to recognise this 
will inevitably result in chaos, a return to Hobbes' perpetual state of chaos. 
Schmitt's theoretical negation of constitutional democracy is not, despite 
the nexus between his theory and the "state of the exception", limited to the 
"state of the exception" or the strictly demarcated national security arena. His 
location of sovereignty in the authoritarian state in exceptional circumstances, 
ultimately has the effect of negating the democratic imperative of popular 
sovereignty in its entirety. In terms of his theory, the true location of sovereignty 
does not in reality, even in times of normalcy, reside in 'the people'. Sovereignty 
at all times resides in that body or person with the power, not only to restore 
society to a state of normalcy, but more importantly that person or body with the 
capacity and power to decide whether a normal situation exists. In other words it 
resides in that body or person enabled and empowered to determine when in fact 
the security of the state is threatened, and by extension, to determine what in fact 
constitutes such a threat. Accordingly, 'Sovereign is he who decides on the 
exception', which is by its very nature, and by necessity, outside of law. 
Schmitt states his argument as follows: 
From a practical or theoretical perspective, it really does not matter 
whether an abstract scheme advanced to define sovereignty .. .is acceptable. 
About an abstract concept there will be no argument.. .. What is argued 
about is the concrete application, and that means who decides in a 
situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or interest of the 
state, public safety and order ... and so on. The exception which is not 
codified in the existing legal order, can at best be characterised as a case 
of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like. But it 
cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed 
law. 12 























Hirst expands on this statement in the following explanation and practical 
application of the underlying principles: 
The sovereign is a definite agency capable of making a decision, not a 
legitimating category (the people) or a purely formal definition (plenitude 
of power, etc., etc.). Sovereignty is outside oflaw, since the actions of the 
sovereign in the state of exception cannot be bound by laws (necessity has 
no laws) .... The sovereign (no abstraction but a definite agency) determines 
the possibility of the rule of law by deciding on the exception: "For a legal 
order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign 
who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists.' ( 
Political Theology, pl3)13 
The definite agency, is in the context of this thesis, that branch of 
government accorded extensive discretionary power to withhold information on 
the ground that disclosure would harm the interests of national security. More 
-fundamentally, it is that agency afforded the power to invoke the national 
security exemptions, or state of exception, on the basis of its analysis of the facts. 
This power translates into the power to define the concept, to determine what in 
fact constitutes national security, and to determine its limits. This agency is 
sovereign, because, in Schmitt's terms, it is empowered to decide on the 
applicability or inapplicability of the exemption, and likewise the applicability or 
inapplicability of the law. The national security branch officials, in their exclusive 
power to not only prohibit access to information in the interests of national 
security, but in their power to define national security, are sovereign. They are 
sovereign as they have the power to determine what constitutes a threat to 
national security, and when in fact security is so threatened. Once it has decided 
that national security is threatened, the situation of normalcy terminates. The 
termination of normalcy in the context of the national security exemptions to the 
right of access to information means that the law, including prevailing 
constitutional principles are rendered inapplicable. Therefore, the invocation of 
the exemption is accompanied by the displacement of the generally applicable 
democratic right of access to information. 
As illustrated during the course of discussions thus far, this is in fact what 
is permitted, and what in fact occurs, when the national security exemption is 
invoked by a national security official. Any allegations that this conduct is 
contrary to democratic principles and the law, is met with the following 
Schmittian rebuttals. First, the dire consequences for the maintenance of order 























necessitate the granting of this unilateral decisive power. Furthermore, this power 
cannot be anticipated and circumscribed by the law, because it is implicitly 
premised on the perception of a threat. The range of potential threats cannot be 
quantified and circumscribed by law. To attempt, or to insist on it being so 
circumscribed, is to disenable efficient and decisive action in response to a threat 
not anticipated by the law. Furthermore, the security branch personnel are 
uniquely qualified, as opposed to any other state or civil sector, to assess and 
anticipate potential threats. Therefore, it is inappropriate for the legislative 
branch of government to dictate the lawful parameters within which this power 
may be exercised. In short, this arena is, by necessity not amenable to democratic 
principles and procedures. 
The combination of actual practice once the exemption has been invoked 
and the arguments in support thereof, clearly locate the current national security 
exemptions within Schmitt's paradigm. 
Therefore, the national security exemptions, and the arguments in support 
thereof, are not compatible with the dictates of a sovereign constitutional 
democracy. They are, in reality, premised on the dissolution of constitutional 
democracy in their location of sovereignty in the hands of the 'uncommanded 
commander', or the national security branch of government. This location is not 
democratically legitimated, but legitimated by necessity. 
To accept and condone the current formulation and application of the 
national security exemptions, is to accept that 'sovereign is he who decides on 
the exception'. Accordingly, to accept and condone these exemptions is to 
accept that location of sovereignty in the national security branch decision-
makers. To accept this is to admit that "most of our formal constitutional 
doctrines are junk."14 
This admission does not inevitably mean that democracy is to suffer the 
same fate. Junking the traditional "democratic" doctrines does not automatically 
junk democracy. In fact it requires a renewed and revitalised commitment to 
democracy through a reassessment, not of the original democratic objectives 
underlying the existing doctrines, but a reassessment of the doctrines themselves. 
They must be reassessed with a view to establishing any deficiencies and 
inadequacies which impact on their ability to give effect to their purported 
founding objectives. They must be critically scrutinised with a view to 
establishing to what extent they implicitly permit undemocratic tendencies. 
The doctrines must, if necessary, be reconceptualised. This 
reconceptualisation depends on a recognition of the reality of the limited liberal 
frame of reference exposed through Schmitt's criticisms. Schmitt's criticisms as 























to the disjunction between liberal theory and reality, point directly to the 
deficiencies of that theory, and the space inhering therein for the realisation of 
undemocratic consequences. His criticisms are valid, but his conclusions are not 
inevitable. They can be avoided by a reconceptualisation, at a theoretical level, of 
liberal constitutional doctrines. This reconceptualisation requires, at the outset, a 
recognition of the realities of the prevailing national security powers and 
functions of the state. Likewise it requires a recognition of the fact that traditional 
doctrines do not accommodate these realities. 
The failure of these doctrines does not however inevitably imply the failure 
of liberal democracy's insistence on subjecting the state to the law. This 
objective remains valid. However, liberal democracy's traditional frame of 
reference must be expanded so as to embrace the full spectrum of government, to 
include the national security functions and powers of the state. 
Up until now this sphere has implicitly been permitted to operate outside 
of the law. Constitutional doctrines must be reformulated so as to expressly 
acknowledge the state's security function and delineate democratically 
appropriate boundaries within which it may operate. 
The democratisation of the national security exemptions to the right of 
access to state-held information will depend on the prior reconceptualisation of 
liberal constitutional doctrines. The national security exemptions, falling as they 
do within "the public", security arena will only be amenable to democratisation if 
the underlying constitutional doctrines overtly embrace, and in so doing, 
subordinate this arena to the law. 
The process of assessing traditional democratic doctrines with a view to 
identifying their deficiencies in delivering on democratic objectives, and their 
subsequent reconceptualisation, has already commenced. It has commenced in 
the assessment and rejection of the doctrine and procedures of representative 
democracy in the modem administrative state. It has been recognised that this 
traditional democratic paradigm is not able to deliver on that essential democratic 
ideal of responsive government in the modem administrative state. Accordingly, 
this recognition has engendered a shift toward a democratic paradigm, better able 
and suited to deliver on this democratic imperative. This shift has seen the 
displacement of the status of representation as the quintessential democratic ideal 
and tool, and the simultaneous recognition of access to information held by the 
administrative branch of government as vital to democracy. The key to the 
importance of such access lies in the fundamental link between information and 
power, and therefore in the fundamental link between access to information and 
the realisation of the democratic imperative of popular sovereignty. For this 
reason, the public's access to information is recognised, guaranteed and 
protected as a fundamental democratic right. 























constrained in its retention of the traditionally divisive public/private template. 
That is to say, the state is in tenns of the shift thus far, more so than ever, 
divested of sovereignty and subject to the law in its subjection to the publics' 
fundamental right to know. However, this improved model of democracy remains 
applicable only in respect of the state' social and economic dimensions. 
A truly democratic society must endeavour to attain, not only an effective 
democratic government, but also a comprehensively democratic order. Achieving 
the latter objective requires a further novel doctrinal jump. It requires the 
express, and unequivocal recognition that democracy requires that the national 
security arena of the state be equally subject to the law. It accordingly requires, 
within the context of this thesis, that the state's interests, functions and powers in 
this sphere, be expressly and unequivocally subordinated to the publics' right of 
access to infonnation. This requires a refonnulation of the national security 
exemptions so as to expressly and unequivocally subject and subordinate them to 
the law. That is to say, they must unequivocally be subject to constitutional 
democracy's principles of participation, accountability and transparency, and 
accordingly, to the public's prior supreme right of access to infonnation. 
6.3 The Problem of Sovereignty and the National Security Exemption in 
Perspective - The Product of the Liberal Democratic Public / Private 
Divide 
Modem constitutional democracies do in fact, despite the elevated status 
of the right to infonnation, pennit extensive, arbitrary and authoritarian secrecy 
practices in the arena of national security. This paradox points to an und,erlying 
assumption that democratic standards and ideals are valid and permissible only in 
relation to a limited sphere of government. It points to the assumption that only 
the social and economic regulatory functions of government pennit the 
realisation of the democratic drive to popular colonisation of the state. 
Conversely, it points to the conclusion that the national security function of the 
state does not, by its very nature, pennit such colonisation. It reveals that these 
exemptions are ultimately premised on an acceptance of the assumption that the 
state is, in this arena, Hobbes' "Leviathan", all-powerful state in which 
"citizen's have no need of governmental infonnation and nor do those who 
purport to speak on their behalf. Government is absolute. It is absolute because it 
needs absolute power to defend society."15 
There is substantial evidence to suggest that this democratically 
destructive assumption is in fact rooted in the classical liberal democratic 























tradition, upon which many modem constitutional democracies are founded. 
This assumption is implicitly encoded in liberal theory's limited focus and terms 
of reference. It finds expression in, and is perpetuated by a number of classical 
constitutional doctrines, most notably in the divisive traditional liberal 
public/private dichotomy. 
The liberal tradition's recognition of the state, and its primary concern 
with limiting the power and role of the state through its subordination to the will 
of"the people" is fundamentally informed by, and expressed in terms of this 
dichotomy. 
The state, in terms of traditional democratic theory is recognised as an 
objective, external entity in: 
... the public-political domain, [ which is recognised as] the reserve of 
government with its external concerns: diplomacy, warfare, law 
enforcement and a minimum amount of charity. 16 
This traditional public-political domain co-incides with Schmitt's language 
of "the political". For both Schmitt and liberal theory, this public-political arena 
is one primarily concerned with issues of the political security and stability of the 
state. The synonymity between Schmitt's thesis and liberal theory however goes 
further than a common language. This synonymity of terminology is in fact 
indicative of a broader common national security discourse. 
Liberal theory appears inconsistent in its conceptualisation of the state. 
There is a marked difference between its conceptualisation of the state in the 
public-political domain, and its conceptualisation of the state in terms of its 
insistence on democratisation of government. The state in the latter instance is 
conceptualised and defined in terms resonant, not of the public-political sphere, 
but of the traditional private arena. The discourse of liberal theory implicitly 
precludes the public-political domain from its democratic narrative which seeks 
to curtail government through democratic procedures. Its insistence on 
democratic government, and its application of this principle, is inherently limited 
to the state's power to control and regulate the social and economic dimensions 
of society. By implication therefore, it, like Schmitt's theory, excludes the public-
political national security arena from democratic parameters. 
The implications of the public/private divide in terms of liberal theory's 
recognition of, and concern with the limitation of government, is that the state is 
recognised as sovereign in the public domain, whereas popular sovereignty is the 
order of the day in the private arena. The implication of this division for the 























location of sovereignty is evidenced by, and a by-product of, liberal theory's 
primary concern with the protection of the rights of the individual. More 
fundamentally, these implications are inevitable in view of its conceptualisation 
of the ambit and content of those rights, which is intrinsically linked with its 
conceptualisation, recognition and limitation of the state. 
Classical democratic theory's dedication to democratic ( and hence limited) 
government, or to rule by "the people" is essentially a dedication to protecting 
"the people's" rights and interests. Those rights and freedoms are, for liberal 
theory, the individual's social and economic rights, rather than the community's 
collective rights to, and interest in the preservation of the collective community, 
or the state. This particular focus on the individual's rights and their chosen 
definition is a product of the central value ascribed by liberal theory to protection 
of the individual's private property, the epitome of the private domain. Locke, 
one of liberal democracy's founding fathers, quantified the centrality of private 
property to the liberal democratic thesis, in his identification of the two 
fundamental rights with which men are born. The one was understandably, the 
right to life. The other, placed on par with this crucial right, and enjoying an 
equal status, was the individual's right to inherit his father's property. The value 
of private property was such that it warranted the recognition of government. It 
was: 
The great and chief end of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting 
themselves under government. .. the preservation of property; to which in 
the state of nature there are many things wanting. 17 
The centrality and importance of private property and the consequent 
premium placed on its protection, translated not only into a recognition of 
government, but was the impetus for the insistence on civil, rather than 
authoritarian government. Traditional classical discourse reflects the centrality of 
the protection of private property to its democratic purpose. That is to say its 
primary objective in seeking to limit state power is intrinsically dependant on its 
concern with the protection of proprietal rights. The centrality of these rights 
translated into their recognition as the founding, or fundamental democratic 
rights. 
The democratic imperative was to protect these proprietal, or private 
rights, from absolute state power, from interference by the state. This particular 
democratic slant is reflected in the language and reason for ascribing to the 
public/private doctrine. The public/private doctrine was essentially an endeavour 























to limit state power in the private, or socio-economic domain. The public/private 
divide was the means of protecting the individual, or more specifically ~ 
liberties of the individual from interference by the state, beyond the public 
frontier. Conversely, the public/private divide implicitly anticipated and 
authorised extensive state power in that public-political domain. 
The implications of this conceptual divide are further evidenced in liberal 
theory's definition of unlawful state conduct. That is to say, in its definition of 
undemocratic state power, or power exercised in contravention of the terms of 
consensual government. The entire question of unlawful state action was, by 
definition, limited to the private domain of proprietal rights. Unlawful state 
power was the exercise of power which sought to: 
... invade the property of the subject, and to make [itself], or any part of 
the community, masters or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties or 
fortunes of the people. 18 
The entire democratic imperative, which sought to subject the state to the 
law, or subject it to the will of "the people", was essentially an endeavour to 
prevent the intrusion of the state into this domain of proprietal rights. It was an 
endeavour to ensure that "the people" retained control over their socio-economic 
rights. 
Liberal democratic theory, by virtue of its focused terms of reference, 
simply does not address, and therefore require, a similar subjection of the state's 
power and functions in the public-political domain, to the will of "the people'. 
This omission ultimately translates into a tacit, unstated acceptance of absolute 
government, or state sovereignty, in the overtly public domain. This conclusion, 
which ultimately means that classical liberal theory is not that far removed from 
Schmitt's thesis, is further substantiated by a further correlation between the two 
paradigms. Liberal theory, like Schmitt's theory, identifies the public-political 
domain in terms resonant of Schmitt's political arena. In addition, liberal theory 
implicitly locates this domain prior, in time, to the democratisation of the state, or 
the social contract. Hence it locates this domain, as Schmitt does, outside of the 
democratic legal framework. The universally shared assumption is that prior to 
existence of the state, society was in a perpetual state of chaos, it was continually 
exposed to the threat of destruction. For the likes of Schmitt, Hobbbes, Locke 
and Rousseau alike, the recognition of the state was preceded by a state of 
political turmoil. Further, the recognition of, and society's willingness to subject 
itself to, government is explained by all concerned, by reference to the overriding 






















interest of self-preservation. The common denominator is ultimately the 
justification of necessity. Although unstated, liberal theory in fact anticipates 
Schmitt's decisionist government in this arena, as a matter of necessity. 
126 
Recognition of the state in this arena, as opposed to the later private arena, 
is essentially a recognition of the need for external regulation and control of each 
individual's absolute freedom, which if left uncurtailed, would inevitably mean a 
return to the prior state of chaos. The emphasis in this arena is on the restraint of 
liberties (by the state). Whereas, in the private arena, the emphasis is on the 
desire to protect individual's rights and liberties. The subtle difference in 
emphasis, when placed within the divisive public/private template, reveals an 
implicit juxtaposition between the security of society on the one hand, and on the 
other, the curtailment and restriction of liberties. It ultimately reveals a 
juxtaposition between state security and democracy. In the public-political 
domain, state powers exercised in furtherance of state security implicitly take 
precedence over the individual's liberties in that domain. Whereas in the private 
domain, the individuals freedom, which in this context means his or her right of 
control over private property, takes precedence over the state's power. 
Therefore, the state is in the public-political arena, in terms of the public/private 
perspective of traditional theory, implicitly recognised as sovereign, and hence 
not subject to the law. 
The traditional liberal democratic state, the extent of its powers, and its 
subjection to popular sovereignty or the law, is fundamentally moulded by the 
imposition of the divisive public/private template. The resultant implicit 
exclusion of the public-political domain from democratic control fundamentally 
informed the legal framework and infrastructure of liberal democracy. The legal 
systems of democratic societies informed by the traditional democratic paradigm 
have accordingly also developed within the confines of the public/private 
template. This is evidenced in their expression and perpetuation of the state's 
national security powers outside of democracy and beyond the reach of the law. 
The emergence of the modern administrative state has resulted in a 
democratic paradigm shift toward more effective democratic procedures. It has 
accordingly seen a resurgence of the importance of effective public participation 
and accountability, and a resultant de-emphasis of the tools of representation. It 
has seen the introduction of additional democratic procedures to facilitate the 
actual attainment of these democratic objectives. Likewise, it has seen the novel 
recognition of rights, such the right of access to information held by the 
administrative branch, as essential democratic rights. 
However, this paradigm shift has, at the end of the day been incomplete. It 
has tenaciously retained the liberal traditional divisive public/private template. As 
a result, democracy has been revived and revitalised, but only in the traditional 























political domain has remained outside the parameters of the realigned democratic 
paradigm, as it did in terms of the traditional paradigm. 
The democratisation of the national security exemptions depends on a 
comprehensive paradigm shift to one which seeks, in addition to revitalising 
democracy, to accommodate within its parameters, the public-political national 
security arena. It requires a shift to a paradigm which actively seeks to draw it in 
and make it subject to the law, or the will of "the people". In short, the 
democratisation of the national security exemption depends on the dissolution of 
the residual public/private divide in the formulation and implementation of its 
enhanced principles and procedures. 
6.4 National Security, Sovereignty, The Public/Private Divide and Dahl's 
Fourth Ideal Democratic Standard - Control of the Agenda 
An order which purports to be democratic must, to truly be regarded as 
such, engage in a comprehensive paradigm shift. Failing which, the retention of 
the residual public/private divide template will frustrate the attainment of 
democracy, as measured against Dahl's fourth ideal democratic standard. An 
order premised on this divide, even were it to create and implement democratic 
procedures of the highest order, even if it were to emulate the quintessential 
Athenian democratic procedures, would remain essentially undemocratic, as it 
would deprive the demos of final control of the agenda. 
Dahl illustrates this requirement with the following hypothetical scenario 
set in the cradle of democracy: 
. .let us suppose that Philip of Macedonia, having defeated the Athenians at 
Chaeronea, deprives the Athenian assembly of the authority to make any 
decisions on matters of foreign and military policy. The citizens continue 
to assemble forty times a year and decide on many matters, but on some of 
the most important questions they remain silent. With respect to "local" 
matters, the Athenian polis is no less democratic than before, but with 
respect to foreign and military affairs the Athenians are now governed 
hierarchically by Philip and his minions. Would we want to say that 
Athens was now fully democratic or was as democratic as it had been 
before?. 19 
This hypothetical scenario could be mistaken, were the names and places 
to be changed, for many modem democratic societies. Most notably, it could be 























mistaken for those systems discussed during the course of this thesis. These 
systems, within the specific context of the subject matter of this thesis, have 
extended their recognition and protection of democratic principles and 
procedures to include the novel right of access to state-held information. This 
recognition has translated into the general constitutional principle that this right is 
constitutive of an essential democratic right and the state's, or government's 
interests are accordingly subordinated to it. In addition, access to information is 
recognised as a democratic process, necessary for the delivery of responsive 
government. It has accordingly been implemented and guaranteed as between the 
demos and the administrative branch of government, who are obliged, as a 
matter of routine to facilitate and ensure the unhindered flow of information to 
the public. Democracy, in the sense of effective rule by "the people" is 
accordingly rendered more effective than ever, in the modem administrative 
state. However, the new and revived democracy remains limited in its 
application to the "private" arena. The "public" arena, or the national security 
function of the state has remained impervious to democratic pressures. 
The exclusion of the national security arena from the democratic 
imperative is evidenced by the prevailing national security exemptions to the 
right of access to information. This exclusion is evidenced in their conferral of 
extensive and unchecked discretionary power on the executive branch of 
government, not only to withhold information in the interests of national security, 
but more significantly in its effective power to define national security. 
The exclusion of the demos from access to national security information at 
the sole behest of this branch and, more importantly, in their exclusion from 
participating in, or control over the definition of the term "national security", 
means that democratic process is rendered inapplicable in this arena, at the 
behest of an unaccountable executive. 
Accordingly, one must conclude that the systems discussed in this thesis, 
as does Dahl in respect of his hypothetical Athens, are, despite their compliance 
with the democratic criteria of effective participation, voting equality at the 
decisive stage and enlightened understanding, not fully democratic. They may 
only be regarded as "fully democratic with respect to [their] agenda", but would 
nevertheless be a "travesty of democracy. For the citizens could not 
democratically decide matters they felt to be critically important other than those 
the rulers had allowed to remain on the pitifully shrunken agenda of the neutered 
democracy. "20 
The systems discussed, in their formulation and application of the national 





















control of the agenda. It enjoys final control of the agenda in its power to define 
the tenn "national security". The fluidity and indeterminacy of the term means 
that the final agenda is subject to incremental shrinkage at the behest of the 
executive branch of government. The breadth of the final agenda is determined 
by the breadth of the definition adopted by it. An expanded definition constitutes 
an expansion of the traditional public domain, which is implicitly excluded from 
democratic process. 
For Dahl, the requirement of final control of the agenda is essentially a 
question of sovereignty: 
The criterion of final control is perhaps what is also meant when we say 
that in a democracy the people must have the final say, or must be 
sovereign. A system that satisfies this criterion as well as the other three 
could be regarded as having a fully democratic process in relation to the 
demos.21 
Depriving the demos of final control of the agenda is to deprive the demos 
of their democratic entitlement to sovereignty. Accordingly, depriving the demos 
of final control of the agenda is fatal to democracy. The democratisation of the 
national security exemptions depends on the extension of that essential 
democratic criterion of popular sovereignty to this arena. Revesting sovereignty 
in the demos in tum depends on the demos enjoying final control of the agenda. 
Final control of the agenda, and hence democracy, requires that the current 
paradigm shift be absolute in its rejection of the public/private divide implicitly 
responsible for locating final control of the agenda in the hands of the 
unaccountable executive branch of government and its administration. 
*** 


























RECONCILING THE IRRECONCILABLE: DEMOCRACY AND THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTION TO THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM 
OF INFORMATION - FINAL CONTROL OF THE AGENDA 
The national security exemptions to the right to freedom of infonnation are, in 
their current fonnulation and in their application, located beyond the parameters 
of constitutional democracy. This location is evidenced by the fact that these 
exemptions are not subject to democratic processes and standards, and 
accordingly not subordinated to the essential right of access to infonnation. "The 
people" are excluded from participating in, access to infonnation about, and 
posterior scrutiny of decisions, as to what constitutes national security. Likewise, 
they are equally excluded from any subsequent decisions to prohibit disclosure of 
infonnation on the ground that it would harm national security as defined. This 
exclusion is effected in practical tenns through the preclusion of prior legislative 
control over the definition of the tenn "national security", by the preclusion of 
direct popular participation in the decision-making process, and in the denial of 
legislative, popular or judicial scrutiny of the decisions. Instead the power to 
define and to decide is placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
unaccountable executive branch of government. 
The location of this power in the hands of the executive branch is 
tantamount to affording it sovereign power. This location of sovereign power is 
contrary to the fundamental democratic premise of popular sovereignty, although 
not contrary to the implicit assumptions underlying the traditional classical 
democratic paradigm. This location of sovereignty is a product of, and explicable 
in tenns of the public/private doctrine so fundamental to this paradigm and its 
principled and procedural infrastructure. This doctrine implicitly anticipates and 
legitimises state sovereignty, as opposed to popular sovereignty, in the public 
domain. It accordingly implicitly anticipates and legitimises the location of 
sovereignty in the hands of the unaccountable executive branch of government in 
all matters pertaining to state security, the epitome of "the public". 
The fact that the dynamics of the current national security exemptions can 
be rationalised by reference to doctrines characteristic of the traditional classical 
democratic paradigm does not render them democratic. The underlying 
conclusion, that the traditional classical paradigm is deficient in view of the 
failure of its doctrines and resultant practices to give effect to democratic 























societies, such as America and Australia, recognised that democracy could not be 
achieved and sustained in the modem state whilst formulated and given effect to 
through the traditional institutions of representative democracy. They have 
accordingly engaged in a democratic paradigm shift founded on the need to 
ensure the attainment of the democratic criterion of popular sovereignty. The 
realigned democratic perspective has accordingly displaced the prior premium 
placed on the tool of representation to achieve participant, responsive 
government and accountability. Instead, representation is now simply seen as one 
of the many, and possibly more important procedures required for the attainment 
of a democratic order. 
This shift has seen the institutional recognition and protection of rights 
such as the right to freedom of access to state-held information as procedurally 
necessary. More importantly, this right has been recognised as more than a 
procedural means to attain democratic ends, but as an essential democratic end, 
in and of itself, in view of the fact that information and power, and therefore, 
information and sovereignty, are one and the same. 
The shift from the classical traditional democratic paradigm has however 
not been complete. It has been re-evaluated, and its traditional procedures and 
practices as between the state and the demos subsequently amended, 
reformulated and supplemented. Despite these changes, societies which have 
engaged in this shift are not fully democratic in terms of Dahl's democratic 
paradigm. In terms of his paradigm, they have only given effect to the democratic 
ideals of effective participation, voting equality at the decisive stage, enlightened 
understanding and inclusivity. This is not enough. Their democratic process in 
relation to the demos, in terms of the realigned paradigm, is fundamentally 
limited. The democratic processes and principles apply, and give effect to these 
democratic ideals, in relation to all state activity falling within the traditional 
"private" domain. It does not extend to "the public" domain, in that it does not 
find application in matters relating to national security. The shift from the 
classical traditional democratic paradigm has only been partial in that the 
realigned paradigm remains fundamentally entrenched within the divisive 
public/private template. 
As long as the demos are excluded from "the public" domain, democracy 
will remain elusive, because their exclusion constitutes an erosion of that all-
definitive democratic criteria of popular sovereignty. 
A legal order which fundamentally limits the ambit of popular sovereignty 
can, by definition, not be regarded as democratic. The attainment of democracy 
requires the dissolution of the fundamental public/private divide and its implicit 
prior anticipation and legitimation of the exclusion of democratic processes from 























freedom of information, democracy requires that these exemptions be 
unequivocally posited within, and be made subject to, the prevailing democratic 
framework. Access to information must constitute the first priority in accordance 
with the prioritisation of popular sovereignty. 
Any system which fails to engage in this comprehensive paradigm shift 
will not, in terms of Dahl's democratic paradigm, be fully democratic. It will 
implicitly be rendered unable to comply with the essential democratic ideal of 
final control of the agenda, as the prior assumption of the exclusion of the demos 
from "the public" national security domain deprives them of final control of the 
agenda. They are precluded from deciding on whether "the public" arena should 
be democratised. More importantly, should they so decide, they are precluded 
from deciding what matters fall within this "public" arena. 
Deprivation of final control of the agenda is essentially undemocratic in it 
that it amounts to depriving the demos of sovereignty. They are deprived of the 
final say with regard to the extent and applicability of the democratic process. 
Final control of the agenda means that: 
The demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are 
to be placed on the agenda of matters that are to be decided by means of 
the democratic process. 1 
This requirement does not mean that the demos are required, or even 
qualified to decide or participate in every question requiring a binding decision. 
Likewise, in the context of freedom of information, it does not presuppose that 
the demos require access to all information, or that it is qualified to decide in 
every given situation whether or not the information requested should be 
disclosed. This extreme position is clearly both practically untenable and 
theoretically unsustainable. 
Control of the agenda does however: 
... presuppose ... that the demos is qualified to decide (1) which matters do 
or do not require binding decisions, (2) of those that do, which matters the 
demos is qualified to decide for itself, and (3) the terms on which the 
demos delegates authority.2 
In other words it does not presuppose that the demos is qualified to decide 
every matter or participate in every matter, but it does presuppose that decisions 
1 R Dahl, op cit, p62 























as to the demos ' competence or limits, and hence the limits of the democratic 
process, are to be decided by the demos, and not by the executive branch of 
government. Final control of the agenda, in its emphasis on locating sovereign 
power, that is to say, the power to have the final say, in the national security 
context, amounts to a rejection of "the liberty limiting principle called legal 
paternalism". This principle seeks to wrest the power of decision from the demos 
on grounds resonant of Schmitt's theory of sovereignty. These grounds are based 
on justifications of protection from harm. The question of harm, as a matter of 
necessity, requires determined and unilateral action. In view of the "expert" 
knowledge of government, they are exclusively equipped to detect the possibility 
of harm, or potential threats to the security of the state. Accordingly, necessity 
dictates that government be afforded the exclusive power to detect, and avoid the 
realisation of this harm, by taking what ever steps it, as the expert, deems 
necessary. The process must accordingly be steered or guided by government, 
and the electorate are subject to that government imperative, for their own good. 
The attitude revealed by this justification: 
Seems to imply that, since the state often perceives the interests of 
individual citizens better than do the citizens themselves, it stands as a 
permanent guardian of those interests in loco parentis. 3 
Reducing this attitude to its essential underlying assumption reveals that it 
is premised on a prior assumption of popular incompetence. It is accordingly 
premised on a prior assumption as to the limits of the democratic process, which 
limits are encoded in the legal framework, as dictated from above. In other 
words, the ambit of the agenda is dictatorially pre-determined, and therefore, the 
demos are unconditionally deprived of final control of the agenda. Legal 
paternalism not only precludes the public from final control of the agenda, it is 
also a destructive assumption which has the potential to undermine the success 
of democracy in, even, the accepted private sphere. In short, it becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. It: 
... is preposterous. If adults are treated like children they will come in time 
to be like children. Deprived of the right to chose for themselves, they will 
soon lose the power of rational judgement and decision. 4 
The current formulation and application of the national security 























exemptions deprive the demos of final control of the agenda, not only in the 
extent to which they are deprived of control, but also in the implicitly 
paternalistic grounds on which such deprivation is justified. 
134 
These exemptions deprive the demos of final control of the agenda in their 
vesting of the extensive power that they do, in the unelected, unaccountable 
executive branch of government. This branch acquires final control of the 
agenda, not only in its unreviewable power to deny access to information on the 
ground that disclosure would threaten national security, but more importantly, in 
its extensive, unilateral, unreviewable, discretionary power to define national 
security. The power to define means the power to decide what in fact constitutes 
national security. It is in this power that this branch is definitively and 
unequivocally afforded final control of the agenda. The act of defining a matter 
as a national security matter "legitimately" locates it within the "public" domain, 
and accordingly off the agenda of matters amenable to democratic process. In the 
context of the national security exemptions, the indiscriminate over-use and 
abuse of labeling matters as a national security issue has translated into an ever 
decreasing agenda of matters "that are to be decided by means of the democratic 
process." 
By granting this branch of government an almost limitless, unreviewable 
discretion to define national security, and accordingly to determine the 
parameters of democratic process, the demos are deprived of final control of the 
agenda. They are deprived of the power to decide: 
(1) which matters do or do not require binding decisions, (2) of those that 
do, which matters the demos is qualified to decide for itself, and (3) the 
terms on which the demos delegates authority."5 
These decisions are taken by the executive branch of government, and 
often, more importantly, by its administration. In allowing this branch an 
unlimited discretion to effectively decide what is in fact not a national security 
issue and therefore amenable to democratic process, it is allowed to decide the 
competence and limits of the demos, and impose that decision from the top 
down. As such, it effectively has the power to establish its own terms within 
which to exercise the power 'delegated' to it by "the people". 
The key to this illegitimate location of power is in the formulation and 
extent of the discretion afforded to the state official. The lack of constraints or 
guidance in the granting of this discretion constitutes a subversion of the original 
democratic founding assumption which legitimates state action in a democratic 























order. It subverts the underlying democratic assumption of delegation, which in 
terms of democratic theory is "a revocable grant of authority"6• The revocability 
of the grant of power is intrinsically determined by the prior constraint of that 
power by the terms agreed to by the demos. These terms are, in terms of 
democratic theory, by necessity, limited to the power to give effect to a 
predetermined policy choice. The power of choice, and formulation, of the 
underlying policy at all times being retained by the demos in accord with the 
democratic requirement of final control of the agenda. 
Should the terms of delegation be permitted to become too broad or 
flexible, in other words, should the delegation be a delegation of an unlimited, 
unconstrained discretion, the grant of authority becomes irrevocable. It becomes 
irrevocable, as too broad a degree of discretion allows the delegatee to move 
beyond merely giving effect to a predetermined policy choice, to being permitted 
to actually make those policy choices. In short, the delegation of power mutates 
into the alienation of power and accordingly the demos can no longer be 
regarded as sovereign, but now subject to an absolute unaccountable sovereign, 
namely the executive branch of government. 
In the context of freedom of information and the national security 
exemptions, the extended, unreviewable, discretionary power to define national 
security, ultimately translates into the power to make broad national security 
policy choices, rather than the power to implement a prior policy choice. This 
underlying concern that the extent of the power vested in this branch constitutes 
an alienation, rather than a delegation of power is succinctly summarised by 
Birkinshaw: 
I cannot envisage arguments which would establish and successfully 
support the need for no restriction on freedom of information. The 
difficulty lies in allowing government prerogative alone to call the tune. 7 
Insisting that the national security exemptions give effect to the 
requirement of final control of the agenda, in both their formulation and 
application does not, as will be discussed hereunder, ignore or disregard the fact 
that: 
6 Ibid 
Any responsible advocate for open government and freedom of 
information must accept that there are subjects which we do not need to 
know about. 8 
7 P Birkinshaw, op cit, p 20 




















Final control of the agenda as a democratic essential, as formulated by 
Dahl, is implicitly cognisant of this fact and permits the space to accommodate it. 
Any legal system which fails to recognise this space and accordingly discounts 
this requirement on the ground that it is incompatible with national security's 
unique concerns, cannot justifiably claim to be democratic. 
This requirement has the capacity to accommodate the exclusion of certain 
matters outside of the competence and limits of the demos. It accepts that there 
are certain matters which are not amenable to democratic process in view of the 
limited competence and interests of the demos. However, it does not accept that 
the prior identification of the matters as matters not amenable to democratic 
process, is itself not amenable to democratic process. Final control of the agenda 
dictates that the demos retain the power to decide the limits of their own 
competence and on the basis of that determination, determine what matters they 
consider to be unsuited to democratic, rather than unilateral decision-making. 
But it is only those specific pre-determined matters which may be 
excluded from democratic process, and not the underlying decision as to the 
amenability of the matter. 
According to this criterion, a political system would employ a fully 
democratic process even if the demos decided that it would not make 
every decision on every matter but instead chose to have some decisions 
on some matters made, say, in a hierarchical fashion by judges or 
administrators. [However, it could only be said to employ a fully 
democratic process] as long as the demos could effectively retrieve any 
matter for decision by itself.9 
In short it permits delegation of the power to decide specific pre-
determined issues in a pre-determined and authorised manner, to the 
administrative branch of government. It does not permit alienation of the power 
to decide what these issues are. The boundary between delegation and alienation, 
as pointed out by Dahl, is not always easy to discern or enforce. Despite this 
difficulty, it is submitted that a key indicator which alerts one to the potential for 
overstepping this boundary is the practice of "delegation" of extensive 
discretionary powers to the administrator, especially if the exercise of that power 
is rendered unreviewable. 

























7.1 Rendering the National Security Exemption Compatible With The 
Democratic Requirement of Final Control Of The Agenda - Proposed 
Solutions 
As long as the national security exemptions permit the executive branch of 
government final control of the agenda they will remain incompatible with 
democracy. In other words, as long as they constitute, in their formulation and 
application, an alienation, rather than the delegation of power, they will not 
comply with the democratic requirement of final control of the agenda. The 
adverse consequences of this for the democratic status of the prevailing order, 
are not limited to the national security arena alone. The deprivation of final 
control of the agenda by these exemptions, poses, in view of Schmitt's theory of 
sovereignty, a threat to the democratic status of the legal order as a whole. In the 
context of the national security exemptions to the right to freedom of 
information, Schmitt's location of sovereignty in that agency who decides on the 
state of exception, is most pertinently applicable. The extensive power afforded 
by these exemptions to define the term national security potentially subjects an 
indeterminate range of government functions, decisions and interests to the risk 
of being precluded from democratic process. The term national security is 
sufficiently broad to encompass an indeterminate range of issues. Once defined 
as such, the issue at hand will be precluded from the agenda, and the agenda is 
subjected to the risk of consisting of a reduced number of largely insignificant 
matters. In short, permitting the executive branch control of the "national 
security" agenda affords it control of almost the entire nature and ambit of the 
agenda. 
A number of writers have recognised the full breadth of the implications of 
the democratically unacceptable national security exemptions to the right to 
information. They have recognised that the key to avoiding these implications is 
through the reconciliation of the exemptions with democratic standards and 
ideals. The key to this reconciliation lies in the issue of the nature and extent of 
the discretionary power granted in terms of the exemptions. 
They have accordingly proposed solutions which seek to inhibit the extent 
of the power delegated, with a view to inhibiting the mutation of the delegation 
of power into the alienation of power. In short, they have put forward practical 
proposals designed to "eliminate unnecessary discretionary power and to check, 
confine and structure necessary discretionary power". By focussing on the 
limitation of discretion, these proposals seek to achieve a democratically 
acceptable balance between discretionary power which is not excessive, and 























is adequate so as to enable the executive to effectively fulfil its role. 10 
In the context of the right to freedom of infonnation and the national 
security exemptions thereto, these proposals have focused on the limitation of the 
discretionary power of the executive branch to define, and accordingly determine 
the limits of national security. Conversely they also focus on reinvesting that 
power in the demos. They focus on reinvesting it directly, through the creation of 
direct participatory mechanisms, and indirectly, through the affirmation of the 
legislative branch's prior control of the executive's activities in this arena. In 
addition, these proposals have sought to ensure posterior control and 
accountability through the creation of effective legislative and judicial 
mechanisms for posterior scrutiny and evaluation. 
The complexity of society, politics and the issue at hand means that the 
solutions to democratising the national security exemptions will not be singular 
or simple. Accordingly, the proposals put forward are diverse and multifold. 
However, at the end of the day, they accumulatively constitute a holistic 
programme designed to guarantee that the right to freedom of infonnation is 
recognised and protected as a fundamental democratic precept in this arena. 
They accumulatively seek, through this recognition and protection of 
infonnation, to ensure that the demos are not deprived of final control of the 
agenda or their legitimate claim to sovereignty. 
One of the primary focuses of these proposals is the prior restraint of the 
extent of discretion afforded the executive branch by the legislature. These 
proposals, in focussing on the limitation of discretion, seek to ensure that: 
A clear distinction [is] drawn between identifying and analysing threats on 
lJle one hand, and fonnulating policy on security and defence on the other. 
The legislative branch of government, as representative of the demos, is 
responsible for policy fonnulation , and must, in tenns of the above requirement, 
retain ultimate control of the definition of national security and the limits of this 
arena. An act of delegation which deprives this branch of this power is contrary 
to the requirement of final control of the agenda. This requires legislative 
activism, it requires that: 
Legislatures that recognise the need for discretionary judgement should so 
far as may be feasible, give administrators direction, rather than carte 
10 Davis, KC, Discretioruuy Justice: A Preliminaty Engµity. 1977, p 3 & 27 
























As such, it has been strongly advocated that the national security 
exemptions must, in their formulation, provide a greater degree of specificity and 
guidance as to what constitutes national security. More specifically, the 
legislature must identify, in advance, specific sub-categories of information, the 
disclosure of which would be harmful to national security. These pre-determined 
matters, which by democratic consensus are known and agreed to fall squarely 
within the ambit of national security, as consensually defined, would then, on 
this ground, legitimately be excluded from the obligation to disclose. Examples 
of the types of matters anticipated are, "tactical military operations, design of 
weapons, and those aspects of diplomatic relations when confidentiality in the 
negotiation process is expected by all parties."13 
The rationale underlying this approach is that any solution must, unlike 
existing restraint mechanisms which "work to correct past mistakes rather than to 
effect the necessary fundamental transformation[ s ]"14, focus on a fundamental 
transformation of the system, premised on prevention rather than a cure. 
In addition, in accordance with the dictates of rational accountable 
government, the mere limitation and specification of categories of information is 
not in itself sufficient. The specification of pre-determined matter must be 
supplemented by the imposition of a positive duty on the decision-maker. The 
decision-maker must be obliged to evaluate each individual request for 
information which potentially falls within these categories, with a view to 
establishing if disclosure would, in fact, result in harm to these specified 
interests. In other words, legislation must only permit refusal of access to such 
information in the event that disclosure would "cause real, not speculative, 
harm"15to national security. A closely related proposal is that the wording of the 
exemptions must render the decision to refuse access to the information falling 
within one of the specified categories, discretionary as opposed to mandatory. 16 
The Canadian Access To Information Act has in fact followed these 
suggestions and given effect to the objective of legislative control of the 
definition of national security and control of the discretionary decision to refuse 
access. This is achieved through the formulation of its national security 
exemption which substantively defines the term and which dictates the legitimate 
12 W Gellhom "Protecting Human Rights in the Administrative State" Human Rights: The Cape Town 
Conference: Proceedings of the First National Conference on Human Rights in South Africa, p 178 
13 Emerson, T, op cit, p 848 
14 Boren, D L, 'The Winds of Change at the CIA' in (1992) Vol 101 The Yale Law Journal, p 858 
15 The Qpen Democracy Bill: A Critical Review, Report by The Human Rights Committee, The Black Sash and 
IDAS (PIMS), unpublished, p 6 























parameters of the discretionary power to refuse access. The latter control is 
ensured by the imposition of a duty on the decision-maker to engage in the actual 
weighing up of the competing interests, with a view to establishing if actual harm 
to national security will occur if the information is disclosed. Refusing to disclose 
on the grounds of anything short of a reasonable likelihood of actual harm will 
not constitute a legitimate exercise of that discretionary power. 
A mere sampling of the relevant provisions clearly illustrates the extent to 
which such limitation is in fact possible, without unduly and detrimentally 
precluding the necessary element of flexibility17 : 
The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any 
record ... that contains information, the disclosure of which could 
reasonably be expected to be injurious to the conduct of international 
affairs, the defense of Canada ... or the detection, prevention or suppression 
of subversive or hostile activities, including without restricting the 
generality of the aforegoing, any such information: 
♦ Relating to military tactics or strategy, or relating to military exercises or 
operations undertaken in preparation for hostilities or in connection with 
the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities; 
♦ Relating to the quantity, characteristics, capabilities or deployment of 
weapons or other defense equipment or of anything being designed, 
developed, produced or considered for use as weapons or other defense 
equipment or of anything being designed, developed or produced or 
considered for use as weapons or other defense equipment. 
♦ A further five similarly worded provisions complete the list of matters 
falling within the ambit of national security. They include matters relating 
to the defence or other military force responsible for the detection, 
prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities; matters 
relating to intelligence in respect of subversive or hostile activities and 
foreign states; information relating to scientific equipment or methods for 
collection of intelligence referred to in the preceding paragraphs; 
information relating to prescribed international negotiations, diplomatic 
correspondence; and information relating to specified communications or 
cryptographic systems. 























In addition to specifying the limits of the type of information or the type of 
matters in respect of which information may be withheld, the Act goes further in 
its endeavour to preclude the danger of expansion of the definition of national 
security. It does so by identifying and defining potentially ambiguous, and hence 
flexible terms, contained in the specified list of matters. In its choice of terms 
requiring clarity it limits, not only the definition of national security, but also the 
permissible ambit of the national security functions and roles of the responsible 
agencies. So for example, it defines the term 'defense' as: 
Defense of Canada ... includes the efforts of Canada .. towards the 
detection, prevention or suppression of activities of any foreign state 
directed toward actual or potential attack or other acts of aggression 
. C d is agamst ana a ... 
In addition the Act defines, with a similar degree of specificity, terms such 
as "subversive or hostile activities". In so doing, it precludes the extension of 
these terms beyond their prior, legitimately pre-determined ambit and thus limits 
national security powers and functions to an arena enjoying democratic 
consensus. 
Any serious proponent of pre-determined legislative guidance and control 
of the definition of national security, cannot propose this solution in an 
information vacuum. In order to be in a position to provide guidance, the 
legislature must be equipped with extensive national security knowledge. Prior 
legislative guidance and control in the absence of an informed legislature would 
validly be subject to criticism. An uninformed legislature would, by definition, be 
incompetent on the ground that it lacked the necessary expertise or the ability to 
see the issues at hand in perspective. 
The same principles apply in respect of public participation. Responsive 
government requires that the public be afforded the opportunity for direct 
participation in the circumscription of the permissible national security ambit. 
Accordingly, the public must be afforded the opportunity to participate in the 
drafting of the enabling limiting legislation. Effective and constructive public 
participation at this level naturally requires that the public be informed as 
comprehensively as possible so as to render its participation rational. 
Freedom of information legislation must therefore provide for guaranteed, 
unlimited access by the legislative branch of government to sensitive national 
security information.19 Any such legislation could of course accommodate the 
18 Section 15(2) 























concern for leaks by encoding carefully worded safety mechanisms to ensure 
confidentiality, much the same as has been done so as to prevent leaks from the 
executive branch. 
In a similar vein the national security exemptions must be formulated so as 
to ensure maximum public access to national security related information. In this 
context: 
This will require a meaningful level of transparency ... While some degree 
of secrecy will be necessary, the emphasis should be on freedom of 
information rather than on protection of information.20 
Needless to say, a programme of democratisation of these exemptions 
assumes the implementation of procedures to facilitate public participation at 
every practical stage, which usually translates into participation prior to the 
drafting of relevant legislation. 
Participation in the formulation and limitation of the national security 
exemptions will of course be of little value in the absence of effective 
enforcement mechanisms and accountability. Limitation of the extent of 
permissible discretionary power through clearly constructed boundaries will 
mean very little if there are no means of scrutinising executive conduct with a 
view to ensuring compliance. Likewise, it will come to naught if there are no 
means of demanding justification for non-compliance and remedies capable of 
enforcing compliance. 
The proposed mechanisms of scrutiny and accountability include scrutiny 
by, and accountability to, the legislature, as well as to the public directly. Koh 
has proposed that legislative scrutiny and accountability could be achieved 
through the establishment of a consultative group, drawn from the ranks of the 
legislative branch of government. The executive branch, including the specific 
intelligence agencies, would be obliged to furnish regular reports to this group 
and consult with them on a regular basis in regard to issues concerning national 
security. 21 Other proposals include parliamentary scrutiny of regulations relating 
to national security information, as well as of classification decisions. In addition, 
these regulations once scrutinised, should be published. Prior legislative scrutiny 
would constitute a pro-active approach as it would ensure prior conformity with 
legislative dictates as well as the dictates generally of a sovereign constitutional 
democracy. 22 
Direct accountability of the decision-makers to the public will of course be 
20 L Nathan, Op Cit, p25 
21 Koh, in Peterson, op cit. 757 























achieved by, first and foremost, maximising access to information and imposing 
a duty on the decision-maker to furnish reasons for a decision to withhold 
information. This would enable the public to engage in personal rational 
assessment of the decisions taken, as against the criteria set out in the enabling 
legislation. 
In addition, direct accountability requires a system of effective and 
intensive external judicial review of decisions and actions taken in this arena. 
Concerns about the disclosure of sensitive information during the course of legal 
proceedings are not insurmountable. They may be overcome by making 
provision for in-camera proceedings at the presiding officer's discretion. Koh 
argues that the limitation of judicial review on the grounds of the judiciaries lack 
of competence or ability in respect of national security matters are redundant as: 
The courts will have no more trouble applying the proper Constitutional 
and statutory standards in this area than they do in other complex cases. 23 
A further, and perhaps more compelling answer to these concerns about 
the judiciaries lack competence and ability is to be found in the creation of 
specialised courts. These courts would be limited in their focus to matters of 
national security. Their specialised focus would over a relatively short period of 
time facilitate their acquisition of the degree of expertise demanded by opponents 
of judicial review. 
Experience has shown, as evidenced by the American judiciary' s track 
record, that the greatest stumbling block to effective judicial review is to be 
found in judicial attitudes to questions of national security. As a result, 
progressive legislation which directs the judiciary to engage in substantive 
judicial review may not be sufficient to realise the objective of accountability 
through review. Current judicial ideology has the potential to undermine the most 
overt expressions of legislative authorisation of judicial review. 
The American deferential and conservative attitude toward matters of 
national security is not unique to this jurisdiction. It is also a common feature of 
the prevailing South African judicial ideology. 
Judicial ideology is used here in the sense ascribed to it by David Nicolson 
who explains the concept as: 
.. [the] set of beliefs and assumptions about the judicial function. It 
describes what judges conceive of as their proper role - what they can and 
cannot do - and is reflected in the mode of reasoning which they employ. 























Judicial ideology deals with issues such as judicial precedent, statutory 
interpretation, and the relationship between the courts and other organs of 
government. 24 
It is conceded that the prevailing South African judicial ideology vis-a-vis 
the relationship between the courts and the executive branch of government has 
matured significantly from the ideology of the 1980' s. Current judicial attitudes 
are more appropriate to the dictates of constitutional democracy. As a result the 
courts are more willing than ever to engage in an increasingly substantive review 
of administrative acts. However, a question arises as to whether it has matured 
sufficiently to cast off the shackles which have traditionally inhibited its power of 
review in the arena of national security. 
It is submitted that the traditional liberal democratic paradigm with its 
emphasis on the public/private divide, and resultant institutional perception that 
matters of national security are overtly political and hence non-justiciable, has 
contributed significantly to the character of judicial ideology. Legislative activism 
may prove insufficient in purging judicial ideology of its adherence to these 
residual, but fundamental, aspects of its heritage. 
There are a number of indicators pointing to this conclusion. One such 
indicator is the decision of the magistrate referred to in the introduction to this 
thesis. That decision, it is submitted, is the product of an attitude which is 
prevalent amongst the South African judiciary, especially in regard to matters 
which they regard to be overtly political. National security is perceived by both 
the public and the judiciary as the epitome of the political. 
The prevailing attitude in respect of "political" matters is that they are 
non-justiciable. National security matters, as the epitome of "the political", are 
therefore indisputably beyond the purview of judicial review. The prevalence and 
strength of this attitude is clearly reflected in the following comment made as 
recently as 1995 by Judge John Hlope, a judge of the Cape Division of the High 
Court: 
Judicial review has its limits and it is submitted that it would be 
counterproductive to extend judicial review beyond those limits. The areas 
unsuitable for judicial action are best left outside the purview of judicial 
review. Furthermore, it must be stressed that the judiciary, by its very 
nature, is ill-qualified to adjudicate upon matters of high policy. Judges are 
trained in fact-finding and the application of legal rules to those facts. 























They are not trained to adjudicate matters of policy. The application of 
policy calls for the balancing of the interests of the individual and the 
interests of the community at large, and the courts do not have the 
resources or techniques for assessing the worth of the policy.25 
145 
It is submitted that the ideology informing the attitude reflected in his 
arguments will constitute a substantial impediment to the prospects of 
substantive judicial review of matters relating to national security. It will frustrate 
the attainment of meaningful accountability in a future South Afiica. There is a 
strong possibility that the courts of the future may well find themselves subject to 
the same criticism leveled against the denigrated executive minded court of the 
1980's. That is to say that, like the executive minded courts of the 1980's, they 
... are not prepared to perform their ... duty of control in the sphere of 
what they perceive as 'state security', which is precisely where executive 
discretion represents the greatest threat to the life and liberty of the 
individual. 26 
Any revolutionary programme which seeks to ensure effective 
accountability through review by an objective, external and independent 
body, must take into account the inherent limitations of our traditional court 
structures. It must take into account the entrenched self-imposed limitations of 
judicial review which mitigate against attainment of this objective. Judge Hlope, 
in the same article, proposes a practical alternative which has the capacity for 
overcoming the problems posed by the inherent limitations of judicial review. 
He proposes that the solution lies in the creation of specialised 
administrative tribunals to review government actions or decisions relating to 
matters of national security. 27 It is submitted that the envisaged administrative 
tribunals will go some way to ensuring effective accountability of the executive 
branch of government in respect of decisions made pursuant to the exercise of a 
discretionary power. The envisaged tribunals would be created by legislation and 
afforded substantive appeal, rather than, a review jurisdiction. Their status as a 
legislative construct, separate in design and function from the traditional courts, 
together with their attendant specialist jurisdiction, holds the potential for 
overcoming concerns about expertise and lack of competence in the face of the 
25 Hlophe, J, 'Judicial Control of Administrative Action in a Post-Apartheid South Africa- Some Realities' in 
Controlling Public Power, p66 
26 Corder, Hugh 'Crowbars and Cobwebs: Executive Autocracy and the Law in South Africa', inaugural lecture 
given at the University of Cape Town, 5 October 1988, in (1989) 5 SAJHR. p 17 























'political' nature of the subject matter. These tribunals would simultaneously 
provide an accessible avenue of redress for the public who's rights or interests 
have been effected by an executive decision. 
It is submitted that these tribunals hold, in comparison to the traditional 
courts, the potential to achieve a balance between, on the one hand, the need for 
accessible and meaningful structures of accountability and effective remedies, 
and on the other hand, the need for considered expert review. This potential lies 
in the envisaged origin, nature, role and composition of these tribunals. They 
would "slot neither into the judiciary nor the administration and ... [be] granted 
specifically designed powers of appeal by Parliament ... ". Unlike the judicial 
branch of government, the tribunals would "simply be seen as performing their 
[legislatively] ascribed functions", namely the making of final, legally 
enforceable decisions in respect of executive decisions questioned by the 
public.28 
The touted success and acceptance of the tribunals lies in their potential 
ability to accommodate the diversity of concerns at play. It is submitted that 
tribunals that were modeled on a tribunal structure similar to that proposed by 
Professor Farmer, would succeed in accommodating and balancing the full range 
of concerns relating to external review by court structures. In terms of his 
proposed structure, the tribunals would have: 
1. The ability to make final, legally enforceable decisions; 
2. Independence from any department of government; 
3. Hearings held in public and having a judicial nature, without necessarily 
having the formality of a court of law; 
4. The possession of expertise; 
5. The requirement to give reasons; and 
6. The right of appeal to a court of law on points of law. 29 
A tribunal exhibiting these characteristics would operate within a 
legislatively constructed ideology amenable to review of national security 
matters. The careful and considered choice of adjudicators would overcome 
concerns about competency to engage in review of the merits which is essential 
to accountability of the executive branch. The appropriate qualifications of its 
members would overcome these concerns and would legitimise the tribunals in 
the eyes of the public. 
It is submitted that the cumulative implementation of the extensive and 
28 K Govender, "Administrative Appeals Tribunals" in Controlling Public Power, 72 























diverse range of proposals discussed thus far would go a long way toward 
reconciling democracy, freedom of information and the national security 
exemptions thereto. However, any such programme must, if it is to achieve the 
overall objective of guaranteeing that the demos retain final control of the 
agenda, take cognisance, not only of prevailing judicial ideology, but perhaps 
even more importantly, of prevailing public ideology. 
Attainment of the requirement of final control of the agenda requires a 
transformation of the legal system and of judicial and executive attitudes. The 
success of any such transformation, will however at the end of the day, depend 
on public interest and initiative. The requisite transformation will only proceed 
and be successfully implemented at the behest of, and in response to overt public 
demand. In addition, once the democratic structures are in place, the 
transformation will amount to effectively very little if the structures and 
procedures designed to democratise this arena of government, are not actively 
utilised by the public. 
It is submitted that prevailing public ideology may frustrate the full fruition 
of the envisaged changes. Public perceptions and attitudes have been moulded by 
the historical attitudes and institutionalised legal constraints of the classical 
traditional democratic heritage. Current attitudes have been fundamentally 
informed and shaped by the this heritage with its emphasis on the public/private 
divide and exclusion of the demos from the arena of the expert national security 
decision maker. The tenacity of these attitudes may impede the democratisation 
of the national security arena. The process of transformation of the legal system 
may amount to a formal rejection of that heritage. However, one must bear in 
mind that the public's attitudes are not as easily changed. 
The public's response to the transformation of the national security arena 
may frustrate the realisation of the overarching objective of ensuring that final 
control of the agenda is in fact vested in them. The public may be apathetic in its 
failure to in fact reclaim final control of the agenda. The danger of this likelihood 
increases in accordance with the current degree of public apathy and 
acquiescence. Public apathy and acquiescence is a social reality. It is a product 
of the traditional paradigm, which consistently excluded the public, not only from 
the national security arena, but from government generally. This history of 
exclusion is responsible for the prevailing public ideology. The term public 
ideology is used here to denote not only belief systems, but also relates to 
questions of power. Ideology, in this context, relates to popular belief systems 
and the relation between these systems and the legitimation of the power of a 




















. meaning ( or signification) serves to sustain relations of domination.30 
Historical forces have engendered a public ideology with respect to 
national security matters characterised by popular disempowerment and a generic 
belief in the public's lack of expertise and competence. This belief is-not, as is 
clear from the discussions during the course of this thesis, an inherent given. It is 
the product of historical tradition which has to a large extent been capitalised on 
as a source of executive discretionary power and a source of legitimacy of the 
exercise of that power. 
The success of any freedom of information programme within the national 
security context will to a large extent depend on the dissolution of prevailing 
popular ideology. Public perceptions must be changed with a view to 
· engendering, confirming and enforcing the public's competence and ability in 
this arena. This transformation, it is submitted, will be the most difficult to 
achieve in practice. In view of the fact that ideologies are fundamentally the 
constructed product of key signifiers, prevailing public ideology in the national 
security domain is intrinsically related to the power of the traditionally perceived 
meaning (or signification) of the term, national security. The term must be 
deprived of the connotations of expertise and exclusivity automatically associated 
with it. The first and foremost step toward achieving this lies in the 
demystification of the term. The key to demystification lies in the imposition of a 
duty on the national security branch to engage in routine practices which give 
effect to the objectives of transparency and justification. These practices must 
become the norm and be made automatically applicable in respect of all national 
security matters which do not as a matter of necessity require secrecy. Likewise, 
the right to freedom of information, must at all costs within the context of 
national security be actively protected and given as wide an application as 
possible, and must be seen to be so protected and applied. 
*** 


























DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY EXEMPTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
8.1 Freedom Of Information And Democracy: The Interim And 1996 
Constitutions Of The Republic Of South Africa - Recognition Of The 
Need For, And The Implementation Of, A Paradigm Shift 
South Afiica, like other democratic societies, recognised that the attainment 
of democratic aspirations and ideals necessitated a paradigm shift from the 
traditional liberal democratic model with its emphasis on representative democracy 
and its attendant institutions and structures. For South Africa, the recognition was 
driven, as in the case of other jurisdictions, by the realisation that the dynamics of 
the modem administrative state rendered the classical liberal paradigm inadequate. 
The impetus for change in South Africa however acquired an added urgency in the 
light of its political history. Historically, South Africans have suffered the very real 
consequences of the concrete realisation of the potential space inhering in the 
traditional liberal democratic paradigm which may be capitalised on by an unjust 
and immoral government. In South Africa, more so than in other countries, 
adherence to the traditional liberal democratic paradigm enabled government to use 
'representative democracy, parliamentary government and liberal constitutionalism 
as a means of legitimation' of the unauthorized use and abuse of power, in the name 
of"national security", and 'suffered little restraint in its actions'. In addition, it was 
enabled to do so, under cover of an institutionalised blanket of secrecy and 
disinformation. This opacity, like the atrocities committed under the cover provided 
by it, found justification and legitimacy within the context of the then prevailing 
paradigm. 
For South Africa, the expression of the need for a paradigm shift and the 
implementation thereof was not, as in other jurisdictions, reflected in ad hoc legal 
developments and refinements. The South Afiican paradigm shift was revolutionary 
in that it was expressed and implemented in wholesale rejection and replacement of 
the previous dispensation with a new constitutional order, founded on, and designed 
so as to realise the objectives of democracy, in the true sense of "rule by the 
people". It was expressed and effected in the drafting and adoption of an entirely 
new Constitution. 
The 1993 Interim Constitution was premised on, not only a commitment to 























diametrically opposed to the previous order. The envisaged 'sovereign and 
democratic constitutional state' was one implicitly defined, in both its objectives and 
content, by its aversion to, and rejection of the past. In short, it heralded a 'ringing 
and decisive break with [the] past.' 1 
A unifying, essential feature of all three conceptual components of the new 
Sovereign and Democratic Constitutional State, is the public's right to access to 
government - held information. 
The centrality of the right to information to the success of the desired 
dispensation is recognised in the Interim Constitution in its elevation of freedom of 
information as a Constitutional principle in terms of section 71 ( 1 )(a) and Principle 
IX. These provisions entrenched the right to freedom of information as a 
fundamental non-negotiable central tenet of the South African Sovereign and 
Democratic Constitutional state. Unlike the Interim Constitution itself, this principle 
was rendered permanent and an obligatory component of the envisaged Final 
Constitution. 
8.2 Freedom of Information - An Essential Feature Of The South African 
Sovereign Democratic Constitutional State 
Constitutionalism is that discipline concerned with questions of power within, 
and between society and the state. The Constitution is in tum, a formal expression 
of the legally prescribed location and separation of that power. Accordingly, the 
Constitutional recognition and entrenchment of freedom of information as a 
Constitutional principle, and as a fundamental human right, constitutes a formal 
recognition of one of the central tenets of the revised democratic paradigm: 
Information is a form of power. 
Sovereignty, in democratic discourse, requires that power be located in the 
people. This is accordingly where the South African Constitution locates it by 
constitutionalising the right to freedom of information and further, by entrenching 
it as a fundamental human right. 2 By entrenching it as a fundamental human right 
it is implicitly recognised as a cornerstone of democracy, as in terms of Section 7(1) 
of the Final Constitution: 
[The] Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It 
enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic 
values of hum~ dignity, equality and freedom. 
1 s v Mhlungu and Others 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) @873-4, para8 























The attainment of democracy depends, as in the case of all democratic 
paradigms, on the realisation of the fundamental principle of popular sovereignty. 
In tenns of the revised democratic paradigm ascribed to by the Constitution, this 
fundamental principle necessitates the elevation of the public's right to access to 
government - held infonnation as a cornerstone of democracy. The right to know is 
the right to power. Popular power, or sovereignty, therefore implicitly subordinates 
the state's control over infonnation, or its claims to secrecy, to the fundamental right 
to know. Accordingly, the fundamental human right to access to infonnation is 
supreme, and in practical tenns this means that: 
The Bill of Rights [ and hence the fundamental right to government - held 
infonnation] applies to all law and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary, and all organs of state. 
The constitutionalisation of freedom of infonnation and the elevation 
thereof as a fundamental human right underscores the impetus of the intended 
paradigm shift. Democracy, in tenns of this paradigm shift, is revived as "rule by the 
people". The original democratic objectives of responsive and accountable 
government are reaffinned as democracy's primary objectives. In addition, this 
reaffinnation is given practical effect by guaranteeing the key to achieving these 
objectives, by guaranteeing the right to freedom of infonnation - a necessary 
precursor for participation and accountability. 
In tenns of the South African Constitutional vision, the right to freedom of 
information in a sovereign constitutional democracy serves a dual function. 
Freedom of infonnation is on the one hand, a primary and central constitutive value 
or ideal in and of itself, in view of the fact that it is constitutive of power. It is 
however also of practical importance. It is not only of conceptual importance, but 
is also a tool or process, vital to the successful delivery of the host of other values 
and ideals, including transparency and accountability, so central to constitutional 
democracy. This duality of the value of the right to information is summarised by 
Selby Baqwa as follows: 
Access to infonnation is important. It is important because it is a constitutive 
part of the freedoms related to communication. It is, however, not simply one 
of the civil liberties the existence of which makes democracy valuable. It is 
also a necessary condition for any democratic regime to work. Unless it is 
sufficiently well infonned about the government's activities, the public 
cannot have the power to subject the government to its own values, principles 
and preferences. For as long as official documents remain unavailable, so 























efficient public interest action will remain extremely narrow.3 
The South African Constitution recognises freedom of information as a 
fundamental constitutional principle. Likewise, it recognises, participation, 
accountability and responsive good government as fundamental constitutional 
principles. In addition to recognising freedom of information as a fundamental 
constitutional value in and of itself, it recognises that realisation of the latter 
principles is entirely dependant on the practical implementation of the former 
principle. 
The following extract from the Constitution recognises the fundamental value 
of participation, accountability and responsive government to democratic 
government: 
Section 1: 
The Republic of South Africa is one sovereign democratic state founded on 
the following values: 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections, 
and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness. (my stress) 
The Constitution accordingly equates democracy with the original democratic 
objectives of accountability, responsiveness and openness. However, in giving effect 
to these overarching democratic objectives, the Constitution, in accordance with the 
revised democratic paradigm ascribed to by it, seeks to guarantee the fullest 
realisation of these objectives. It recognises that South Africa is a modem 
administrative state and that these democratic objectives depend on the · 
democratisation of the previously marginalised, administrative branch of 
government. Therefore, it expressly imposes a duty on all organs of state to adhere 
to, and to give effect to these basic values of accountability, responsiveness and 
openness. In addition to the general duty imposed on all organs of state in terms of 
section 8(1), the Constitution singles out, and expressly obliges the administrative 
branch of government to adhere to these values. In terms of S 195(1 ): 
Public administration must be governed by the democratic values and 
principles enshrined in the Constitution, including the following principles: 
( e) People's needs must be responded to, and the public must be 
3 Advocate Selby Baqwa, The South African Public Protector, 'Welcoming Address' to IDASA Workshop on 






















encouraged to participate in policy-making. 
(f) Public administration must be accountable. 
153 
(g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, 
accessible and accurate information. 
The South African Constitution, as evidenced by the preceding selection of 
provisions, has unequivocally recognised the need for, and sought to effect a 
democratic paradigm shift, with a view to ensuring, as opposed to paying mere lip 
service to a sovereign, democratic state. 
What is perfectly clear from these provisions of the Constitution and the tenor 
and spirit of the Constitution viewed historically and teleologically, is that the 
Constitution is not simply some kind of statutory codification of an 
acceptable or legitimate past. It retains from the past only what is defensible 
and represents a radical and decisive break from that part of the past which 
is unacceptable. It constitutes a decisive break from a culture of Apartheid 
and racism to a constitutionally protected culture of openness and democracy 
and universal human rights for South Africans of all ages, classes and 
colours. There is a stark dramatic contrast between the past in which South 
Africans were trapped and the future on which the Constitution is premised. 
The past was pervaded by inequality, authoritarianism and repression. The 
aspiration of the future is based on what is 'justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality'. It is premised on a legal 
culture of accountability and transparency ... [these are the] purposes sought 
to be advanced by their enactment.4 (my stress) 
The Constitution equates democracy with responsive, transparent and 
accountable government, in the fullest sense of the term. Most notably, democracy 
is, in terms of the Constitution, wholly dependant on a responsive, transparent and 
accountable administrative branch of government. 
The Constitution recognises that democracy, as defined, is wholly dependant 
on the fullest recognition and protection of the right of access to state - held 
information. The fundamental connection between, on the one hand, the attainment 
of democracy - or an accountable, responsive administration amenable to public 
participation - and, on the other, the right to access to information, is recognised 
in the Interim Constitution in its directive that: 
Provision shall be made for freedom of information so that there can be open 























and accountable administration at all levels of government. 5 
The Final Constitution has recognised the importance of this right to 
democracy in following through on this directive. Not only has it entrenched the 
right as a fundamental right. It has, in the formulation thereof, adopted a 
significantly expansive format. Unlike the Interim Constitution, the right of access 
to information is not dependant on a prior infringement of the individual's rights. 
Every person has, in terms of section 32, a fundamental right of access to 
information. In addition to its general freedom of information provision founded on 
the Interim Constitution's directive, the Final Constitution recognises the essentiality 
of the link between responsive democratic administration and the right to 
information in its specific imposition of a duty on the administrative branch to 
furnish information in the form of written reasons for administrative action which 
adversely affects the public's rights. 6 
The fundamental and intrinsic link between the objectives of democratic 
government and the right to access to information held by the administrative branch 
has found judicial recognition in a number of cases. 
In the case of S V Makwanyane the court confirmed that the Constitutionally 
created ethos of accountability is wholly dependant on the state and its 
administration being compelled to answer for its actions and being subject to critical 
scrutiny.7 And that 
Section 23 [the fundamental right to access to information] is ... a necessary 
adjunct to an open democratic society committed to the principles of 
openness and accountability. 8 
The Final Constitution is by its very nature a document which embodies the 
founding political principles on which the South African state is to be governed. 
A principle is defined by The Collins English Dictionazy as "a general truth or law; 
the essence of something; a constituent of a substance that gives the substance its 
characteristics or behaviour". The Constitutional provisions which recognise the 
dual value of the right of access to information are an expression of one such 
essential founding principle, or Grundnorm, of a sovereign constitutional 
democracy: Public access to state-held information. 
The Constitution is " a prescriptive and not a descriptive document; [it] 
indicates how state power should be exercised and not how it · is exercised in 
5 Act 200/1993 
6 Ibid, S 33(2) 
7 1995(3) SA 39l(CC) @431, para 88 























practice. [It] is nonnative, ... it denotes which set of values should be upheld in the 
governing process." 9 The values or principles encoded in the Constitution provide 
the substantive essence which must be reflected in, and respected by the legal and 
political infrastructure. The tenns and provisions of the Constitution therefore, by 
definition, lack detail and specificity as to exactly how, and to what extent those 
government agencies obligated to it, should give effect to the stated principle. 
The Constitution, in recognition of this fact, and in recognition of the 
potential hann that could be done to this primary value through legislative inertia, 
directs that national legislation be enacted to concretise this right, to give practical 
effect to it, in order to ensure the realisation of a sovereign, constitutional 
democracy. 10 
This legislation has not as yet been enacted, but currently exists in the fonn 
of a proposed bill - The Draft Open Democracy Bill 11. The title of the bill is, in its 
choice not to emulate the title of similar foreign legislation, indicative of the 
intention of the drafters to give effect to this right, not in abstract, but in the context 
of the furtherance of the objectives of transparent and accountable government. 
The immediate object of the Bill is, in tenns of clause 3(l)(a): 
To provide for public access, as swiftly, inexpensively and effortlessly as 
reasonably possible, to infonnation held by governmental bodies without 
jeopardising good governance, personal privacy and commercial 
confidentiality. 
The immediate objective of the Bill is therefore, in accordance with the 
Constitutional directive, to give practical effect to the public's right to access to 
government-held infonnation. The starting point in achieving this objective is 
through the imposition of a general mandatory duty on the state to disclose any 
infonnation requested. 
Despite any other legislation, .... any person must, on request, but subject to 
this Act, be given access to any record of a government body. 
The Bill is accordingly premised on a prior presumption of a disclosure of 
infonnation, rather than the protection ofinfonnation. The public's right to access 
is prior to any confidentiality interests the state may have. The latter are expressly 
subordinated to the fonner. 
9 L Boulle, B Harris & C Hoexter, Constitutional and Administrative Law: Basic Principles, 1989, p 20 
10 S 32(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may provide for reasonable 
measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burden of the state. 























The chosen route for attaining the immediate objective of the Bill, namely to 
guarantee, and provide mechanisms for implementing the right, has however been 
fundamentally informed by the broader contextual objective of the Bill. The Bill is, 
in terms of the broader constitutional objective, a vital key to the attainment and 
maintenance of constitutional democracy. Accordingly, the Bill, in providing for 
access to information, identifies its broader contextual objective as: 
Generally, to promote transparency and accountability of all organs of state 
by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information and 
by empowering the public to effectively scrutinise, and participate in, 
governmental decision-making that affect them. (my stress)12 
The Bill, in its original draft, in both the prescribed ambit and content of the 
right and correlative duties, clearly located the right to freedom of information 
within the context of the attainment of these expansive objectives. The original 
draft sought to guarantee access to information in such a manner so as to promote 
transparency and accountability, to ensure effective scrutiny and so as to enable 
effective public participation in governmental decision-making. Despite the fact that 
the Bill's current format differs in certain respects to the original draft, most notably 
in its exclusion of its "open meeting" provisions, it remains nonetheless committed 
to the broader objectives. In fulfilling these objectives: 
The bill is very ambitious and seeks to encompass within a single piece of 
legislation matters frequently covered by several statutes in other 
jurisdictions. At its most expansive, the bill sought to: 
♦ Give citizens access to information held by government bodies 
♦ Allow citizens to attend meetings of government bodies 
♦ Prevent government from misusing information it holds about individuals ... 
♦ Protect government officials who disclose governmental wrongdoing ... 13 
The Bill has yet to be enacted, and until such time, the right to 
information remains bedded within its broad Constitutional format, and accordingly 
remains subject to the uncertainty of the interpretive process. 
12 Clause 3(1)(h) 
13 'The Open Democracy Bill: A Critical Overview, December 1997', A report by The Human Rights 






















8.3 Limitations On The Right To Freedom Of Information - A 
Constitutional Perspective 
157 
The Constitution recognises that all fundamental rights entrenched in the 
Bill of Rights, with the exception of certain non-derogable rights, are not 
absolute and are capable of limitation. The right to freedom of information is not 
classified as a non-derogable right and is therefore subject to limitation. 
However, in terms of S 36(1) of the Constitution: 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including -
a. the nature of the right; 
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c. the nature and extent of the limitation; 
d. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose (my stress) 
In addition, where government action has an adverse effect on an person's 
rights, the government agency responsible for the adverse action or decision is 
obliged, in terms of S 33 (2) to furnish written reasons for such action or 
· decision. Clearly, the limitation of a person's rights, including the right to 
freedom of information, constitutes an adverse effect and accordingly warrants a 
statement of reasons in respect of such limitation. 
One of the purposes for compelling the furnishing of written reasons under 
these circumstances is to enable the recipient to determine whether or not the 
decision-maker has complied with the further duty imposed in terms of S 33(1 ). 
In terms of this provision, the administrative branch of government bears a duty 
to act reasonably. It is submitted that this means inter alia, that the reasons 
furnished for the decision or action must, in relation to the decision or action 
taken, be reasonable and justifiable as measured against the dictates of an open 
and democratic society, as required by the Constitution's general limitation 
prOVISIOn. 
The cumulative effect of these provisions is to engender and entrench a 
culture of justification and accountability, so as to allow for the realization of the 
objectives of a sovereign constitutional democracy. 
It is submitted that this culture of justification and accountability requires 
that any administrative act which deprives a person of one of their fundamental 























in turn that the state bear the onus to prove the contrary. That is to say, that the 
onus is on the state to prove that the limitation is constitutional. Accordingly, any 
administrative decision pursuant to the exercise of a discretionary power, to 
refuse access to requested infonnation, is in tenns of the Constitution, presumed 
to be unconstitutional. 
In other words, the Constitution creates a presumption in favour of 
disclosure as the nonn and places the onus of proving the contrary, that is to say, 
that non-disclosure is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society, on the state agency. 
In fact, one can go as far as to say that the entrenchment of the right as a 
fundamental right creates a presumption against the constitutionality of the 
conferral of extensive executive discretionary power to limit the rights in the Bill 
of Rights, including the right to infonnation. Accordingly, the Constitution in fact 
creates a presumption that no executive or administrative agency is authorised to 
exercise a discretionary power to withhold infonnation, unless the contrary is 
proven by the state. Further, in order to discharge that onus, the state must prove 
to the court that the decision to withhold that infonnation, ( and in fact the 
exercise of the discretionary power to so withhold the infonnation), measured as 
against the reasons given for withholding the infonnation, is both reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society. 
These implications of the constitutionalisation of the right to freedom of 
infonnation, in respect of the presumptions created, the location of onus and the 
standard of proof required to discharge that onus, were confirmed by Jones J in 
the case of Commissioner of SAPS v A-G. Eastern Cape . The court was referred 
to Canadian law which recognises that the State, in criminal matters, has a 
discretionary power to withhold infonnation. It was argued that the same rule 
applies in South African law. The court rejected this argument on the following 
grounds: 
[The Canadian position] ... is that the State has in a proper case a 
discretion. reviewable by the Courts, to withhold information which would 
ordinarily be disclosed to the defense. This must be shaped to the 
principles of our Constitution and to the sphere in which it operates. The 
Canadian Charter does not contain a specific provision like our S 23 [of 
the Interim Constitution]. In Canada the right to information is not a 
direct constitutional right~ it is a development arising out of the right to 
make full answer and defense which is not itself a charter right. It is one of 
the fundamental principles of justice referred to in S 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights ...... It is accordingly not inappropriate for a Canadian 























officers of State which is subject to the Court's powers of review. It.is.. 
however, inappropriate to confer a discretion upon an official of State 
to withhold information from an accused in the face of a fundamental 
right to that information which is directly guaranteed by the 
Constitution. 
14 (my stress) 
The court having confinned a presumption against the conferral of a 
discretionary power to withhold information, acknowledged that the 
discretionary limitation of the right could be justified under certain 
circumstances. However, the onus to disprove this presumption fell on the state. 
The onus to set aside the presumption in favour of disclosure would only be 
discharged if the state was able to prove that the limitation of the right was 
justifiable: 
But the fourth principle can be given a modified application: while S 23 
gives the defense a right to the information in the police docket, there may 
be justifiable restrictions upon that right which satisfy the conditions of S 
33(1) of the Constitution. If there are, State officials may claim the 
restrictions. If the defense do not accept that claim, the Courts will be 
called upon to adjudicate upon the issue. 15 
As to what would be required to satisfy the court that the exercise of 
discretion and consequent limitation of the right was justifiable, in other words 
what would be required for the state to discharge the onus of proof, was set out 
in some detail in the case of S y Sefadi by Marnewick AJ: 
For the limitation on the right of access to information in the statements 
contemplated by S 23 of the Constitution to be valid, the limitation ... has 
to comply with three different requirements laid down by S 33(1 ). In the 
first place, it has to be reasonable to maintain the existence of the 
limitation constituted by the privilege. In the second place, the existence of 
the privilege has to be justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on freedom and equality. In the third place, the limitation constituted by 
the privilege should not negate the essential content of the right in 
question. 16 
14 1995 (1) SA 799 (E)@ 830-831 J-D 
15 @831 D-F 























Although both of these cases dealt with the specific question of an 
accused's right of access to information contained in police dockets, it is 
submitted that the statements made during the course of these judgements are of 
general application. They are of general application to all discretionary 
limitations of the right to information in view of the fact that these judgements 
were premised on the broad implications of the constitutionalisation of the right 
to information as a fundamental right, for the recognition and validity of 
discretionary power to limit that right. 
The rationale underlying these judgements was informed by the dictates of 
the Constitution. In expressly constitutionalising and entrenching the right to 
freedom of information as a fundamental right, the Constitution unequivocally 
confirmed that all limitations thereto are subject to the express constitutional 
principles, including the rule oflaw. They are made subject to the rule of law as 
this principle, in terms of section 1 ( c) of the Constitution, enjoys an elevated 
status equal to the supreme status of the Constitution. 17 Accordingly, the right to 
freedom of information, encoded as it is in the Constitution as a founding 
principle and as a fundamental right, is supreme and enjoys an elevated status in 
relation to all other interests not specifically provided for in the Constitution, 
including the interests of the state. Accordingly, any discretionary limitation of 
that right not expressly authorised by an enabling act of parliament is presumed 
to be contrary to the law and to the Constitution, unless it can be shown that it is 
justifiable in an open and democratic society. In addition, it is submitted that 
even a discretionary limitation authorised by an act of parliament, is presumed 
contrary to the Constitution. In view of the fact that all laws are subject to the 
Constitution which disapproves of unconstrained discretionary limitations of the 
fundamental rights contained therein, the legislation itself which authorises such 
a discretionary limitation of the right to information will be presumed 
unconstitutional. By extension, any subsequent exercise of that discretionary 
power will suffer the same fate, unless the contrary is proven. 
The comparative jurisdictions discussed in this thesis have not expressly 
entrenched the right to freedom of information in their Constitutions. Some of 
them have nonetheless recognised its elevated status as an essential democratic 
right. However, any such recognition is an interpolation of the existing 
Constitution. Its recognition as a constitutional fundamental is derivative, a status 
recognised by necessary implication. For example, in the United States, the right 
to freedom of information is recognised as a necessary, but unstated adjunct to 
The First Amendment rights. 
17 Sl(c): The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: 























The fact that the democratic status of the right remains constitutionally 
unstated has afforded the courts and the executive branch the space to overlook 
the fundamental status of this right. It has implicitly allowed and justified judicial 
elevation of the state's purported national security interests above the public' 
right to know, when reviewing claims to the national security exemptions to this 
right. The mere legislative recognition and protection of this right as a 
fundamental right through the creation of prior presumptions of disclosure of 
information rather than protection of information have failed to accord it the 
requisite pedigree. The diluted prestige and strength of legislative 
pronouncements in relation to the prestige and strength of a concurrent written 
constitution has meant, in the arena of national security, that the right to freedom 
of information is easily, and "justifiably" sacrificed in the interests of the all 
important objective of the safety of society. 
It is submitted that the South African Constitution has sought to address 
this particular lacunae by expressly constitutionalising and entrenching the right 
to freedom of information. It has left no doubt on the matter. In 
constitutionalising the right, the Constitution has subordinated all government 
action, not only to the law in the narrow sense of the word, but more importantly, 
to the overarching constitutional principles. Accordingly, by implication, it 
prohibits all acts 'outside the law', whether it be outside the parameters set by 
legislation or outside the parameters set by the Constitution. 
8.4 Limitations Of The Right Of Access To State-Held Information In 
The Interests Of National Security - Constitutional Prescriptions 
The Constitution, as it must, permits the space for legislatively ordained 
restrictions of the right of access to information, in the interests of national 
security. This space is permitted subject to the condition that such restrictions, 
often formulated in terms which afford an individual, or agency, a discretionary 
power to withhold information on the ground that disclosure would harm national 
security, comply with the criteria set out in the Constitution's limitation 
provision. As such: 
In appropriate and genuine circumstances it is likely that law restricting 
access to information on the grounds of national security would be 
upheld18 
The envisaged acts ordinarily formulate these restrictions to the right to 























freedom of information in such a manner as to generally authorise the limitation 
of the right in the event that disclosure would harm the interests of national 
security. Therefore, implicit in the power to restrict, is a prior obligation on the 
decision-maker to identify and analyse the potential harm that disclosure would 
or could cause to national security. The process of threat detection is a complex 
issue and the actual identification of a threat is "inherently subjective because [it] 
relies on perceptions of threats". 19 The full spectrum of potential threats cannot 
be circumscribed by the law, in the narrow sense, that is to say by the enabling 
legislation, in view of the indeterminacy and complexity of the matter at hand. 
Therefore the terms of the enabling legislation authorising the decision to limit 
the right on these grounds invariably confer discretionary powers on the 
decision-maker, and the decision to limit the right on these grounds is invariably 
the result of the exercise of that discretionary power. The national security 
discretionary power, by virtue of the nature of the subject matter at hand, is not 
immediately and obviously amenable to prior circumscription by the law. By 
extension, strictly speaking, all such discretionary decisions to withhold 
information in the interests of national security are therefore outside of the law, 
but nonetheless legal, in the sense that they are exercised within the terms of the 
discretion afforded by the enabling legislation. However, in view of the 
Constitution's preclusion of the discretionary limitation of the rights contained in 
the Bill of Rights, these decisions , prima facie, fall beyond the Constitution's 
permissible boundaries. 
The discretionary limitation of the right of access to information is in terms 
of the Constitution, presumed to be outside of the constitution's legal framework, 
and therefore unconstitutional. Therefore, one may conclude that any actions 
taken by a government official in terms of such law, so as to deny access to 
information would certainly be closely scrutinised by the courts. This conclusion 
is shared by Jonathan Klaaren who argues that 
.. the courts will certainly closely scrutinise an assertion of national 
security in view of the long history of the abuse of this ground and in view 
of the conflict between the notion of national security and the 
constitutional value of openness.20 
The presumption as to the unconstitutionality of the discretionary 
executive limitation of the right to know will remain operational, and the refusal 
of access will remain unlawful, unless that presumption can be rebutted, by 
























showing that the discretionary decision does in fact comply with The Law. That 
is to say, by showing that it is justified in terms of the criteria set out in the 
limitations clause of the Constitution. 
Could it be argued, as proponents of extensive secrecy practices and 
discretionary power in the arena of nationals security would seek to argue, that 
the Constitution implicitly intends the aforesaid principles to apply to exemptions 
generally, but not to the national security exemption. Or that, if it does apply to 
this exemption, the standard of proof required to discharge the onus on the state 
to show the justifiability of its actions, must, as a necessity of circumstance, be 
significantly lower. 
The answer to both questions is clearly no. The Constitution has expressly 
entrenched the right to freedom of information and thereby subordinated .all law 
or conduct to it. In addition, any remaining doubts as to the inclusion of the 
national security function of the state within the categories of "law or conduct" 
so subordinated, are expunged by the sentiments expressed in section 3 7 of the 
Constitution. This section, which deals with "States of emergency" is of direct 
significance to the issue at hand. A "State of emergency" is surely one of the 
most direct expressions of decisions taken in the interests of the prevention of 
harm to national security. 
The Constitution directly and unequivocally makes the declaration of a 
state of emergency, the power to do so, and more importantly the powers 
exercised during such a state, subject and subservient to the Constitution. Section 
3 7 specifies the lawful circumstances under which such a state may be declared21 
and it vests in the courts, the power to decide on the extent to which these lawful 
circumstances have been complied with. In other words, the courts are vested 
with the power to determine the validity of -
♦ A declaration of a state of emergency; 
♦ Any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; or 
♦ Any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a 
declaration of a state of emergency. 22 
It is submitted that the sentiments expressed and the constraints imposed 
by this provision, in respect of a legislative declaration of a state of emergency, 
clearly indicate that discreet executive instances of denial of access to 
information, on the ground that disclosure would be harmful to national security, 
must be subject to both the Constitution. If the declaration of a state of 
21S 37 (1),(2) and (4) 






















emergency by the legislative branch of government is subject to the law, then 
surely the more isolated daily discretionary decisions by lower ranking state 
officials relating to questions of state security must also be so subject. 
Any remaining doubts as to the supremacy of the law (in the narrow 
sense) and the Constitution over the national security function of the state are 
laid to rest by Chapter 11 of the Constitution. The inclusion of this chapter, 
which is expressly and exclusively devoted to the Security Services, visually 
locates these functions within, and by implication, subject to the broader 
constitutional framework. This implied location of subordination is expressly 
confirmed by the provisos that: 
164 
National security must be pursued in compliance with the law, including 
international law, and 
The security services must act, and must teach and require their members 
to act, in accordance with the Constitution and the law.23 
The pervasiveness of these directives is all-encompassing. Even the 
President's actions as head of the national executive and as Commander-In-Chief 
of the defence force, are expressly subject to the Constitution and its overriding 
principle of popular sovereignty. 24 
The constitutional context and directives dictate the unavoidable 
conclusion that executive or administrative discretionary limitations of the right 
of access to information, in the interests of national security, are, as with all other 
discretionary limitations, equally subject to the law and the Constitution. This 
means that the substance of the decision, or more specifically the underlying 
allegation of harm, must be substantiated in terms of the criteria set out in the 
Constitution, and any other relevant law. In addition, it means that the courts are 
competent, qualified, and in fact obliged to assess the substance of the validity of 
-any such assertion. 
23 Sections 198(c) & 199(5) 
24 See section 203(1) of The Final Constitution-The President's declaration ofa state of national defence is 























8.5 Limitations Of The Constitutional Right Of Access To State-Held 
Information In The Interests Of National Security: A Prognosis - Is 
The Fate Of The South African Constitution To Be "A Smoke Screen 
For Business As Usual- Secretly"? 
Constitutionalism is a prescriptive and not a descriptive doctrine; it 
indicates how state power should be exercised and not how it is exercised 
in practice. It is normative, that is it denotes which set of values should be 
upheld in the governing process. These values require more than just a set 
of constitutional rules: as is often observed, not every country with a 
constitution upholds the principles of constitutionalism. The fact that it is 
prescriptive and normative does not make constitutionalism something that 
is not 'real'; its principles do influence the practice of government and are 
a significant ingredient in the constitutional systems of the world. They 
provide a standard by which the record of individual government systems 
can be measured, and by which one can be compared with another. It has 
some influence on those who operate the state system: policy - makers, 
administrators, and most importantly, judges. However, it does not 
describe how political systems actually work in practice. 25 
The question that arises is whether the Constitutional national security 
ethic is, or will be, mirrored in the prevailing South African political and legal 
systems. Is it, or will it be embraced by the state's three branches, namely the 
legislature, the executive (and its administration) and the judiciary. 
This thesis will commence this enquiry by scrutinising the judiciary, in 
view of their essential role as guardians of the Constitution. The question in 
relation to this branch is whether it will, in the practical application of the 
Constitution to discretionary denials of access to information on the ground that 
disclosure would be contrary to the interests of national security~ in fact comply 
with its constitutionally dictated duty. Will it engage in the requisite degree of 
scrutiny of assertions of harm to national security? 
If one simply has reference to the magistrate's court decision referred to in 
the introduction to this thesis and the concerns raised in respect thereof, 
answering this question unequivocally in the affirmative is not as simple as it 
may appear. The tone set by the circumstances and initial, but automatic 
outcome of that decision do not bode well for the future implementation and 
protection of the Constitutional vision. It does not bode well for the 
presumptions of openness and accountability in the context of the national 























security exemption to the right to freedom of information. 
The magistrate's decision must be viewed within the broader context, and 
as a product of prevailing judicial ideology. As evidenced by the comments made 
by Judge IIlope, who is now in fact the Deputy Judge-President of the- Cape High 
Court, quoted in the previous chapter, prevailing judicial ideology is 
characterised by its tenacious adherence to an attitude of non-justiciability of 
national security matters. The rationale being that these matter, falling as they do 
within the overtly political/public domain, are not amenable to judicial scrutiny 
and review. The import of magistrate's decision, viewed within this context, and 
as a product thereof, compels one to question the strength of Klaaren' s optimistic 
conclusion that: 
The courts will certainly closely scrutinise an assertion of national security 
in view of the long history of the abuse of this ground and in view of the 
conflict between the notion of national security and the constitutional 
value of openness.26 
In contrast, there exists the very real danger that the courts will not 
generate the requisite level of caution and skepticism in respect of assertions of 
national security necessary to lay the foundation for the development of a 
Constitutionally appropriate judicial ideology. 
It is submitted, as evidenced by the tone of the current judicial statements 
and findings, that the judiciary' s fundamental conservatism, founded in its liberal 
democratic heritage, will prove far stronger and more resilient than the force of 
the lessons to be learnt from the past. Accordingly, one cannot place undue 
reliance on this branch alone to ensure the democratisation of the national 
security exemptions. 
It is not only prevailing judicial ideology which may frustrate attainment of 
the democratic objectives of transparency, accountability and participation. The 
attainment of these democratic objectives in the national security arena is, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, also significantly threatened by prevailing 
popular or public ideology. Judicial ideology may frustrate the Constitutional 
vision in its failure to enforce the Constitutional principles and values. The threat 
posed by an inappropriate popular ideology is, on the other hand, potentially 
more severe and pervasive. Its systemic ability and tendency to be perceived and 
presented as a source of legitimacy has profound implications for the impetus for 
change on the ground. 
The public, as much as the judiciary, has good reason, in view of the 























lessons to be learnt from the past, to adopt an increased level of awareness of the 
dangers inhering in assertions of, and claims to, the interests of national security. 
Accordingly the public, like the judiciary, ought to be less inclined to respond 
blindly to scare tactics. More fundamentally, they ought to be less inclined to 
tacitly condone and even encourage extensive security powers and the resultant 
extensive secrecy practices in this domain. 
Unfortunately the public's memory is, as in the case of the judiciary, 
proving to be short lived. The force of the lessons to be learnt from the past are 
proving insufficient to sustain popular awareness of, and pressure toward the 
eradication of the space permitted by claims of national security interests for 
democratically unacceptable practices in this arena. Present social dynamics are 
threatening to supercede the lessons to be learnt from the past. Public reaction to 
these dynamics, which reaction, it is submitted is a product of our long-term 
socialisation and entrenched national security ideology, is, as in the past, 
exhibiting tendencies to succumb to the appeal of Schmitt's simple alternative of 
absolute control or chaos. This tendency is responsible for Y aniv' s observation 
that: 
.. any rise in the "threat barometer" of a democracy leads inescapably to 
tensions between the requirements of democracy and those of security. 
.. threats breed "fear" and, as a result, a well informed willingness to 
tamper temporarily ... with fundamental liberties.27(my stress) 
That is to say, it is responsible for the dilution of popular commitment to 
the Constitution. 
Current social dynamics in South Africa are such at present that the 
"threat barometer" is on the rise. 
We are experiencing in this country what can be described only as a crisis 
of social order. All around us, we see its signs. We feel the fear and the 
apprehension in our lives. Those of us who have thus far been exempt 
wonder, not unreasonably, when the tide of criminal depredation will wash 
up around us and slop into each of our lives.28 
A common and prevalent, discemable response to this crisis has been a 
renewed skepticism about the value of constitutionalism. It has generated a 
skepticism about a culture that revolves around rights. This skepticism translates 
27 A Yaniv, op cit, p 1 























into a wide spread ideology, reminiscent of Schmitt's ideology, which: 
... doubts the value of law at all in a period of social crisis, [which is wide 
spread because] The premises of this viewpoint are powerful and in some 
ways attractive: 
♦ It suggests that legal rights are an obstruction to public safety. 
♦ It urges that direct coercive action by the state is required in the 
maintenance of social order and that, to the extent that the legal system 
inhibits such action, it is inimical to public welfare. 
♦ It argues that legal principle must (temporarily) be sacrificed in the 
attainment of social order.29 
These premises constitute and articulation of Schmitt's theory of "The 
Political", the state and sovereignty in relation to matters of national security. 
They emulate Schmitt's aversion to, and displacement of, The Law. The 
immediate connection made between the prevalence of the law and the 
Constitution and social chaos, conversely assumes that a return to order depends 
on the displacement of the law and the Constitution. Therefore, like Schmitt, 
proponents of these premises effectively seek to locate national security matters 
outside of, and not subject to, the law (in the narrow sense), as well as the 
Constitution. A regression to a state of chaos, which is how many South Africans 
would describe prevailing social dynamics, must be met with a parallel 
regression to authoritarian, absolute government. The imperative is to end the 
state of chaos, and that imperative, and that imperative alone, dictates and 
justifies resorting to repressive "decisionist" state action. In short, it dictates and 
justifies resorting to means outside of the democratic legal-political paradigm. 
The blatancy of Schmitt's terms to describe these calls for the temporary 
sacrifice of our Constitutional rights, and his overtly undemocratic assumptions 
to explain the premises underlying those calls, are an anathema to any self-
proclaimed democracy. However, despite the fact that his theories offer an 
accurate description and explanation of these calls, they remain a regular feature 
of South African society, which continues to ascribe to the democratic way. This 
fundamental inconsistency is explicable in terms of the traditional democratic 
paradigm, which has been rejected by the terms and tone of the Constitution. 
Public attitudes have however lagged behind in this rejection, thereby rendering 
the purported paradigm shift incomplete. Public attitudes, perceptions and the 























resultant ideology, in regard to matters of national security, remain bedded within 
the divisive "public/private" residue of that prior paradigm. Public ideology, 
which has seen calls for the effective exclusion of democratic and constitutional 
principles from the arena of national security, in the interest of self-preservation, 
cast back to, and find legitimacy in the theories of the traditional philosophers 
such as Rousseau and Locke. These theories have informed the liberal 
democratic tradition, a heritage which has substantially informed prevailing 
national security ideologies. This tradition, it is submitted is largely responsible 
for the perception that: 
... the problem of 'freedom' and the problem of 'security' for human 
beings in society are basically the same problem, looked at from two 
opposite angles.30 
This perception is in turn largely responsible for affording government 
greater discretion and power to infringe on our 'freedom', by force if necessary, 
to ensure "effective enforcement of a minimum of social order, our physical 
safety and well-being, our economy, our spiritual life itself. "31 
An example of this type of reaction and the resultant calls for more 
extensive and decisive government action and power is currently playing out in 
the Western Cape. This area is experiencing a crisis of "urban terrorism" caused 
by the alleged activities of the militant Muslim vigilante group known as 
P AGAD. The perceived inability and incapacity of the government officials 
responsible for the restoration of law and order, to put an end to this crisis, has 
elicited calls for special legislative measures to deal with urban terrorism. 
32 These calls translate into calls for legislation to confer extraordinary 
(discretionary) powers on government agencies responsible for policing matters 
such as urban terrorism, that is extraordinary in relation to existing legally 
prescribed and constrained powers. 
What is of course of concern is the fact that the pervasiveness of these 
attitudes are such that they are not limited in their application to individual and 
isolated instances of infringement of rights. The ideological assumptions 
underlying these attitudes in fact "set the general tone of discussion". 
33 The pervasiveness of these attitudes facilitate a move from ex post facto 
condonation of a specific infringement to a an a priori unquestioning 
acquiescence to, and condonation of a national security culture characterised by 
30 RN Berki Security and Society: Reflections on Law and Order and Politics, 1986, pl 
31 Cameron E, Ibid, p 508 
32 Saturday Argus, January 16/17 1999, pl 























extensive powers. It is these powers which hold the potential for the routine 
infringement of rights in the 'interests of national security'. In short, they found 
an ideology characterised, not by a recognition of the need for limitation of 
constitutional rights in terms of constitutional criteria, but one characterised by 
disdain for constitutionalism, in the national security arena. 
The danger herein, as pointed out by Cameron, is that the Constitution is 
the "first hedge we cut down in the struggle for social order. [Whereas] it should 
be the last". 34 
Any society shaped by perceptions and attitudes such as these of course 
exposes itself, in its unquestioning ethos, to the potential dangers of abuse of the 
extensive power conferred. In the context of freedom of information, it exposes 
society to the danger of abuse of power through the manipulation of information 
so as to mould and present it as information pertaining to security. The incentive 
to do so lies in the opportunity presented to capitalise on the prevailing ethos of 
acquiescence. This ethos may be capitalised on in the secure knowledge that the 
invocation of the term national security will preclude any significant level of 
questioning or calls for accountability, as reference to the term invokes emotive 
as opposed to rational responses. And of course that public acquiescence is then 
identified by those exercising these extraordinary powers as a source of 
legitimation for their conduct. The potential for this danger is echoed in the 
following statement by Peter Gastrow, the Western Cape Director's statement in 
response to the P AGAD "crisis": 
Lets deal with the situation in a rational, open and honest way without 
whipping up hysteria. Constant use of the word 'crisis' does not help, 
because that is when people fail to think rationally.35 
The irrational use of the security related term 'crisis' was recognised by 
him as laying the foundation for a slide down the "slippery slope" to uncontrolled 
and uncontrollable government power, in his statement that 
While I agree that extraordinary measures are needed to deal with urban 
terrorism, these must fall within the parameters of the Constitution. 36 
The first point to bear in mind in respect of claims to prevailing popular 
attitudes as a source of legitimacy is that any such claim is inherently 
unconstitutional. A fundamental premise of constitutional democracy is that 
34 Cameron, ibid, p5 l 0 
























democratic standards and questions of participation in power are not determined 
at the discretion of the dictator, or at the discretion of the "dictatorial 
collective". A constitutional democracy overtly and expressly displaces 
democracy in the sense of simple and absolute rule of the majority. It insists on 
the constraint of that rule within the prevailing constitutional framework. 
Majority rule is subject to the supremacy of the constitutional framework and the 
values enshrined therein. 37 
In addition, allegations of, or claims to popular legitimacy of the exercise 
of unconstitutional powers in the national security context, must be regarded 
skeptically. They depend on the validity and rationality of the prevailing popular 
perceptions founding popular ideology. These perceptions must themselves be 
regarded with skepticism given the power and incentive to manipulate the 
information on which those perceptions are based. In the national security 
context there exists the very real possibility that popular opinion is premised on 
incomplete, inaccurate, exaggerated and distorted information. 
The immediate solution to the danger inhering in prevailing popular 
ideology is to insist on external legislative and judicial enforcement of the 
Constitutional principles and directives. The long term solution, which is 
intrinsically linked with the right to freedom of information, is to ensure 
maximum enforcement of this right in the arena of national security. Maximum 
access to information by the public is a pre-requisite for the demystification of 
the term, which is in tum essential to the development of a constitutionally 
appropriate popular ideology. Information is essential to the success of a 
fundamental transformation of prevailing public ideology into a constitutionally 
appropriate ideology. Transformation depends on an informed public, who on the 
basis of complete and accurate information will be empowered to engage in 
rational, as opposed to emotive participation. 
8.6 Defining National Security in South Africa 
In the interim, until such time as popular and even judicial attitudes to 
questions of national security undergo the requisite transformation, the danger 
exists for the acceptance of unconstitutional claims for extended national 
security powers. This danger is, as in other jurisdictions, exacerbated by the 
flexibility and indeterminacy of the term national security. 
This flexibility and indeterminacy is directly related to the definition, or 
more specifically the lack of definition of the term 'national security'. Current 
South African legislation which regulates the interplay between information and 























national security pre-dates the Constitution, and is accordingly formulated in 
accordance with assumptions particular to the traditional democratic paradigm. 
This inevitably means that the relevant legislation fails to define national 
security. Therefore, when it affords the executive, and its administration, the 
power to decide to withhold information in the interests of national security, it 
effectively affords them the power to decide what in fact constitutes national 
security. 
In South Africa the resultant potentially extended ambit of national 
security, and the attendant ambit of extraordinary executive powers, is further 
complicated by the current climate of transformation. A systemic feature of this 
climate is a tendency toward an extended reconceptualisation of national 
security. The argument is that national security, in view of the diversity and 
reality of the dangers facing the security of South African citizens, can no longer 
be solely equated with 'political' violence and hostilities. The security of the 
state must, in terms of this school of thought, be redefined in holistic terms, as: 
... an all encompassing concept that enables the individual citizen to live in 
peace and harmony; to have equal access to resources and the basic 
necessities of life; to participate fully and freely in the process of 
governance; and to enjoy the protection of fundamental rights.38 
In short, national security must, in terms of this school of thought, be 
reconceptualised so as to include more than the traditional military dimensions of 
security, that is to say, the archetypal 'political' matters. It must include the 
'private', non-military, social and economic security dimensions of society. 
The proposed reconceptualisation of national security is predicated on the 
prevailing Constitutional vision of the developmental benefactor state. The state 
is obliged to respect, protect and develop its citizen's rights and freedoms. The 
ambit of this obligation is however not limited to the protection of the political 
rights and freedoms, traditionally encoded in constitutions, from external threats. 
It is fundamentally extended in accordance with the prevailing 
reconceptualisation of rights and freedoms. Fundamental rights and freedoms, as 
reflected in the Constitution, expressly connote the right to social justice and a 
qualitative life. Security of the state, or protection of the citizen's rights and 
freedoms must accordingly connote protection against threats posed to its 
citizen's social and economic rights. The state's protective role, that is to say, its 
security role, is premised on a vision of the state freed from the traditional 
public/private constraints of classical liberal theory, that is to say a state actively 























involved in the social and economic spheres of society. 
From a constitutional perspective, this signifies a first, and significant step 
in the rejection of the residual public/private template. However, it constitutes 
merely the first step which must be followed through in both the substance of 
legislative directives and in the practical implementation of those directives. In 
the absence of legislative activism and control, the constitutional context may 
simply serve as an expedient source of legitimacy for excessive executive action 
in the national security arena. The right to freedom of information, and by 
extension, the supremacy of democracy, may at the end of the day, be subject to 
an even greater corrosive threat, at the behest of an unaccountable executive 
branch of government. 
Should legislation, and the judiciary, continue to permit this branch an 
extensive, unreviewable discretion to define national security, and to identify 
threats to security, within the reconceptualised context of national security, their 
power may simply be extended. The reconceptualisation of national security 
dissolves the public/private division. Herein lies both its strength and its 
weakness. The traditional conceptualisation provided at least some, albeit an 
imprecise and indistinct, boundary as to the definition of the term. By extension, 
it offered as at least some constraint on the executive power to define. The 
connotations of the term "national security", and the resultant expansive 
authoritarian powers "legitimated" thereby, were to some extent inherently 
limited by the terms of reference of the traditional conceptualisation. The mere 
extended reconceptualisation of the term, as endorsed by the Constitution, could 
result in the dissolution of even this prior, albeit indistinct and imprecise 
constraint on the power of this branch in this arena. 
Should the dissolution of this division not be accompanied by a similar and 
concrete democratic reclamation of this extended arena through legislative and 
judicial activism, the end result may be a "legitimate" denial of access to an ever 
increasing body of information. 
The "public" sphere has up until now permissively precluded the intrusion 
of democratic ideals, practices and procedures. Not to actively follow through on 
the constitutional dissolution of the public/private divide could result in the 
extension of the ambit of the permissibly excluded public domain. Rather than 
being seen as an extension of the private, and hence, democratic domain, it could 
lead to the converse expansion of "the public" and the correlative expansion of 
that arena not susceptible to democracy. 
In view of the strength of both popular and judicial connotations attached 
to the mere label "national security", the danger is that by subsuming matters 
social and economic within its frame of reference, the mere invocation of the 




















"public" domain. Likewise, its mere invocation could lead to a greater body of 
information being "legitimately" precluded from the obligation to disclose, on the 
ground that disclosure would be contrary to national security, as determined by 
an unaccountable executive branch of government. 
8. 7 Current Practice - The Executive's Power to Define National Security 
in South Africa 
The South African legal system, like many of its international 
counterparts, does not provide a legislative definition of national security. Like 
its counterparts, it may be accused of conferring on the executive branch officials 
an expansive degree of discretion to define the term. A prime example of this 
may be found in The Protection of Information Act of 1982. This act prohibits 
the disclosure of information relating to matters traditionally regarded as falling 
within the national security arena, including information relating to the defence 
of the Republic, a military matter, or the prevention of terrorism. In addition, it 
prohibits the disclosure of information falling into the broad generic category of 
"security" information. 
The act fails to provide any guidance as to the content of these concepts, 
except in so far as it purports to define a 'security matter'. In terms of S 1 ( 1 )( c) a 
security matter is defined as: 
Any matter which is dealt with by the Agency or the Service as defined in 
section 1 of the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 or which relates to the 
functions of that Agency or Service or to the relationship existing between 
any person and that Agency or service. 
The 'Agency' is defined in terms of S 1 of The Intelligence Services Act 
as 'the National Intelligence agency; and the 'Service' as 'the South African 
Secret Service, the Intelligence Division of the National Defence Force and the 
National Investigation Service of the SAPS' .39 
The matters dealt with by the 'Agency' and its functions are set out in the 
National Strategic Intelligence Act No 39 of 1994: 
♦ Domestic intelligence, which is defined as intelligence on any internal 
activity, factor, or development which is detrimental to the national 
stability of the Republic, as well as potential threats to the constitutional 

























order of the Republic and the safety and well being of its people.40 
♦ Counter-intelligence, which is defined as measures and activities designed 
to counteract hostile intelligence operations, protect classified intelligence, 
to counter subversion, sabotage and terrorism. 41 
♦ Departmental intelligence, which is defined as intelligence regarding any · 
threat to the national security and stability of the country which falls 
within the functions of a department of state.42 
And the 'Agencies" functions are to -
Gather, correlate, evaluate and analyze the above intelligence; and on the 
basis thereof, to identify any threat or potential threat to the security of the 
Republic or its people. 
The relevant provisions dealing with the 'Service' are very similar 
in formulation, differing only in so far as the source of potential threats are 
referred to as external, rather than internal. 
Ultimately, the definition of a security matter, in terms of the aforesaid 
provisions, amounts to no more than the tautologous definition of matters 
concerning the national security and stability of the country. In addition, it 
implicitly anticipates the extension of the ambit of this unquantified concept to 
include matters falling outside of the traditional security arena. This extension is 
anticipated, by way of example, in the National Strategic Intelligence Act's 
reference to, not only the safety, but also the "well being" of society, as a matter 
dealt with by the 'Agency'. 
The definition is rendered no more specific by its reference to the 
traditional security terms such as subversion, sabotage and terrorism. Even these 
traditional security concepts remain undefined. The lack of definition in respect 
of these concepts is compounded by the fact that they were constitutive of crimes 
in terms of the Internal Security Act 7 4 of 1982, which act has since been 
repealed in its entirety. The repeal of this act constituted a rejection of the state 
sanctioned response and approach to issues such as these, within the broader 
context of a rejection of the previous dispensation's high handed approach to 
matters of national security. Viewed within this context, the repeal of the act left 
a legal vacuum, which to date has not been filled. One cannot even tum to the 
common law for guidance in regard to these terms or crimes, because, they, 
40 S l(ix) 
41 S l(v) 























unlike sedition and treason, do not constitute common law crimes. 
At the end of the day, the definition of these terms and the definition of 
national security is, in terms of the Protection of Information Act, left in the 
hands of the national security officials. This is clearly evidenced in both its 
failure to define the relevant terms and in its mandatory directive not to disclose 
information falling within these undefined categories. More specifically, in its 
mandatory directive that information which such official knows or reasonably 
ought to know falls within these categories, may not be disclosed. 
Section 4 of the Act , entitled Prohibition of Disclosure of Certain 
Information codifies this mandatory directive as follows: 
(1) Any person who has in his possession or under his control or at his 
disposal-
(b) any document, model, article or information -
(i) which he knows or reasonably should know is kept, used, made or 
obtained in a prohibited place or relates to a prohibited place, anything in a 
prohibited place, annaments, the defense of the Republic, a military 
matter, a security matter or the prevention or combating of terrorism .... 
And who-
(aa) discloses such ... to any person other than a person to whom he is 
authorised to disclose it or to whom it may be lawfully disclosed or to 
whom, in the interests of the republic, it is his duty to disclose ... 
.sh.a.lLbe guilty of an offence .... (my stress) 
The determination of what the highlighted categories encompass and 
whether certain information falls into those categories is left entirely at the 
discretion of the person in possession thereof, which in practice, is usually the 
national security official. Further, the official is prohibited from disclosing all 
information falling into those categories, irrespective of whether or not such 
disclosure would harm the national security interests of the country. Accordingly, 
this Act , in effect prescribes the mandatory wholesale exclusion of all 
information in the ambiguous arena of national security, at the sole discretion of 
the national security official. 
The Protection of Information Act, for these reasons, poses an inherent 
threat to the democratic status of the right of access to information. This threat 
manifests itself in the unrestrained discretion afforded the national security 























national security, and in its failure to impose a duty on that official to weigh the 
hann of disclosure against the right to information. In the context of national 
security information this right is, despite its constitutionalisation, displaced in its 
entirety by the breadth of the Act's mandatory directive. 
The extent of the potential damage inhering in this Act, which is 
admittedly the product of another era which pre-dates the Constitution, is not 
mitigated by the possibility of ex post facto control by the judiciary. Judicial 
review in this arena is inherently problematic in view of prevailing judicial 
ideology. The prevailing judicial ideology is in fact confirmed and aggravated by 
the terms of this Act. There is nothing in the Act to nudge the judiciary toward 
adopting a more Constitutionally appropriate approach. In fact, the terms and the 
tone of the Act encourage and entrench an inappropriate approach. The court is 
invited to regard decisions taken in terms of the Act as non-justiciable. This 
invitation lies in the mandatory tone and terms; the Act's imposition of a criminal 
penalty for disclosure; and by its failure to define the relevant terms, which 
failure may unequivocally be interpreted as a legitimate source of extensive 
discretionary power to define and decide. The court is invited to retain its 
traditional approach, more suited to the pre-constitutional dispensation, by more 
than the terms of the Act. It is invited to do so by the prevailing legislative 
attitude of condonation of the breadth and extent of the powers conferred by this 
act. This legislative attitude of condonation is evidenced by the legislature's 
failure to amend this Act subsequent to the passing of the Constitution, so as to 
bring it in line with the dictates of the shifted democratic paradigm. The 
legislature's failure in this regard is clearly indicative of it remaining mired 
within the residual traditional paradigm's public/private perspective in regard to 
national security matters. It constitutes concrete evidence of the fact that the 
paradigm shift in South Africa has not been complete, and it affords the judiciary 
the ideological space to follow its traditional course. 
Judicial conservatism and legislative inertia certainly provide the space for 
the executive branch and its administration to draw on its definitive powers 
granted by the Protection of Information Act, to take the initiative in 
reconceptualising the term national security. The Act, in its reference to the 
extremely broad term, 'security matter', allows the scope for an extension of the 
arena of national security beyond its traditional boundaries. This undefined term 
is specified as a national security category alongside, and therefore, in addition, 
to the traditional national security categories such as subversion, terrorism and 
defence of the republic. Once placed within the context of the drive for a 
reconceptualisation of national security, the Act empowers the executive branch 
to extend the ambit of the national security arena beyond those traditional 























and economic stability of the country, and threats thereto, within the ambit of the 
_ subject matter covered by its draconian provisions. 
By implication, should claims of non-disclosure of information on the 
grounds of national security be allowed to prevail and go untested, the 
consequences would be profound for the right to freedom of access to 
government held information. By extension, this right could be denied across the 
fullest spectrum of information. The denial of access to information, and 
confinnation of that denial by a deferential judiciary, on the grounds of the 
interests of national security, would include the denial of a vast and new arena of 
information previously outside of the traditional ambit of national security. 
The traditional 'narrow' view of national security which has dominated 
official thinking for many years is reflected in the following definition: 
The ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to 
maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable 
terms; to protect its nature, institutions and governance from disruptions 
from outside; and to control its borders .... as the condition of freedom from 
external physical threat which a nation state enjoys ... .it is really physical 
violence which is generally perceived to be .... the real and tangible danger 
to its survival. [ and also as] The preservation of the reigning political 
structure against any change, save change through channels which that 
structure has previously defined as legitimate.43 
The traditional definition, over time, crystallised into a number of 
identifiable threats. Simon Baynham, writing in 1990, identified the following as 
traditional threats to the national security of South Africa: 
♦ The sustained build-up of high-tech military hardware in nearby states. 
♦ Problems with the procurement of military equipment due to an arms 
embargo. 
♦ Poor relations with neighboring states. 
♦ Civil war and increased political strife in neighboring states. 
♦ Continued threats of violence by both left and right wing extremists. 
♦ Increased ethnic, racial and class conflict. 
♦ Increased militancy due to increasing unemployment and urbanisation. 44 
The sufficiency of this traditional approach to national security has 
43 ProfM Hough, 'National Security and Strategic Doctrine in the RSA' in~. October 1990, p54 























however increasingly been questioned. It has been criticised for its inability to 
accommodate contemporary South African realities in its failure to take into 
account the full range of security issues facing South Africans today. 
179 
Maxi van Aardt is one such critic who argues that the real dangers 
constituting a threat to our national security are in fact no longer the threats 
falling within the traditional national security paradigm. Instead the greatest 
threats to our nation's security emanate from civil unrest, migration, diseases, 
drought, famine, environmental degradation, debt and unemployment. In short, 
van Aardt argues that the biggest singular threat to our national security is "the 
very survival of human collectivities".45 
This view is echoed by that of Prof Hough who similarly argues that South 
Africa, like other third world countries, is faced with a unique security dilemma, 
characterised by poverty, scarce resources, the need for institution building and 
respect and personal dignity. 46 
Both of these writers argue that national security ought to be redefined in 
accordance with the real location of threats to our national survival. In addition, a 
reconceptualisation not only requires a redefinition of national security, but a 
reassessment and redefinition of national security objectives. The primary 
national security objectives, argues van Aardt, should focus, not on the mere 
maintenance, but on the actual provision of security. 47 
This seems to suggest that national security must focus on addressing and 
remedying the causes of unrest, insecurity and related threats to the stability of 
the country, as opposed to merely attempting to suppress and avoid the physical 
symptoms which generally find expression in violence and discord. In achieving 
this objective national security must by necessity be seen as a broader concept 
than mere military preparedness.48 
These concerns and criticisms have not been limited to the ranks of 
academic writers, but have found expression from within government. They have 
been taken into account and driven the state's initiative to reconceptualise 
national security. The resultant reconceptualisation has, most notably, taken 
place within the context of the security related agencies of the South African 
government. The location for the discussion of the need for a reconceptualisation 
has been within the context of the traditional military-security agencies, such as 
defence and intelligence agencies. The reconceptualisation has not necessarily 
been accompanied by a re-evaluation as to which agencies are responsible for the 
45 M van Aardt, 'In Search of a more Adequate Conceptualisation of Security for Southern Africa: Do we need 
a feminist touch' (1993) Vol 20, nol, June, Politikol!, p58 
46 Hough, M, ibid, 58 
47 van Aardt, ibid, p 61 























provision and protection of the nation's extended security. The extended security 
matters are still eminently regarded as falling within the domain of the traditional 
defenders of security. This is cause for concern as it is reflective of an attitude 
which seeks to militarise all aspects of national security, rather than one which 
seeks to demilitarise the notion of security. The danger in this failure to invert the 
military emphasis is that if national security in all respects is militarised, it is 
implicitly located, in its extended version within the political domain in which 
extraordinary powers are the norm. 
This militarised location of the extended reconceptualised national security 
is evidenced by the fact that it is dealt with, at a state level, in both the Draft 
White Paper on National Defence49 as well as the White Paper on Intelligence50 . 
They have, in their tone and content, been informed by concerns to extend the 
ambit of national security. 
Chapter 2 of the Draft White Paper on Defence, entitled 'The Challenge of 
Transformation', commences with a discussion of 'National Security Policy and 
the RDP'. The content and tone of this discussion reveals a decisive shift toward 
the broader understanding of national security, which is encoded in the reflected 
in the chosen definition of security, as: 
.. an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizen's live in 
freedom, peace and safety; participate full in the process of governance; 
enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and 
the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not 
detrimental to their health and well being. 51 
The content and tone of the framework set out by the White Paper on 
Intelligence reveals a similar approach to that adopted by the defence draft paper. 
That is to say, it adopts a broader approach to the content of national security, 
and accordingly, a broader vision of the role and function of intelligence agencies 
in South Africa. 
The White paper devotes an entire section, entitled 'Towards a new 
national security doctrine', to this issue. It identifies the traditional narrow 
approach to security and the corresponding role and function of intelligence as 
follows: 
The traditional and more narrow approach to security has emphasised 
49 Defence in a Democracy: Draft White Paper on National Defence For the Republic of South Africa, 21 June 
1995 
























military threats and the need for strong counter-action. Emphasis was 
accordingly placed on the ability of the state to secure its physical survival, 
territorial integrity and the independence, as well as its ability to maintain 
law and order within its boundaries. In this framework, the classic function 
of intelligence has been the identification of military and paramilitary 
threats or potential threats endangering these core interests, as well as the 
evaluation of enemy intentions and capabilities. 52 
The White Paper then proceeds to reject this 'military-strategic' approach 
to security in favour of 'security in the modem idiom', in other words security in: 
... more comprehensive terms [which] correspond with new realities since 
the end of the Cold War era. [Which] realities include the importance of 
non-military elements of security, the complex nature of threats to stability 
and development, and the reality of international interdependence. 53 
The White Paper advances two reasons for adopting this new approach. 
First, it is in accord with the international security agenda which is shifting to the 
full range of political, economic, military, social, religious, technological, ethnic 
and ethical factors that shape security issues. Second, following this international 
trend, the White Paper recognises that the main threat to the well-being of 
individuals and interests of the nation is not a neighboring army, but internal and 
external challenges such as economic collapse, overpopulation, mass migration, 
ethnic rivalry, political oppression, terrorism, crime and disease.54 
Following on from the above framework, the following key features are 







Security is conceived as a holistic phenomenon and incorporates political, 
social, economic and environmental issues. 
The objectives of security policy go beyond achieving an absence of war 
to encompass the pursuit of democracy, sustainable economic 
development and social justice. 
Regional security policy seeks to advance the principles of collective 























In practice, this, in tenns of the White Paper means that: 
The broader and modem interpretation of the nature and scope of security 
leads to the conclusion that security policy must deal effectively with the 
broader and more complex questions relating to the vulnerability of 
society. National security objectives should therefore encompass the basic 
principles and core values associated with a better quality of life, freedom, 
social justice, prosperity and development. 55 
As laudable as the sentiments underlying the expansion of the ambit of 
national security might be, there remains nonetheless a danger in the contextual 
location of the extension of that ambit. In the absence of fundamental changes in 
prevailing popular, judicial and national security branch ideology, the danger for 
the integrity of the democratic right to freedom of infonnation is clear - a 
correlative incremental malignant encroachment on the ambit of the right to 
freedom of infonnation. 
8.8 Reconciling The Right To Freedom Of Information And The Interests 
Of National Security In South Africa - Recognition Of The Dilemma 
And Solutions Thereto, Actual And Proposed 
The White Paper on Intelligence, having extended the ambit of national 
security, implicitly recognizes the potential danger inhering therein. It recognises 
the potentially unacceptable consequences for the attainment of the standards 
and ideals dictated by the Constitutional vision of a Sovereign, Constitutional 
Democracy. It recognises that these consequences can only be avoided if the 
prevailing national security branch's ideology is transfonned so as to render it 
Constitutionally appropriate. It recognises that achieving this change will require 
a fundamental transfonnation of the intelligence community, its attitudes, 
functions and methodology. 
The White Paper accepts that: 
The creation of a new intelligence dispensation in South Africa [must] be 
accompanied by a review of the underlying principles of the system to be 
transfonned. 
It implicitly realises that the democratisation of South Africa will be 






















meaningless unless it extends to all spheres of government, including the 
'transformation and democratisation of the intelligence community. ' 56 
183 
Transformation and democratisation is recognised, within this context as 
requiring recognition and implementation of, inter alia, the following principles: 
1. Political neutrality, 
2. Legislative sanction, accountability and parliamentary control, 
3. The balance between secrecy and transparency, 
4. The separation of intelligence from policy making. 57 
Having recognised the need for democratisation of this branch of 
government, the White Paper proceeds to formulate proposals for the concrete 
implementation of the aforesaid principles. These proposals include, inter alia, a 
Code of Conduct to govern the performance and activities of individual members 
of the intelligence services, guidelines as to the composition of the intelligence 
community and mechanisms for the control and coordination of intelligence. 
The primary focus of the paper appears to fall on legislative control and 
coordination of the intelligence role and function. In so doing, it recognises that 
transformation at an administrative level will depend on legislative initiative and 
guidance. U1timately, constitutionally appropriate, and sufficiently detailed 
legislative control and guidance must be the first step toward transformation at an 
administrative level of government. A commitment by the intelligence 
community to the rule of law will automatically, in the presence of legislative 
control, go a long way to ensuring constitutionally appropriate conduct and 
attitudes by the intelligence community. 
Accordingly, the primary route for ensuring compliance with these 
principles appears to be legislative control through: 
♦ A clearly defined legal mandate; 
♦ Parliamentary oversight; 
♦ Budgetary control and 
♦ Ministerial Accountability. 
These proposals, by virtue of their focus, clearly seek to address one of 
























the primary issues raised during the course of this thesis, namely the control of 
discretionary power. Control of discretionary power is accordingly implicitly 
recognised as the route to democratic governance which requires that: 
... the government must exercise meaningful control over the intelligence 
community through a range of measures: the separation of intelligence 
functions; obliging the agencies to operate in a legal capacity; controlling 
access to the executive; and differentiating the functions of collection, 
reporting, coordinating and review. 58 
The term 'government' here is used to connote the legislative branch of 
government, which, as the representative's of the demos must engage in prior, 
ongoing control by means of a clearly defined legal mandate. In addition, it must 
engage in posterior oversight to ensure compliance with its prescriptive mandate. 
These steps are required to ensure that the legislature or Parliament, as 
representatives of the demos, subordinate the administrative branch to its 
sovereign power. 
These proposals have to some extent been put into practice, most notably 
in the form of the Committee of Members of Parliament on and Inspectors-
General of Intelligence Act. 59 This Act established a parliamentary committee on 
intelligence, consisting of a number of members of parliament. This committee is 
assigned the task of reviewing and making recommendations in respect of the 
role and conduct of the intelligence agencies, as well as in respect of any 
proposed legislation relating to the intelligence agencies. 
This Act, in recognition of the fact that parliamentary control will be 
meaningless in an information vacuum, directly addresses the issue of legislative 
access to information in the 'national security arena'. It affords the committee 
access to intelligence, information and documents held by the intelligence 
agencies, under certain circumstances. 60 It must be noted that the Committee is 
not granted a general right to such information, but is granted a conditional right. 
It is entitled to this information, only to the extent that it is necessary for the 
performance of the Committees functions, and further, provided the information 
does not contain details of the name or identity of any person or body engaged in 
intelligence activities, or of a confidential source of that information. The Act 
does make provision for the resolution of any dispute in this regard by way of 
referral thereof to a committee composed of the Inspector - General responsible 
for the service concerned, the head of the Service, the chairperson of the 
58 Ibid, pll 
59 Act No. 40, 1994 























Committee and the relevant Minister. This committee constitutes the final arbiter 
in matters such as these and as such there is no question of an appeal to a further 
body or court of law. 
As such, the right of access to information by the legislative branch of 
government is a limited right. The extent of that limitation, and by extension, the 
extent of the committee's right to information,·is effectively determined by the 
holder of the information. Ultimately it is the holder of the information who is 
afforded the discretionary power to determine whether or not the Committee 
requires certain information to perform its designated function, or whether it falls 
outside one of the other specified conditions. This limitation, although subject to 
review by an external body, headed by an independent objective third party, is, it 
is submitted unsatisfactory. The potential for the exclusion of information from 
the purview of the Committee is significant. 
In addition, this limitation is unnecessary, in view of the multitude of 
safety mechanisms built into the Act to prevent leaks from the committee. Firstly, 
the committee is comprised of only a limited number of members of parliament 
and secondly, the members of the committee are, as in the case of the 
intelligence service, obliged to handle the information in accordance with 
prevailing security guidelines.61 
These limitations are rendered all the more problematic in view of the fact 
that this Act and all other acts remain silent on the public's right, or the rights of 
parliamentarians not part of the committee, to access to 'national security' 
information. In the absence of direct legislative regulation in this regard, this 
right remains regulated by the existing legal framework, of which The Protection 
of Information Act, which has to date not been repealed or amended, forms an 
integral part. The lack of definition in the Protection of Information Act and the 
extensive discretionary powers granted in terms thereof to the executive branch 
of government, has not been remedied or supplemented by any subsequent 
legislation. Accordingly, the public's access to information in the 'national 
security' arena has not been addressed or brought into line with the stated 
objective of the democratisation of the government's national security function. 
The Committee of Members of Parliament on and Inspectors-General of 
Intelligence Act is not sufficient to guarantee the democratisation of the national 
security arena, most notably, with regard to access to information. The Act's 
provision for parliamentary oversight is insufficient as this route is only one of 
the many solutions required. In addition, the form of parliamentary oversight 
provided for by the Act is limited in two respects. It is limited by the limited 
focus and ambit of the Act. It is also limited by the nature of the oversight 























process. It is a formal intermittent procedure which by its very nature will ensure 
oversight of only a limited number of"big" issues. The numerous daily, mundane 
decisions made during the routine business of the national security functionaries, 
and by implication, those decisions which have the potential to effect our daily 
lives, are implicitly beyond the purview of the Act. As a whole the Act is limited 
by the fact that it anticipates, to a large extent, posterior parliamentary oversight, 
rather than consistent prior legislative control of discretionary power implicit in 
this arena. There have been no significant legislative measures in this regard. 
The public's prior and routine right to 'national security' information 
requires express clarification and overt protection in view of the dangers for 
democracy should that right be left to determination by the executive branch of 
government, or alternatively, determination by a reluctant judiciary. 
The Open Democracy Bill has recognised this need and sought to address 
it in its recognition and formulation of the prior right of access to information. In 
addition, it has recognised, and sought to address the dilemmas posed for this 
right in the national security arena in its formulation of a 'national security' 
exemption. 
Clause 3 7 of the Bill, entitled Defence and security of Republic states that: 
(1) The information officer of a government body may refuse a request 
for access to a record of the body if its disclosure would be likely to 





frustrating any measure for the prevention, detection or 
suppression of -
(i) aggression against the Republic; 
( ii) sabotage or terrorism aimed at the people of the 
republic or a strategic asset of the republic, whether 
inside or outside the Republic; 
(iii) an activity aimed at changing the Constitutional order 
of the republic by the use of force or violence; or 
(iv) a foreign hostile intelligence operation; 
jeopardising the effectiveness of a government body, branch 
of that body or person responsible for the prevention, 
detection or suppression of an activity contemplated in 
paragraph (a)(i),(ii),(iii) or (iv) by disclosing its or his or her 
capabilities, deployment or performances; 
jeapordise the effectiveness of-
( i) arms; or 























cryptographic systems, used or intended to be 
used ..... by disclosing their or its capabilities, quantity, 
deployment or performance; or 
( d) jeopardising the effectiveness of methods or equipment for 
collecting, assessing or handling information used for the 
prevention, detection or suppression of an activity 
contemplated in paragraph (a)( i- iv), or disclosing the 
identity of a confidential source of information used for that 
purpose. 
8.9 Evaluation Of The Open Democracy Bill's 'National Security' 
Exemption 
The Bill's exemption clearly seeks to address many of the problems 
relating to the reconciliation of freedom of information and national security as 
discussed during the course of this thesis. In view of the fact that the primary 
source of these problems is to be found in the conferral of extensive discretionary 
powers on the executive, not only in respect of the decision not to disclose, but 
also in the power to define national security, the focus of the };3ill' s exemption is 
the constraint of that discretion. 
The exercise of discretion to withhold information in the interests of 
national security is first and foremost constrained by the imposition of a duty on 
the decision-maker to actively engage in a process of the weighing of competing 
interests. Further, in evaluating the weight of the interests, refusal of disclosure is 
permitted only in the event that such disclosure would cause real and not mere 
speculative harm. 
The focus of the exemption is accordingly directed toward the protection 
of information, the content of which requires exemption, as opposed to the 
privilege of broad categories of information characterised by the source of the 
information or the protection of particular government departments.62 
This emphasis on the content as the determining factor qualifying 
information as exempt, is carried further as a mechanism of constraining 
discretion, in the specific delineation or definition of national security 
information. The Bill has followed the Canadian example in setting out detailed 
definitions as to what qualifies as 'national security' information. In other words, 
it provides a definition of national security for the purpose of freedom of 
information, or more specifically, for the purpose of denying access to requested 
information. 























The Bill seeks through this drafting techniques to prevent a tendency 
toward arbitrary blanket secrecy practices, which endeavor is carried further by 
the fact that the invocation of the exemption is rendered discretionary, as 
opposed to mandatory in the event of information in fact falling within the 
exempt category. 63 
The Bill's emphasis on the constraint of discretion as a necessary 
concomitant of a democratic society finds unequivocal expression in its public 
interest override clause. Clause 45, obliges the disclosure of information, 
including information falling within the 'national security' exemption, should 
public interest warrant it. In instances such as these, the discretion to withhold is 
entirely eradicated if the interests of open, accountable and participatory 
administration outweigh the need for protection of information. This clause 
amounts as such to an unequivocal affirmation of the elevated status of the right 
to information in an open and democratic society, vis-a-vis, the interests of 
national security. 
The Bill, as is apparent from the aforesaid sampling of its provisions, 
clearly commences from the point of prior prevention of abuse of discretion, 
rather than merely focusing on the ex post facto control thereof. It is concerned 
with prevention rather than a cure. The focus on prevention through the prior 
constraint of discretion is further evidenced by the Bill's failure to include, as in 
the American and Australian Acts, as an exempt category, information which is 
protected by any other secrecy legislation. The Bill accordingly addresses the 
lacunae permitted in the other systems for the exercise of discretionary powers to 
disclose and to define categories of exempt information, in terms of legislation, 
other than the freedom of information legislation. The Bill expressly precludes 
the possibility of refusal of access in terms of such legislation which permits or 
obliges non-disclosure on terms other than those stated in the Bill. Any such 
legislative authorisation of the exercise of discretionary power would, in terms of 
Article 2, be invalid as ground for non-disclosure as, in terms of article 2: 
This Act applies despite any other legislation whether that legislation came 
into effect before or after the commencement of this section. 
Therefore, in theory, the Protection of Information Act and its broad 
discretionary terms would, in terms of the above provision, be rendered subject 
to the terms of the Bill. The refusal of access to information on the grounds 
stated in the Act, which differ in style and content from the Bill's provisions, 
63 Article 29 (b): The information officer ... !!YU'. refuse a request for access to a record contemplated in 























would be unlawful. However, it remains to be seen whether the Bill will be 
passed in its current form. The extremity of the difference between the terms and 
the tone of the Bill and the Protection of Information Act is indicative of the fact 
that they are the products of polar ideologies. The Bill's provision that it prevails 
over any other legislation constitutes an articulation of the victory of its root 
ideology. Accordingly, the passing of the Bill in its current form will constitute 
the last step required to complete the current democratic paradigm shift. If it is 
passed, the Protection of Information Act will have to be revised in its entirety. 
Whether this step will come to fruition remains to be seen as the Bill must be 
passed by the same legislature which has to date left the Protection of 
Information Act untouched. 
The Bill's focus on a priori prevention, the detailed regulation of 
discretion, and the attendant effective presumption in favour of disclosure which 
is given effect to by the positive duties imposed on government to disclose at all 
costs, subject to severely curtailed limitations, is indicative of the fact that 
The Bill is more than the sum of its parts and more than a change in the 
law. It is about creating a new culture; both inside and outside government 
in which openness in government is practiced in the spirit as well as the 
letter of the law and that government information is available for 
inspection by the real owners of the information -the public.64 
In short it seeks to re-invest in the public its democratic entitlement to 
sovereignty in the national security arena. In short, it seeks to confirm the public' 
final control of the agenda. 
The Bill's focus on prior legislative control, limitation and even prevention 
of the exercise of discretionary powers is supplemented by its provision for ex 
post facto control of the exercise of that power through a number of mechanisms 
designed to give effect to the dictates of accountability. Having set the lawful 
parameters of the exercise of the discretionary power to withhold information in 
the interests of national security, a number of mechanisms are established to 
ensure that any exercise of that discretion complies with the lawful criteria set 
out in the Bill. 
The first of these mechanisms is a general duty on the information officer 
who refuses a request for access to information, to notify the requester of that 
decision and to furnish the requester with the reasons for that decision, including: 
♦ the findings on all material questions of fact, referring to the material on 























·which those findings were based; 
♦ the reasons for the refusal (including the provision of this Act relied upon 
to justify the refusal) in such manner as to enable the requester to 
understand the justification for the refusal and make an informed decision 
about whether to lodge an internal appeal with the head of the 
governmental body or to utilise any other remedy in law available to the 
requester; and 
♦ that the requester may lodge an internal appeal with the head of the 
governmental body against the refusal of the request, and the procedure 
for lodging the internal appeal.65 
This duty clearly also applies to a denial of access to information 
in terms of the 'national security' exemption, as evidenced by its expansive and 
detailed formulation. It is clearly, in its formulation, premised on the control of 
discretion in terms of the criteria of rationality. Any refusal of access must be 
rational as opposed to arbitrary, and the decision-maker is required to justify its 
decision in rational terms as determined and sanctioned by the Bill. 
The culture of justification and accountability is further entrenched in the 
availability of an appeal to the head of the relevant department. Clearly however 
an appeal to the head of the department alone is insufficient in that the appeal 
does not lie to an independent objective outsider. 
This problem is to some extent addressed by the Bill's provision for 
applications to the High Court in respect of a decision by the information officer 
or the Head of the Department on internal appeal.66 In terms of this provision an 
applicant refused access on appeal, either by the information officer or Head of 
Department, may make application to the High Court for appropriate relief. The 
Bill does not expressly confer on the High Court an appeal jurisdiction, but rather 
an extended review jurisdiction to determine if the refusal of access to 
information is in fact justified in terms of the Bill's exemptions. The nature of the 
court's power is extrapolated from clause 79, which clearly and unequivocally 
places the onus of proof that the refusal is justified in terms of the Bill, on the 
government department claiming the exemption. In terms of this article, the High 
Court's power is evidenced by the wording of article 79, which specifies that in 
any application brought in terms of Chapter 2, which deals with Court 
applications, the onus is as specified. The Court is therefore empowered to 
determine the justifiability of the decision sought to be reviewed in relation to the 
criteria as set out in the Bill. The Court's extended review power is clearly 
65 Article 20(1) & (2)(b) 























intended to extend to all claims of refusal of access, including refusal on 
'national security' grounds. In addition the standard of review is no lower in this 
arena than in other arenas, as is evidenced by Clause 78 which expressly states 
that the Court, in reviewing the decision, "may examine any record of a 
government body to which this Act applies, and no such record may be 
withheld from the court on any grounds." (my stress) The Bill makes 
provision for the balancing of the Court's power to examine all records and the 
need for protection of certain information from disclosure for good reason. 
However in the presence of good reason, determined according to the criteria set 
out in the Bill's exemption clauses, the Court is not precluded from access, it is 
simply precluded from disclosing that information to any other person. 
Its extended review power is further substantiated by the remedial powers 
granted to it in terms of clause 80. In terms of this clause, the Court is entitled to 
"make any order or other decision which it considers just", including but not 
limited to: 
(a) confirming, amending or setting aside the decision which is the subject of 
the application in question. 67 
The power to set aside a decision in the context of a refusal to access to 
requested information must by implication connote the power to reverse that 
decision, and effectively substitute the original decision with that of the courts. 
That is to say, should the court decide to set aside the decision, and should this 
not imply that the decision is in effect reversed, this remedy would be rendered 
meaningless. Therefore, the power to set aside the decision effectively amounts 
to the power of appeal or substantive review of the merits, as the setting aside of 
the decision amounts to remaking the original decision in response to the request 
for information. 
This lengthy analysis of the Court's implied extended powers of 
substantive review is necessitated by the fact that the Bill is not expressly clear 
in its statement as to the court's powers. It does not unequivocally indicate the 
precise power of the court. In other words, whether it is afforded a review or an 
appeal function. The aforesaid discussion reveals that the Bill appears to clothe 
the court's powers in the language of review, but the content of the provisions 
are more indicative of an appeal function. 
The Bill's approach to this issue is entirely unsatisfactory. Firstly because, 
in the absence of affording the court the power of appeal, it fails to deliver on the 
full implementation of the necessity for appeal from the decision of the original 























decision-maker to an independent, objective and impartial body. This 
requirement is necessitated by the status and importance of the right to freedom 
of information. 
The second problem with the Bill's approach to, and its formulation of the 
Court's powers, is the space it implicitly permits for a conservative court to avoid 
engaging in substantive review of the overtly political issue of denial of access to 
information on the ground that it would be contrary to the interests of national 
security. The court, in the absence of an express directive to engage in de novo 
review, may well be afforded the opportunity to follow the approach adopted by 
courts in other jurisdictions. The courts may, in terms of the Bill, decline to 
subject the decision-maker's reasoning as based on the alleged facts to any 
meaningful degree of scrutiny. 
The solution to this problem is, as argued in the previous chapter, the 
creation of an independent and impartial suitably qualified administrative appeals 
'national security tribunal'. A tribunal of this nature, specifically mandated to 
review decisions not to disclose information on the grounds relating to national 
security, de novo, will negate the need for the Bill's ambiguity. 
The argument in favour of this route as a viable and effective mechanism 
for the implementation of the requisite degree of scrutiny and accountability is 
strengthened by the available evidence as to its feasibility and practical 
attainability. One simply has to peruse the decision of the Commission of Inquiry 
Into Alleged Arms Transactions Between Armscor and One Eli Wazan and 
Other Related Matters68. This Commission of Inquiry was set up as an 
independent tribunal, outside of the ordinary court structures. During the course 
of its investigations it was presented with the argument that certain information 
sought by it could not be disclosed as such disclosure would be contrary to the 
interests of national security. The Commission subjected the claim, on the basis 
of the merits presented in support thereof, to substantive intensive review and 
found that the claim was not justified. The Commission, exhibited none of the 
restraint evidenced by the courts in the past and still even today, in asserting its 
power of review over matters of national security. It in fact asserted that, in view 
of the importance of the right to access to information in an open and democratic 
society, the standard of review and the requirements to discharge' the onus on the 
claimant that such right should be displaced, was substantial. In discharging this 
onus, the state was required to tender substantial proof in support of its 
allegation of harm, and further had to prove that the likelihood of harm was both 
realistic and persuasive. That is to say, the state's conclusion as to the actuality 























of harm, had to be based on concrete factual detail. 69 
It is submitted that this decision and the forum within which it took place 
has much to offer by way of illustration as to the way forward in resolving 
disputes between claims to access to information and claims of harm to national 
security in a sovereign constitutional democracy. 
8.10 Some Concluding Points 
The preceding discussion in respect of the Open Democracy Bill, and 
related information legislation, does not purport to be definitive or 
comprehensive. It has focused on only a limited number of a multitude of 
relevant provisions and issues arising out of those provisions, within the context 
of this thesis. The provisions discussed have been selected with a view to 
illustrating the complexity of the matter at hand and the resultant complexity in 
isolating and implementing appropriate solutions in response thereto. 
The one conclusion that may be drawn with certainty is that the issue of 
reconciling national security interests and the right of access to information in a 
sovereign, constitutional democracy, is complex and difficult to address. South 
Africa has however, more so than other jurisdictions, recognised the issue for 
what it is: A question of sovereignty. 
South Africa has accordingly, unlike other jurisdictions, expressly 
constitutionalised the right to freedom of information, in recognition of the fact 
that one is dealing with a question of power. 
In addition, it has been recognised that the mere constitutionalisation of 
the right is insufficient, especially within the context of national security. The 
complexity of the relationship and the immensity of the tension between these 
two potentially conflicting interests has necessitated a programme of legislative 
reform, not only in the arena of the right to information, but also in the arena of 
national security. This programme of reform has sought to address many of the 
problems and criticisms directed at the legal systems of other jurisdictions. 
The South African legal system has illustrated an attempted practical 
implementation of the theoretical proposals for reform which have been put 
forward with a view to reconciling freedom of information and national security 
in a sovereign, constitutional democracy. 
The South African steps in this regard are still, to a large extent, tentative 
and in their infancy. It is at this stage that the system must be evaluated and any 
problems and omissions addressed. The South African legal system certainly 
does exhibit a number of problems and omissions which may hinder or frustrate 























the reconciliation of the two issues. 
These problems and omissions must be addressed now, •prior to the 
system becoming concretised and fixed, as this concretisation usually goes hand 
in hand with the concretisation of judicial, public and administrative attitudes and 
responses to the issue at hand. The danger is that should such attitudes, as 
influenced and determined by an inadequate system, become fixed, any 
subsequent realisation of the inadequacy of the system, and the mere amendment 
of that legal system will be rendered insufficient to rectify the problems at hand. 
The mere amendment of the legal system will not guarantee the requisite 
fundamental transformation of the entrenched underlying attitudes and values. 
A failure to address the current inadequacies and omissions so as to ensure 
maximum access to information in the national security arena will have 
enormous consequences, not only for democracy, but also for the demos directly 
as a collective body. The direct harm which may be inflicted in the absence of 
effective and comprehensive restraints and checks dictates that the focus at all 
times must be on prevention rather than a cure. In the arena of national security, 
focusing on a cure often amounts to no more than "too little, too late". 
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